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Abstract
The objective of this dissertation is to systematize the existing hypotheses in the
electoral engineering literature and to test them in a set of selected case studies in order to
answer a central question: does the electoral system affect the structure of political parties in
ethnically divided societies and if so how? The academic debate on electoral design for
divided societies has focused on the impact of institutional choices on ultimate conflict
outcomes. The findings of previous studies have been generally inconclusive, while the lack
of sub-national data on ethnic composition and voting patterns has made it difficult to
examine mechanisms regarding the role of demographics. To approach the problem from a
different angle, I propose a research design focusing on the intermediate link from electoral
institutions to the ethnic structure of the party system. For the empirical portion of my work,
I chose to conduct a structured historical comparison of four societies which implemented
major electoral reforms: Turkey, Northern Ireland, Guyana, and Sri Lanka. Based on the
study of these cases, I am arguing that politicians and voters have not responded to electoral
incentives in the ways predicted by existent theories, and that no clear relationship can be
observed between the electoral system's proportionality, the heterogeneity of electoral
constituencies, and the number of parties or the types of ethnic appeals they make to voters.
These findings indicate that the hopes placed in electoral system design for divided societies
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BALLOT BOX AND TINDER BOX
CAN ELECTORAL ENGINEERING SAVE MULTIETHNIC DEMOCRACY?
Introduction
The larger puzzle motivating this study is not new, but it is painfully persistent: can
multiethnic democracy be designed? Some multiethnic societies seem to have attained an
envied condition where, despite occasional tensions, democracy and diversity thrive, while
other less fortunate ones are struggling with deadlock and violence. Can the latter emulate
the former by copying certain political institutions, and if so, which institutions are the most
critical? By the 2 1st century, several conflicts around the world have proven persistent and
deadly enough to gain their place in a putative list of places with politics considered too
divisive for democracy to easily take root. From Afghanistan and Iraq to Sub-Saharan Africa,
and from the Balkans to East Timor and Fiji, every time such a conflict-ridden society makes
an effort to transition or re-transition to democracy, either on its own or under international
tutelage, institutional choices have to be made. A fundamental one is the selection of the
electoral system.
A lively academic debate with direct policy implications revolves around the best
way to devise electoral systems for divided societies. In the last two decades the international
community designed the electoral systems of several countries behind closed doors and the
choices it made were often criticized for their effectiveness. These debates have furthered our
understanding of the problem but they have been largely inconclusive. My objective in this
dissertation is to systematize the theoretical insights provided by electoral specialists and to
test them in a set of selected case studies in order to answer a central question in this debate:
does the electoral system affect the structure of political parties in ethnically divided societies
and if so how? The existent empirical literature on electoral engineering consists of either
single or loosely structured small-n qualitative studies, or large-n quantitative studies using
data sets that are not well suited for answering questions about patterns of ethnic voting. For
the empirical portion of my work, I chose to conduct a structured historical comparison of
four societies which implemented major electoral reforms: Turkey, Northern Ireland,
Guyana, and Sri Lanka. Based on the study of these cases, I argue that politicians and voters
did not respond to electoral incentives in the ways predicted by existent theories, and that no
clear relationship can be observed between the electoral system's proportionality and the
ethnic make-up of parties or the types of appeals they make to voters. These findings indicate
that the hopes placed in electoral system design for divided societies are unwarranted and
that attention among political scientists and policymakers should shift to other peace-building
approaches.
More than thirty years have passed since the famous Italian political scientist
Giovanni Sartori called electoral systems "the most specific manipulative instruments of
politics." Donald Horowitz and Arend Lijphart, the two scholars towering the debate on
institutional design for divided societies, also agreed on this common point. According to
Horowitz, "the electoral system is by far the most powerful lever of constitutional
engineering for accommodation and harmony in severely divided societies, as indeed it is a
powerful tool for many other purposes." According to Lijphart, choosing how the legislature
and the executive will be elected are "the two most fundamental choices of the many that
have to be made when new democratic constitutions are drafted."' The ideas of Arend
Lijphard, summarized by the concept of consociationalism, ultimately gained a larger
following in the academic community; on electoral matters, they favored the adoption of
proportional representation (PR).
Until the 1990s, constitution drafting had usually been the prerogative of national
elites or, in some cases, colonial authorities. After the end of the Cold War, a wave of
transitioning democracies and a proliferation of international interventions to resolve armed
conflicts brought constitutional design in general, and electoral design in particular, to the
forefront of policy, not just theory. Organizing a free democratic election became the
IAll three quoted in Arend Lijphart, Thinking about Democracy: Power Sharing and Majority Rule in Theory
and Practice (London and New York: Routledge, 2008), p. 180.
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pinnacle and metric of success for international missions, as it was expected to seal a peace
agreement and vest it with popular legitimacy, marking the beginning of a new era. Benjamin
Reilly, an Australian expert, notes that "'post-war elections' are now a feature of almost all
efforts to democratize war-torn regions, with peace agreements routinely including
provisions for elections to be held as part of the process of conflict termination, often with
the assistance, supervision, or sometimes direct control of the international community."2
The policymakers' decisions have reflected the prevailing climate of opinion in academia:
typically some form of list PR was chosen, but in several exceptions the institutional
designers opted for another alternative (see Table 1). The scorecard for these efforts is mixed.
In some cases (Namibia, Mozambique, Bosnia-Herzegovina) the election led to a least some
stability and a successful transition to democracy; in other cases (Cambodia, Haiti, Sierra
Leone) it was an abject failure followed by a return to violence, sometimes prompting a
second intervention; yet in others (Afghanistan, DR Congo, Sudan), the outcome is too close
to call, or the election has not yet taken place. In many cases the international actor is still
heavily involved and this is expected to continue for at least a few more years.
It is not my purpose in this dissertation to undertake a comparative evaluation of the
cases on this list, for methodological reasons explained in detail in the following chapter.
Briefly put, the vast majority of countries that were targeted by post-Cold War interventions
were not democratic to begin with, and it is difficult to assess counterfactually how their
politics would have evolved under a different electoral system. I list them here to illustrate
how profoundly engaged the international community has been in the electoral engineering
vocation, and to hint at how likely this is to carry on in the near future. Ethnic divisions are at
the heart of the majority of conflicts on the list, and from this point on I will also limit the
discussion to such cases. This is because the theoretical debate on electoral design has largely
taken place within the subfield of ethnic politics. Ethnic divisions constitute "hard test" cases
for theories of institutional engineering, but insights from them may carry to other types of
cleavages as well.
2 Benjamin Reilly, "Post-war Elections: Uncertain Turning Points of Transition," in From War to Democracy:
Dilemmas ofPeacebuilding, edited by Anna K. Jarstad and Timothy D. Sisk (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2008), p. 157.
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Table 1: International electoral design interventions in the post-Cold War era3
Target Country Time Period Intervenor/Mediator Formula Chosen
Namibia 1989-1990 UN PR
Cambodia 1991-1993 UN PR
Angola 1991-1999 UN PR
West Bank & Gaza 1991-1996 US BV (now PR & BV)
Mozambique 1992-1994 UN PR
Haiti 1993-96, 2004- US/UN/Brazil TRS
Liberia 1993- Nigeria/UN PR (now SMP)
Rwanda 1993-1996 UN/France PR
Bosnia-Herzegovina 1995- NATO/UN/EU PR
Albania 1997 UN/EU SMP & PR
DR Congo 1999- UN PR
East Timor 1999-2005 UN/Australia SMP & PR
Kosovo 1999- NATO/UN PR
Sierra Leone 1999-2005 Nigeria/UK/UN PR
Burundi 2000-2007 AU/UN PR
FYR Macedonia 2001 NATO/EU PR
Afghanistan 2001- NATO/UN SNTV
Iraq 2003- US/UK/UN PR
Cote d'Ivoire 2004- UN SMP & PBV
Sudan 2005- UN/AU SMP & PR
The plan of the dissertation is the following: in the first chapter I will lay out in
general terms the arguments about electoral system design that different theorists have
proposed, group them into a compact list of hypotheses, and defend my choice of cases and
method for evaluating them. In the four following chapters I will sketch the history of
political parties and ethnic relations in each case study, making case-specific observations
about the impact of electoral reform. In the final chapter I will combine the material from the
case studies into a structured comparison, arguing that the theoretical hypotheses were not
borne out by the empirical facts.
3 This table consists of cases where an international actor played an important role in institutional design,
including overseeing the conduct of elections. In many other cases, international advisors and/or international
observers were involved, without a direct intervention by a foreign government or international organization.
Abbreviations used: PR = proportional representation, SMP = single member plurality, BV = block vote, PBV
= party block vote, TRS = two-round system.
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Chapter 1
THEORY, HYPOTHESES, AND METHODS
In this introductory chapter, I will lay out the major schools of thought that have
dominated the debate on electoral system design for divided societies and provide a synoptic
list of the hypotheses they put forward. I will also propose a new typology of political parties
that fits these theoretical hypotheses and is better suited to collecting information on ethnic
voting behavior. Next, I will review the current findings of the empirical literature examining
relationships between electoral formulas and ethnic conflict, and expound upon the merits of
a structured historical comparison of electoral reforms.
Ethnicity and Democracy
The relationship between ethnicity and democracy has been a major preoccupation of
modem political science. Both are big concepts writ large, but the former has more widely
accepted definitions than the latter, built around a set of common characteristics: the
participation of a large segment-if not all members-of society in decision-making, the
alternation of governors in power, meaningful competition between candidates in elections
and public debates, free and independent channels of information on public affairs, non-
concentration of power in one person or institution, and public oversight of all key
institutions.4 Many theorists consider the electoral criterion a minimal one: regimes that
conduct elections are not necessarily democratic, but regimes that do not cannot be conceived
as democracies.
4Philippe Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl, "What Democracy Is... and Is Not," Journal ofDemocracy vol. 2 no.
3 (Summer 1991): 75-88; Robert Dahl, On Democracy, (New Haven: Yale University Press 1998).
Ethnicity is a much more debated sociological concept than democracy. As a result,
its study has been mired with problems of measurement. Which identities are ethnic may
seem intuitive to people in specific social and historical contexts, but they are not as easy to
generalize across space and time. The most popular definitions in current social science are
descriptive, summarizing ethnic identities as ascriptive distinctions based on language, race,
religion, or caste. Such definitions are reasonably encompassing, but they are analytically
unsatisfying unless accompanied by a framework explaining what these types of identities
have in common-or why others, like gender, are not among them. Some scholars have
responded to this problem with functional definitions, understanding ethnic characteristics as
human attributes acquired by rules of descent.5 In this framework, humans categorize each
other according to some descent-based characteristic, e.g. religion, caste, dialect, skin color,
and depending on the social context each category can take a number of commonly agreed
values or parameters, e.g. for religion {Muslim, Orthodox, Catholic} in Bosnia-Herzegovina,
or {Protestant, Catholic} in Northern Ireland. Any given ethnicity then can be viewed as a
perimeter of ethnic parameters joined by Boolean operators. For example, Ceylon Tamils in
Sri Lanka are widely understood to be the people who are speakers of Tamil AND NEITHER
Muslim NOR descending from lower caste immigrants from South India in colonial times.
Ethnic "identity entrepreneurs" may try to mobilize people around commonly accepted
perimeters, or change the perimeter borders or construct new ones; over time, parameters
may split or combine and new parameters may appear due to population flows or cultural
shifts. In the short and medium term, however, ethnic attributes are 'sticky' i.e. costly to
acquire or change. In ethnically polarized societies the perimeters often become very
entrenched and their boundaries hard to cross-manifested by segregated living patterns, low
rates of intermarriage, and ethnically homogeneous social networks.
This functional definition, inspired by the language of rational choice theory, forms
the background of my understanding of ethnicity in this dissertation, with one caveat: I feel
that it primes the ancestral direction of descent and does not sufficiently account for the
process of assimilation, the role of posterity, and the shadow of the future. Like all human
'See Donald Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), p. 53;
Kanchan Chandra, "What is Ethnic Identity and does it Matter?" Annual Review of Political Science vol. 9
(2006): 397-424 and the introductory chapter in Daniel Posner's Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
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organizations, ethnic groups require some intergenerational continuity in order to be salient
in time. Also, assimilation (rather than ancestry) can be a focal point of controversy in many
societies torn by ethnic conflict, where the issue is not the impermeability of the ethnic
boundary, but rather its state-sanctioned permeability in only one direction-towards the
dominant group. In many contexts, people can acquire conditional membership in a descent-
based group even if they lack all the ancestral qualities, by committing to and associating
with other members of the group (often through marriage, conversion, adoption, and/or
participation in cultural organizations), also establishing an expectation that their offspring, if
any, will be raised in accordance with the group's cultural norms. I would then define ethnic
characteristics as costly attributes that are socially bonding within and highly transferable
between generations, in a such way that the benefits or detriments accrued to someone on the
basis of such attributes can be expected to extend to his or her kin.
Even though the mobilization of ethnic identifications has been associated with
specific cases of violence and democratic collapse, it is not clear that ethnic diversity is by
itself detrimental to democracy. Strong ethnic allegiances can become destabilizing in a
democratic context under two circumstances: when they rigidly determine social preferences
and create permanent majorities and minorities on key social issues, rendering public
discussion and alternation of parties in power impossible or irrelevant; or when they involve
fundamental disagreements about the nature and boundaries of the political community, the
borders of the state, and who should or should not have the right to be a citizen and
participate in decisions. The first deadlock usually leads to permanent political exclusion, the
second to separatist claims. Oftentimes these two phenomena coexist.
Since some multiethnic democracies have flourished and others collapsed, political
scientists for decades have been on a quest to identify those institutions and practices that can
be transplanted from the successful to the unsuccessful cases. Two broad schools of thought
have crystallized in academic circles. The consociational strand, arguably the dominant one
among practitioners, favors maximal recognition and autonomy for groups, quotas and
proportional representation, veto rights, and grand-coalition governments. The centripetalist
6 See Tanja Ellingsen, "Colorful Community or Ethnic Witches Brew? Multiethnicity and Domestic Conflict
during and after the Cold War," The Journal of Conflict Resolution vol. 44 no. 2 (April 2000): 228-249, and
Steven Fish and Robin Brooks, "Does Diversity Hurt Democracy?" Journal of Democracy vol. 15 no. I
(January 2004): 154-166.
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strand favors institutions and practices that submerge ethnic distinctions and encourage
cross-ethnic appeals and social integration. 7 The two sides have conflicting recommendations
about electoral regimes, within their larger programmatic frameworks for institutionally
designing multiethnic democracy.
Ethnicity and Parties
If politics in divided societies are dominated by one issue dimension, and if the
distribution of citizens' positions on this dimension is highly bimodal and largely determined
by family descent, it follows naturally that the party system will be rigid and not genuinely
competitive. Most parties will draw support only from one ethnic group, as civil society
infrastructures between groups will be weak or entirely lacking. The relative importance of
(and value of appealing to) citizens with ambivalent or moderate views will depend on the
exact distribution of the ethnic characteristics in the electorate; but there is an ever-present
danger of ethnic outbidding: losing one's voters to a more extremist party or candidate if one
reaches out too much to the other groups.8 Socially segregated in many other ways, divided
societies may also feature segmented electorates, where party competition truly happens only
within ethnic groups.9 And yet, it is possible that parties attempting to bridge or ignore the
ethnic cleavage will enter the fray. In fact, this is exactly what external peacemakers often
hope to see.
Theorizing about the role of political parties under conditions of ethnic division
requires typologies of ethnic structure. Donald Horowitz's tripartite categorization of parties
as ethnic, multiethnic or non-ethnic has dominated the field for many years.' 0 Ethnic parties
are thus defined as those making appeals to specific ethnicities and excluding others;
multiethnic parties make ethnic appeals but equally approach all ethnicities; while non-ethnic
7The fundamental works in each school are respectively considered to be Arend Lijphart's Democracy in Plural
Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977) and Horowitz's Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1985).
8An idea originally developed by Alvin Rabushka and Kenneth Shepsle in Politics in Plural Societies: A Theory
in Democratic Instability (Columbus, OH: Charles E. Merrill, 1972) based on their observations about Ceylon
and Northern Ireland, and expanded by Donald Horowitz in Ethnic Groups in Conflict, chapters 7-9.
9This is what Paul Mitchell has called a "dual party system" in the case of Northern Ireland.
'
0This is the typology used by Chandra in Why Ethnic Parties Succeed: Patronage and Ethnic Head Counts in
India (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004) and in CDEI.
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parties choose to emphasize issues other than ethnicity. Although this typology is established
and developed, it has two analytical weaknesses. First, it is based primarily on party
campaign rhetoric and perhaps cadre composition, but not electoral results, so it is quite
possible that a party may be appealing to categories of voters that do not end up supporting it.
For example, a party may be using leftist rhetoric on political and economic equality, making
appeals to all citizens of a country, and still primarily consist of and be voted by people
ascribing to one ethnic group-such is the case of the Democratic Society Party in Turkey.
Second, the categorization implies that each party has one ethnic platform before each
election. Some parties, however, may use different rhetoric towards different groups or in
different constituencies. For instance, a leftist party may be using Marxist language towards
all, but infuse it with ethnically-relevant content when appealing to specific minorities-as
the Turkish Workers' Party did in the 1960s. Also, a party may have a varied platform and a
diverse voter base but attract the overwhelming majority of voters from a specific ethnic
group; it may in turn function and be perceived as an ethnic party in areas of the country
where ethnic divisions are strong. This has been the case for the Democrats with respect to
African Americans in the US since the Civil Rights era and for the Republican People's Party
with respect to Alevis in Turkey since the appearance of the Islamic right.
To move around these problems, I propose a different typology of parties based on
their electoral success among various groups along two dimensions defined at the party-level:
congregation and pluralism. Congregation measures how much of one specific ethnic group's
vote is won by the party. Pluralism measures how many different ethnic groups the party is
winning votes from. These two dimensions create a simple codification with four ideal types:
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Hegemon parties win all or the lion's share of one ethnic group's vote and are not
supported by voters of any other group. They may be parties that claim to represent only their
group, or parties that tried to but failed to break out of their ethnic power base. Most
hegemon parties will be in the former category, and content to maintain their dominance over
the group, by virtue of which they can claim to be its sole legitimate speaker. The Unionist
Party was the hegemonic party of Northern Ireland's Protestants between the 1920s and the
mid-i 960s, while the People's National Congress has played this role for Africans in Guyana
since the early 1960s.
Agonist parties win only part of the vote of one ethnic group and do not have any
substantial support outside it. They may be radical champions of an ethnic cause or moderate
parties with incidental ties to a specific ethnic community. In either case, their characteristic
is that they struggle to gain a larger portion of the general vote-either to capture the entire
vote of their ethnic group and become hegemons or to break outside their ethnic base and
become antagonists. The Federal Party and the Tamil Congress were agonists vying between
them for the Ceylon Tamil vote in the 1950s and 60s. A Kurdish leftist agonist party has been
contesting elections in Turkey since the 1990s.
Magnet parties win votes from different ethnic groups but also win the vast majority
of the vote from at least one. They may be broadly based multiethnic parties whose platform
is particularly appealing to one minority group; or they may have grown out of a hegemonic
ethnic party that successfully attracted voters from other groups. The former is the case for
the Republican People's Party concerning Alevis in Turkey; the latter applies to the
Progressive People's Party, a traditionally East Indian hegemon party in Guyana, which now
also captures the larger part of the Amerindian vote.
Antagonist parties win a portion of the vote from multiple ethnic groups without
commanding the vast majority of the vote of any. They may be genuine multiethnic parties
trying to overcome ethnic barriers like the Alliance Party of Northern Ireland or catchall
parties with populist platforms like the center-right parties in Turkey since the 1950s. Their
common characteristic is that they are intrinsic antagonists of all other types of parties.
Parties that contest on issues other than ethnicity and mange to mobilize voters of diverse
ethnic backgrounds along a different dimension belong to this category par excellence. The
Northern Ireland Women's Coalition was a short-lived example.
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In principle, this codification can be applied only after an election has taken place. It
tries to capture more accurately the effective party structure and the audience pressures that
parties face after entering parliament. However, if cadre composition is considered, the
typology can also be used for the pre-election process of party formation. In that case, the
above definitions should be amended to reflect a party's attraction of potential candidates
from different ethnic groups, instead of voters.
A graphic representation of this typology using Venn diagrams is given below.
Figure 1: Venn diagrams of party types; P = party's voters, G = voters of an ethnic group
P G G
G PPG P
Magnet Agonist Antagonist Hegemon
Electoral Systems and Ethnic Politics
It has long been understood that different voting rules may favor or disfavor different
actors in the political system, and that, in Richard Katz's words, the question of which
electoral system to adopt depends on "who you are, where you are, and where you want to
go."" This seemingly relativistic statement translates into a less ambiguous task for an
external intervenor in a society torn by conflict: the intervenor typically has broad leeway in
designing and even imposing institutions, the political system is afflicted by ethnic rifts, and
the intervenor has a clear preference to overcome them, favoring or disfavoring certain local
actors in the process.
"Richard Katz, Democracy and Elections (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 308.
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The main lines of argument in the electoral engineering literature follow the logic
Electoral System 4 Party System Structure 4 Ethnic Conflict
The arrows of causation may arguably go in the opposite direction as well, but when
external actors advocate or design an electoral system for an ethnically divided society, they
are hoping to lead it down a path that follows along this line.12 Not surprisingly, debates over
what electoral formula newly democratizing states should adopt have been particularly
heated.' 3 Granted, the scholars involved in these debates have not been simpletons expecting
the electoral system to provide a miracle solution. Still, they have expressed considerable
hope in its capacity to have an impact. In Donald Horowitz's words, "it should surprise no
one that electoral reform cannot work magic on ethnic conflict.... Yet it is extraordinary how
much an electoral system can do in what seems an intractable situation."' 4
There are more than ten basic types of electoral systems for parliamentary elections
used around the world today.' 5 Many more have been developed theoretically, but it is not
possible to examine their effects empirically.16 Electoral systems can be categorized in
various ways, but their most fundamental feature is their inherent proportionality, i.e. how
closely the distribution of seats that they produce matches the vote shares that political
parties won in the election. A second important aspect of the electoral formula is the degree
of choice between candidates that it affords the voter, a concept I will call ordinality.'7
Proportionality and ordinality are central to the consociationalist-centripetalist debate. The
former favor proportional representation (PR) systems, developed in the Lower Countries
and Scandinavia; the latter champion ordinal and usually less proportional systems like the
12For the argument for causation in the opposite direction, see Josep Colomer, "It's Parties that Choose Electoral
Systems (or Duverger's Laws Upside Down)" Political Studies vol. 53 no. 1 (2005): 1-21.
For two notable instances, see the debate between Donald Horowitz and Arend Lijphart on South Africa in
Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic Societies edited by Joseph Montville (Lexington, MA: Lexington
Books, 1991), and the more recent one between Horowitz and Jon Fraenkel over Fiji in the pages of
Comparative Political Studies vol. 3 5 no. 5 (June 2006).
4Ethnic Groups in Conflict, 650-65 1.
"For an introductory survey see David Farrell, Electoral Systems (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2001).
16For a review, see Steven J. Brams, Mathematics and Democracy: Designing Better Voting and Fair Division
Procedures (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007).
17For a discussion of ordinal features of electoral systems and an argument in their favor, see Lauri Karvonen,
"Preferential Voting: Incidence and Effects," International Political Science Review vol. 25, no. 2 (April 2004):
203-226.
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Alternative Vote (AV) or the Single Transferable Vote (STV), pioneered in Australia and
Ireland respectively, which ask voters to rank candidates, thus motivating them to consider
their lower preferences. PR systems are widely used around the world today, and seem to
be the preferred formula in most international interventions; preferential systems, on the
other hand, are touted by several political scientists but used only in a handful of countries.
Plurality systems like the Anglo-American First-Past-the-Post (FPTP)-also called Single
Member Plurality (SMP)-which are neither proportional nor ordinal, have the weakest
following, even though they are arguably the simplest and continue to be used by some of the
oldest and largest democracies in the world. 19 Mixed systems combining SMP and PR have
also received considerable attention after their adoption by a wave of both advanced and
young post-communist democracies in the 1990s. Like preferential ones, mixed systems have
seen limited use in divided society settings, and it is unclear whether they should be treated
as a class of their own or simply be categorized by their overall proportionality.2 0
Theoretical disagreements extend on both causal arrows, i.e. on what kinds of parties
different electoral systems produce and on whether such parties are better or ill-suited to
manage ethnic divisions. The consociationalist argument is that minority groups yearn for
representation for practical and psychological reasons and disproportional systems will tend
to exclude them; centripetalists fear that maximal proportionality leads to a proliferation of
mono-ethnic parties, whereas lower proportionality could encourage cross-ethnic appeals.
Most research so far, including quantitative and qualitative studies, has connected the first
with the third link of the causal chain, i.e. explored relationships between electoral systems
and levels of conflict. This is probably because datasets on electoral systems and ethnic
18 Donald Horowitz and Benjamin Reilly have specifically endorsed AV, and Reilly has also expressed some
support for STV in principle. Horowitz considers STV as practiced in Ireland to be too proportional to foster
adequate incentives for cross-ethnic appeals. Arend Lijphart considers STV a proportional system, and believes
AV to be equivalent to TRS and equally skewed in its results with SMP.
19For a defense of plurality/majority see Guy Lardeyret, "The Problem with PR," Journal of Democracy vol. 2
n. 3 (Summer 1991): 30-39 and Christine Fauvelle-Aymar and Michael Lewis-Beck, "TR vs. PR: Effects of the
French Double Ballot," Electoral Studies vol. 27 no. 3 (September 2008): 400-406. For the argument against the
majoritarian double ballot, see Sarah Birch, "Two-Round Electoral Systems and Democracy," Comparative
Political Studies vol. 79 no. 3 (April 2003): 319-344.
- For a discussion of mixed systems, see Matthew Shugart, and Martin Wattenberg, Mixed-Member Electoral
Systems: the Best ofBoth Worlds? (Oxford: Oxford Universtity Press, 2001). A 2005 survey of electoral system
experts reported that mixed systems topped respondents' preferences ahead of STV. See Shaun Bowler, David
M. Farrell, and Robin T. Pettitt , "Expert Opinion on Electoral Systems: So Which Electoral System Is "Best?""
Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties, vol. 15 no. 1 (April 2005): 3-19.
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conflict worldwide exist, but data on the ethnic structure of political parties in various
countries are scarce.
The results of both qualitative and quantitative research on the relationship between
electoral formula and ethnic conflict have not been conclusive either within or across
methodologies. Preferential systems are very infrequent, so their study has been limited to
single case studies or comparisons of the few countries that use them. Proponents of AV
credit it with success in Papua New Guinea and Australia, but the experience of Fiji seems
disastrous. STV is still used only in Malta and Ireland (north and south). Most research has
therefore been on the effects of proportionality, but the picture there is no clearer.
Proportionality and ethnic heterogeneity are believed to be positively correlated with the
number of parties in the legislature, but their effects, if any, on the ethnic structure of parties
have not been explored.2 3 A medium-n study by Andrew Reynolds on the recently
democratized countries of Southern Africa argued for a positive effect of PR on the quality of
democracy, but the finding was confounded by differences in economic development and
demographics.24
Large-n studies have explored the association between proportionality and levels of
protest and violence, using the Minorities at Risk (MAR) dataset, and proportionality and
levels of voter satisfaction, relying on the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES)
2 tKanchan Chandra has produced one such dataset for the year 1996. See A Constructivist Dataset on Identity
andInstitutions (CDEI), http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/politics/faculty/chandra/CDEI2005.pdf
22See Jon Fraenkel and Bernard Grofman, "Does the Alternative Vote Foster Moderation in Ethnically Divided
Societies? The Case of Fiji" Comparative Political Studies vol. 39 no. 5 (June 2006): 623-651 and Robert
Stockwell, "An Assessment of the Alternative Vote System in Fiji." Commonwealth and Comparative Politics
vol. 43 no. 3 (2005): 382-393.
23See Ordeshook and Shvetsova, "Ethnic Heterogeneity, District Magnitude, and the Number of Parties,"
American Journal of Political Science, v. 38 no. 1 (February 1994): 100-123 and Octavio Amorim Neto and
Gary Cox, "Electoral Institutions, Cleavage Structures, and the Number of Parties," American Journal of
Political Science vol. 41 no. 1 (January 1997): 149-174. William Clark and Matt Golder in "Rehabilitating
Duverger's Theory" Comparative Political Studies vol. 39 no. 6 (August 2006): 679-708 had weaker findings
on this relationship. Gary Cox in Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World's Electoral
Systems (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997) has argued that the link between
district size and the number of parties is logically weak.
24Andrew Reynolds, Electoral Systems and Democratization in Southern Africa (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1999). Reynolds could not deny that Botswana, which uses FPTP, is also a successful democracy,
although her largely mono-ethnic structure makes for a difficult comparison with neighboring South Africa and
Namibia, which use PR. One cannot escape noticing that South Africa, Botswana, and Namibia are also by far
the wealthiest countries in the region in addition to being the most democratic.
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dataset. Two studies based on MAR from two different time periods produced conflicting
findings.2 6 Frank Cohen found a significant negative effect of PR on rebellion but a positive
one for party fragmentation for the period between 1945 and 1989. Controlling also for
economic variables, Saideman et al. found a significant association of PR with lower levels
of both protest and rebellion for the period 1985-1998, acknowledging that the geographic
concentration of groups also had a strong impact. In her latest study with an expanded
version of MAR which included information on ethnic minority support for certain parties
and participation in government, J6hanna-Kristin Bimir found that "there is not a statistically
significant difference with respect to violence between plurality and proportional systems"
and that there was a negative effect from mixed systems.27 Finally, in a study using the
World Values Survey, Pippa Norris found no strong support for the claim that PR makes
ethnic minorities view the political system more positively.28
The Role of Ethnic Demographics
Apart from lack of data on the ethnic structure of parties, another major impediment
for electoral engineering research is the lack of information on the geographic clustering of
ethnic identities in the electorate. Until recently, statistical studies relied on general country-
wide measures of ethnic heterogeneity, like the ubiquitous ELF and other competing indexes
without a geographic component. In the last decade, a new wave of research has drawn
attention to the importance of geographic clustering for ethnic rebellion and civil war onset,
and new datasets are being constructed for the spatial distribution of ethnic groups.29 These
251t should be noted that CSES, by its survey nature and associated data collection costs, is more limited in
geographic scope to MAR, and also does not specifically focus on ethnic divisions.
26Frank Cohen, "Proportional versus Majoritarian Ethnic Conflict Management in Democracies." Comparative
Political Studies, v. 30, n. 6 (December 1997): 607-630; Stephen Saideman et al., "Democratization, Political
Institutions, and Ethnic Conflict: A Pooled Time-Series Analysis, 1985-1998," Comparative Political
Studies, vol. 35 no. 1 (February 2002): 103-129.
2 7J6hanna-Kristin Birnir, Ethnicity and Electoral Politics (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2007), pp. 194-195.
2 8 Pippa Norris, Electoral Engineering: Voting Rules and Political Behavior (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2004).
29Work in this field has originated mostly at Harvard University in the US and ETH in Switzerland. See Monica
Toft The Geography of Ethnic Violence: Identity, Interests, and the Indivisibility of Territory (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 2003); Janina Matuszeki and Frank Schneider, "Patterns of Ethnic Group
Segregation and Civil Conflict" Harvard-NBER unpublished paper, 2006; Lars-Erik Cederman and Luc
Girardin, "Beyond Fractionalization: Mapping Ethnicity onto Nationalist Insurgencies," American Political
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projects, however, are geared towards the study of civil war, not electoral behavior, and at
this stage they do not collect information that can be combined with electoral constituency
boundaries.
A central idea in centripetalist theory is that ethnically diverse constituencies carry a
potential for cross-ethnic appeals. Donald Horowitz has argued that "the most reliable way,
under conditions of democratic elections, is to make politicians reciprocally dependent on the
votes of members of groups other than their own."30 And according to Benjamin Reilly, "the
more heterogeneous a constituency, the more likely it is that meaningful vote pooling will
take place."3' When electoral constituencies are largely mono-ethnic or when the largest
group constitutes an overwhelming majority, this potential evaporates. On the other hand,
proponents of PR have suggested that in countries where groups are concentrated in separate
ethnically homogenous areas, proportionality, with its multiplicative effect, could encourage
the proliferation of parties, thereby allowing greater flexibility for brokering coalitions. 32
Conceptually, the electoral system must be considered jointly with ethnic
demographics to determine the structural incentives facing politicians before an election.
Within a given electoral system, the votes of two different ethnic groups of equal population
size but different concentrations, if mobilized, may yield completely different seat allocations
in the legislature. Of course, constituencies could be drawn arbitrarily and malapportionment
could produce any imaginable result. In practice, however, most democracies do not engage
in extreme gerrymandering, and the international community is unlikely to do so when
devising electoral rules for one of its protectorates, lest it completely delegitimize itself. The
geographic distribution of ethnic groups therefore creates limitations. Unless voters are
creatively assigned to virtual mixed constituencies (a practice used in ancient Athens),
unitary electoral constituencies drawn on the map are bound to have different potentials for
cross-ethnic voting. The simplest way to categorize the demography is along a continuum
from lowest (a) to highest (d) potential for cross-ethnic voting:
Science Review vol. 101 no. 1 (February 2007): 173-185; and Lars-Erik Cederman, Jan Ketil Rod, and Nils
Weidmann, "Geo-Referencing of Ethnic Groups: Creating a New Dataset," ETH, unpublished paper, 2007.
30 Donald Horowitz, "Incentives and Behaviour in the Ethnic Politics of Sri Lanka and Malaysia," Third World
Quarterly vol. I 1 no. 4 (October 1989): 18-35.
3Ben Reilly, Democracy in Divided Societies: Electoral Engineering for Conflict Management (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 185.
32Chappell Lawson, "How Best to Build Democracy: Laying the Foundation for a New Iraq," Foreign Affairs
Vol. 82 No. 4 (July/August 2003).
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(a) Clustered (ethnic groups form overwhelming majorities in different areas)
(b) Strongly dominated (groups are mixed and one group forms a strong majority)
(c) Weakly dominated (groups are mixed and one group forms a thin majority)
(d) Undominated (groups are mixed and there is no majority)33
In electoral politics, the constituency is understood to be the focus of attention for
both voters and candidates. Politicians already involved in political parties and aspiring
candidates desiring to join a party or form their own must take into consideration both the
electoral formula and voter composition when deciding whether to appeal to certain ethnic
constituencies. Similarly, voters through their social experience are expected to have a rough
idea of the distribution of ethnic attributes in their constituency's population and a basic
understanding of the electoral system's workings. They should therefore be able to calculate
if mobilizing with others along a specific ethnic identity will pay off by electing a candidate
who can then recognize them as an ethnic kin and represent them or reward them with
patronage.34 This interactive process is schematically presented in a box diagram below.
Figure 2: Schematic representation of the electoral process in an ethnically divided society









33This categorization also corresponds to the group-based four-way coding of concentration used in the
Minorities at Risk dataset.
3This rational choice framework is borrowed from Daniel Posner, Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa, and
Kanchan Chandra, Why Ethnic Parties Succeed.
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This assumption may seem to place too high of an information requirement on voters
and candidates. However, in ethnically polarized settings voters are very likely to be aware of
their district's ethnic composition for many more reasons other than electoral calculation.
People in divided societies are often acutely tuned to gauging ethnicity, and use their
assessments to make decisions about residency, employment, social networks, and personal
security in times of crisis. Similarly, candidates are likely to be aware of the ethnic
breakdown of their home constituency, even if official census data are lacking. The electoral
system may be poorly grasped by voters, and perhaps even by candidates at first, but if it is
maintained during several elections, its effects will be observed and probably understood by
most.35 In theory, people have multiple identities and multiple dimensions of ethnicity can be
mobilized. Electoral constituencies can have complex, matrix-like demographic breakdowns,
and may be dominated by one group in some dimensions but not others. This possibility will
be separately examined in the case studies, but in practice the number of ethnic attributes
available for mobilization is not infinite. Certain identities are already politically activated in
ethnically divided societies and they are known both to citizens and to external observers.
Given these observations about the influence of ethnic demographics on electoral
incentives, the expected effects of electoral systems should be different at the two ends of the
demographic continuum. In electorates characterized by clustered constituencies, there is no
built-in constituency-level incentive to make cross-ethnic appeals. Proportionality, however,
should affect the total number of parties entering in parliament. In electorates characterized
by undominated constituencies, reductions in proportionality should create incentives for
cross-ethnic appeals as envisioned by centripetalists. As for dominated constituencies, the
dominant group is guaranteed representation regardless of proportionality; the dominated
groups, though, may be entirely excluded if the electoral system is majoritarian. The greater
the degree of demographic dominance of the large group, the smaller the potential benefit for
a political party to appeal to the demographically dominated groups under a majoritarian
electoral formula.
1 5Rein Taagepera in "Designing Electoral Rules and Waiting for an Electoral System to Evolve" suggests four
elections as a rule of thumb, which I follow in my case studies. See The Architecture of Democracy, edited by
Andrew Reynolds (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 248-264.
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Variables and Hypotheses
The literature on electoral engineering has progressed with a frequent disconnect
between programmatic battles over detailed mechanisms and empirical studies with the eye
on the larger picture, i.e. the elliptic link between formula and ethnic conflict. Since the
statistical findings on the nature of this link are inconclusive, it is even more important to
take stock and look more carefully at the intermediate causative link, where all the theoretical
controversy lies. Based on the same theories, rather than asking if the electoral formula
conditions ethnic conflict, we could be asking two separate, connected questions:
i. Does the electoral formula condition certain ethnic structures of parties? and
ii. Do party systems with different ethnic structures accentuate or mitigate conflict?
These questions have been theorized by some works in formal modeling and case
studies.36 Unfortunately, the statistical analysis still lags behind due to the lack of suitable
data. In some ways, the elliptical question is simpler because the categorization of electoral
formulas by their proportionality is straightforward. Higher proportionality is then either
associated with lower ethnic violence or it is not. Questions about the intermediate link, the
ethnic structure of parties, are more complicated. In this section, I will outline these
intermediate hypotheses found in the literature and separate them according to the causal link
they address, (i) or (ii).
As explained, the key independent variables discussed by theorists are the formula's
proportionality and the ethnic heterogeneity; both are fairly easy to measure. But there is no
standard way to operationalize the intermediate variable, ethnic party systems. Based on the
typology for parties I developed, I propose that the two key variables describing ethnic party
systems are party fragmentation and the incidence of cross-ethnic voting (CEV). Cross-ethnic
voting at the individual level is understood as voting for a candidate of an ethnic group
different from one's own or for an ethnically mixed ticket. At the collective level, it can be
36 See Donald Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, chapters 9 and 14 for a classic approach, and Kanchan
Chandra, "Ethnic Parties and Democratic Stability," Perspectives on Politics vol. 3 no. 2 (June 2005): 235-252
for a more recent one.
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approximated as the total vote share of parties that make cross-ethnic appeals and put
forward multiethnic candidate rosters. Party fragmentation is often measured by the effective
number of political parties (either by vote share at elections or by seat share in parliament).
But in the context of multi-ethnic societies it is also conceptually important to consider the
number of parties relative to the number of ethnic groups. Party fragmentation and cross-
ethnic voting are the dependent variables for the first causal link. Unlike congregation and
pluralism used to categorize parties, fragmentation and cross-ethnic voting are systemic, not
party-level variables. To understand their correspondence with the party typology, consider
what kind of parties will characterize the party system (i.e. obtain the largest vote share) for
different combinations of their values.
Table 2: Correspondence between party fragmentation, cross-ethnic voting, and party types
Parties < Groups Parties ~ Groups Parties > Groups
High CEV
Low CEV
As show in Table 2, when cross-ethnic voting is low, the party system is bound to be
dominated by hegemonic parties if there is a roughly equal ratio of parties to ethnic groups,
and by agonist parties if there are many more parties than groups. A situation with low cross-
ethnic voting and fewer parties than groups (lower left cell) is theoretically possible if some
minorities are so alienated that they do not care to vote, and the society is run as a one-party
(or cartel) ethnocracy by the dominant group(s). On the other hand, if cross-ethnic voting is
high, the party system will be characterized by either magnet or antagonist parties depending
on party fragmentation, with the boundary being roughly an equal ratio of parties to ethnic
groups. I hope that the reader has appreciated the value added from this more complex party
categorization, designed to capture both the ethnic nature of political actors (cross-ethnic vs.
Magnet Magnet/Antagonist Antagonist
Hegemon Hegemon Agonist
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mono-ethnic) and their relative number in the party system. The latter aspect is important for
assessing the possible impact of proportionality on coalition-building dynamics.
The following propositions summarize the arguments that have been made about the
first causal link, that between formula and party system structure. The first two propositions
come from the quantitative literature on factors affecting the number of parties, and at least
the first is widely accepted by consociationalists and centripetalists alike. The second two
derive from centripetalist theory on cross-ethnic appeals. I attached a synoptic name to each
proposition for mnemonic reference.
Proposition 1: The Multiplicative Effect
Increased electoral proportionality will tend to increase party fragmentation, and hence the
average number of parties representing each ethnic group. This may mean at least one party
for smaller groups and more than one party for larger groups.
Proposition 2: The Multiethnic Effect
High ethnic diversity will tend to increase party fragmentation. The more ethnic cleavages in
a divided society, the more parties there will be.
Proposition 3: The Strategic Voting Hypothesis
Low proportionality increases incentives for cross-ethnic appeals and strategic cross-ethnic
voting by forcing voters to consider their lower-order preferences. On the contrary, high
proportionality favors voting along ethnic lines, since minority voters can easily gain
representation by voting for their co-ethnic candidates.
Proposition 4: The Mixed Constituency Hypothesis
The more diverse electoral constituencies are, the greater their in-built potential for cross-
ethnic appeals and incentives for cross-ethnic voting.
The hypothesized combined effects of the independent on the dependent variables are
symmetrically interactive: whereas they operate synergistically on party fragmentation, they
are antagonistic on cross-ethnic voting. High proportionality is expected to impact the latter
negatively, while ethnic heterogeneity at the constituency level should affect it positively.
The following graphs visualize the relationships between the four variables by showing how
32
Evangelos Liaras Theory, Hypotheses, and Methods
Theory, Hypotheses, and Methods
proportionality is expected to affect the number of parties and cross-ethnic voting under
different demographic conditions. The interaction means greater marginal effects (a steeper
slope) of a change in proportionality in more demographically diverse settings.







To demonstrate the intuition behind propositions 3 and 4, let's imagine that we have
three multiethnic constituencies and three ethnic groups, A, B, and C. The distribution of the
groups is different in each constituency, ranging from a strong majority to a simple plurality
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A B C
Clustered 80 10 10
Dominated 60 20 20
Undominated 40 30 30
Imagine that ethnic divisions run high and that ethnicity is a strong predictor of
political preferences in this society. If we could change the proportionality of the electoral
formula how would this affect the calculations made by politicians and voters in each of
these constituencies? First, let's consider the undominated constituency. If the electoral
formula is majoritarian, group A's plurality would give it a considerable advantage.
Depending on the specifics of the system, politicians appealing exclusively to group A could
win most or even all seats. However, exactly because A does not have a clear majority,
groups B and C have room for maneuver. If they cooperate, they can form a majority that
will leave A out and win all seats, reaping the benefits of the electoral formula. To forestall
this development, leaders of A may approach either B or C and offer such a deal first.
Whether the electoral rule is strictly majoritarian (i.e. requires the winning candidate to
garner more than half the vote) or simply plurality ultimately makes little difference
strategically, since the most secure plurality is a majority. Majority/plurality formulas should
therefore create incentives for cross-ethnic pacts in highly heterogeneous settings. If electoral
proportionality were to increase in the undominated constituency, the incentives for cross-
ethnic appeals would rapidly fade. Because groups B and C are almost as large as A, they
would benefit from even a small increase in proportionality. We assume that voters prefer to
elect candidates from their own group both for psychological and practical reasons, since
these candidates will be closer to their preferred political positions and more likely to
distribute patronage to them. The positions of any candidate or mix of candidates put forward
as part of a compromise cross-ethnic deal will inevitably be closer to those of the other
group. The more proportional the formula, the less interest there is in pre-election pacts.
Now let's consider the clustered constituency at the opposite end of the spectrum. A's
majority there is so decisive that politicians appealing exclusively to group A would sweep
the polls under plurality, majority, or even mildly proportional formulas. There is very little
incentive to appeal to minority groups, and minority groups in turn have little power to affect
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the electoral outcome, unless there is very strong intra-ethnic competition within group A,
splitting its vote. But in an ethnically divided society we assume that inter-ethnic cleavages
are strong and group A's politicians will tend to marginalize minority voters if they have
good chances of winning by appealing only to their own group. Voters belonging to groups B
and C will likely feel alienated and powerless. It would take a major increase in
proportionality for parties appealing to them to have a realistic chance of gaining seats. Low
ethnic heterogeneity makes small changes in electoral proportionality less important.
The logic is exactly the same for dominated constituencies that lies in the middle of
the spectrum between the clustered and the undominated. What primarily matters is group
A's margin of dominance, which determines the ease at which A's politicians can ignore the
other groups in the constituency. A plurality/majority electoral formula will still benefit A;
but the lower A's margin of dominance is, the more bargaining power other groups have
more for intra-ethnic pacts. As A's margin approaches 50%, if groups B and C form an
alliance, they will need to convince an ever smaller portion of A's members to join them in
order to form a majority. This is a particularly powerful threat in winner-take-all systems,
where forming a new majority yields dramatic benefits and can turn the tables on a previous
one. If the electoral system is amended to become more proportional, groups B and C will be
able to gain some representation by voting for parties that appeal exclusively to them,
without the need to reach out to defectors from group A. With increased proportionality,
group A's advantage as a majority will diminish; but so will A's need to look out for possible
alliances with other groups or to fend off the threat from such alliances of rival groups. 37
Negotiations for interethnic electoral pacts are similar to coordination games between
party bosses who control votes in a constituency. Assuming that the leadership of an ethnic
group can more or less direct all the group members' votes, the question is: under which
conditions of proportionality and relative group size will leaders have the greatest incentives
to collaborate? A simple way to conceptualize this is by focusing on the interaction between
two groups in a multiethnic constituency. If there are only two groups, the answer is trivial.
The interaction between them can be represented by a line segment with endpoints at zero
and one (Figure 4). The points on this line segment represent all the possible ratios between
37The relative sizes of B and C matter only for minimum-winning coalitions; if C is smaller than B, then A may
prefer to approach C first in order to forestall an alliance between B and C, giving C more bargaining power.
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the two groups (e.g. 50:50, the most diverse configuration, lies in the middle etc.) The same
points also represent all possible electoral thresholds (e.g. the middle point is the majority
voting rule with a 50% electoral threshold). When only one of the two groups can pass the
threshold, it wins the constituency and has no incentive to appeal to the other group that
gains no representation (payoffs are one and zero respectively). When both groups can pass
the threshold, they gain payoffs equal to their vote share ratio in the constituency and are
indifferent to an electoral agreement. The only possibility for cooperation arises when the
groups are exactly of equal size and majority voting is in effect.38
Figure 4: Representation of interaction in a constituency with only two groups
A notch marks the intergroup ratio and a wedge the electoral threshold
A 0 i V B
B crosses the electoral threshold and gains payoff 1; A is left unrepresented (payoff 0)
A 0 V G B
A and B both cross the electoral threshold and gain a payoff equal to their respective size
A * B
A and B are of equal size and can toss a coin or join forces to cross the majority threshold
If there are more than two groups the exercise becomes more interesting. Let us focus
first on the interaction between any two groups in a constituency containing three or more.
Let x (the horizontal axis) stand for A's vote share and y (the vertical axis) for the B's vote
share, such that x, y E [0, 1]. All the possible combinations of A's and B's vote shares can be
graphically represented by an isosceles right triangle with a vote share constraint hypotenuse
38In that case, the leaders could be indifferent between joining forces to cross the thresholds and tossing a coin
to determine the victor, as their expected payoff (0.5) would be the same.
36
Evangelos Liaras Theory, Hypotheses, and Methods
(see Figure 5). Points along this hypotenuse are equivalent to the line segment in the previous
simplex example (i.e. the extreme case where all other groups have zero total vote share).







First, let's examine what happens when A and B operate under a majoritarian
electoral formula. This is a winner-take-all system; if a group can win alone, it gains a payoff
equal to 1 and all other groups have a payoff of 0. If two or more groups join forces and win,
they will have to share the political spoils proportionally to their electoral contribution. For
example, if A and B collaborate and win their payoffs will be and ' respectively.
x+y x+y
In the area labeled I, A is certain to win alone and will have no incentive to cooperate with B
or any other group; conversely, in area II, B can win the election alone with no need for
partners. The possibilities for cooperation arise in areas III and IV. In area III, A and B can
combine their vote shares to achieve the upper threshold of 0.5 and win. In area IV, A and B
have insufficient joint vote share to exceed the upper threshold. If the remaining share 1- x -
y is controlled by a single group C, that group will certainly forfeit cooperation with A and
B, since it can win alone. If the remaining vote share is controlled by multiple other groups,
A and B can still win if they solicit additional partners. It is obvious that high ethnic
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heterogeneity creates possibilities for alliances, whereas low heterogeneity (when either A or
B or a third group C are sufficiently large) makes pacts unnecessary.








If the electoral formula were more proportional, this would push down the electoral threshold
to a lower constraint (see Figure 6). This situation could be described as winners-share-all;
all groups that pass the threshold T get to share the spoils of representation. A group that fails
to pass the threshold still gets a zero payoff, but any group above the threshold receives a
payoff equal to its vote share divided by the total vote share of groups that passed the
threshold." If x > T is group A's vote share and e < 1 is the cumulative vote share of all
groups that were excluded, then A's payoff will be . As before, in area IV groups A
and B cannot reach the threshold even if they cooperate, so they have to seek alternative or
additional partners or else be excluded from representation. In area V, both A and B can
cross the threshold alone, so they are indifferent to the prospect of a pre-election pact. Their
respective payoffs will be equal to x and Y whether they collaborate or not. In area
1-e 1-e
39In other words, the more groups excluded by the electoral threshold the better for the larger groups that gain
representation, because they can divide more of the spoils of government among them.
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III, A and B can form an electoral pact that will cross the threshold, which is preferable to a
zero payoff resulting from exclusion. In area I, B cannot get elected and needs to team up,
xx
I-1-e
has no incentive to cooperate with A in area 1I. As the electoral threshold decreases, areas I,
II, III, and IV become smaller, while area V expands. In a perfectly proportional system, V
covers the entire area: A and B are indifferent to any electoral alliance for purposes of
representation. They may still be open to negotiations for a post-election coalition to form a
government, which will take place along the lines of Figure 3. In fact, the majoritarian rule is
the special situation where if x >0.5, then e =1- x =>- =1. Perfect proportionality is the
1-e
special case where e = 0 -> - = x. As demonstrated, perfect proportionality theoretically
1-e
dampens incentives for cross-ethnic voting.
A slightly more complicated visualization involving three groups, A, B, and C, can be
made with areal coordinates (see Figure 7).40 All the possible demographic configurations
can be represented as points on the surface of an equilateral triangle shown in the first graph.
The triangle's three corners stand for the three ethnically homogeneous situations (all voters
belong to group A, B, or C), the center of the triangle represents the most ethnically diverse
configuration (%/ A, V3 B, % C), etc. The electoral threshold can be depicted with lines drawn
inside this space for each group. The second graph shows an example of such an electoral
threshold drawn only for group C. If C's vote share is lower than the threshold T, it cannot
gain any representation relying on its own voting power only; if C's vote share is higher than
1- T, C gains all seats and no other groups gains any; if C's vote share is between T and
1- T, both C and at least another group are guaranteed some representation. There are two
thresholds that are special cases: for the 50% majority threshold the two lines collapse in one
(T = 1- T); and for the 0% threshold of perfect proportionality no lines are drawn.
40 See Jonathan N. Katz and Gary King, "A Statistical Model for Multi-Party Electoral Data," American
Political Science Review vol. 93 no. 1 (March 1999): 15-32.
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Figure 7: Visualization with areal coordinates and three groups, A, B, and C
(0,0,1)
Three groups A, B, and
C have respective vote
shares x, y, z E [0, 1].
The surface of the
equilateral triangle
(0, 1,0) contains all possible
combinations of vote
shares as points defined
in areal coordinates.
y
Electoral thresholds can be represented on this triangle by lines for each group:
C (0, 0, 1)
A
(1, 0,0)
Above this line C has enough vote
share to win all seats regardless of
what A and B do
Between these lines C has enough
vote share to win at least some seats
Below this line C's vote share is
too low to pass the threshold
(0, 1,0)
The following graphs illustrate different electoral thresholds for all three groups. White areas
represent demographic configurations where there is a disincentive for cross-ethnic pacts.
Dark shaded areas cover demographic configurations where there are positive incentives for
such pacts because two groups can cross the threshold only by joining forces. Light shaded
areas cover demographic configurations where groups are indifferent about cross-ethnic pacts
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50% threshold: strong incentives for cross-ethnic pacts when no group has majority
C
(0.5, 0, 0.5) (0, 0.5, 0.5)
(0.5, 0, 0.5)
20% threshold: some incentives for cross-ethnic pacts if two of the groups are small
C
y (0, 0.8, 0.2)
B
(0.2, 0.8, 0)
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Drawing the threshold lines for all three groups, a 50% effective threshold (the case
of a majoritarian electoral formula) is shown first. Demographic configurations inside the
shaded dark grey area favor cross-ethnic pacts, whereas if the vote share of any of the three
groups surpasses 50% (white areas), there is no such incentive. The second example depicts a
more proportional electoral system with a 20% threshold. Whenever only one or two of the
three groups can pass this threshold by themselves, there is a disincentive for cooperation.
Cooperation is expected whenever two groups can cross the threshold only by joining forces
(dark grey). An area of indifference exists in the center of the triangle (light grey) where all
three groups on their own can cross the threshold. In the last example, under a perfectly
proportional formula, the area of indifference grows to cover the entire space. Again, this
illustrates that under plurality/majority incentives for cross-ethnic voting should be different
for ethnically homogeneous and heterogeneous constituencies, and that they should disappear
for all demographic configurations under maximal proportionality.
These abstract illustrations made two simplifying assumptions. The first was that
ethnic leaders control their entire groups' vote as a block. This can be relaxed by introducing
some intra-group competition and/or the possibility that candidates from one ethnic group
can attract at least a small proportion of another group's voters. The second simplification
involved focusing on one electoral constituency. In practice, most countries are divided into
multiple constituencies whose demographic structures may vary. Ethnic entrepreneurs at the
national level then face an aggregate situation consisting of multiple constituency-level
games. As long as most electoral constituencies are of the same type (clustered, weakly or
strongly dominated, or undominated), the groups' leaders will follow the same strategies at
the aggregate level as for any single constituency.
The last set of hypotheses relate to the second causal link, between party system
structure and ethnic conflict. I have dubbed them corollaries to distinguish them from the
propositions from the first causal link on which they are based. The first three follow jointly
from propositions 1 and 2 (hereby abbreviated P1 and P2) and reflect opposing views on the
effects of high party fragmentation; the fourth follows from P3 and P4 concerning cross-
ethnic voting.
4 For the same reasons as in the example with two groups, the groups that gain representation benefit from the
fact that some groups are excluded and the political 'pie' can be shared among fewer actors.
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Corollary 1: Voice to the Alternative (pro-PR)
Through its multiplicative effect, PR can encourage political diversity, separating moderates
from extremists within each group into different political parties, and hence creating more
flexible combinations for cross-ethnic coalition governments of moderates.
Corollary 2: Voice to the Excluded (pro-PR)
Higher proportionality reduces the threshold of representation for small minorities,
increasing their visibility and bargaining power. When each group receives seats proportional
to its population a legitimizing sentiment of 'fairness' for the political system contributes to
stability.
Corollary 3: Rewards to Extremism (anti-PR)
A lower electoral threshold will give more leverage to small extremist ethnic parties and lead
to unstable coalition governments, whereas less proportional electoral systems will favor
large centrist parties with moderate agendas.
Corollary 4: Rewards to Moderation (anti-PR)
Strategic voting helps multiethnic parties or ethnic parties with moderate positions, bridging
ethnic divisions. Higher proportionality diminishes incentives for strategic behavior, favoring
strictly ethnic voting.
To evaluate the hypothesized interactive effect of the independent variables on party
fragmentation, P1 and P2 must be examined jointly; similarly P3 and P4 must be examined
jointly to evaluate the hypothesized interactive effect of the independent variables on cross-
ethnic voting. Corollaries 1 and 2 (abbreviated C1 and C2) extol the benefits of adopting PR,
whereas C3 and C4 make negative forecasts.
Case Selection and Methodology
Ideally, the aforementioned hypotheses should be tested using data from across the
world. However, as noted, such data is unfortunately unavailable today, and creating a
worldwide dataset on patterns of ethnic voting is beyond the capacity of a single doctoral
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student. What I have therefore opted to do in this dissertation is test the hypotheses on a
small number of carefully selected case studies, with an eye to maximizing inferential value
from a small-n design. The most promising cases for such an endeavor are societies with
significant and persistent ethnic divisions that implemented an electoral reform involving a
major change in proportionality. Despite the fact that many countries have changed their
electoral system in the last few decades, only four cases fulfill the criteria: Northern Ireland,
which switched from STV to FPTP in 1929 and back to STV in 1973, Guyana which moved
from FPTP to PR in 1964, Sri Lanka, which implemented a similar change in 1978 (also
adopting a variation of AV for presidential elections), and Turkey, which introduced one
reform from plurality to PR in 1961, and a second one to lower proportionality in 1983.42
This choice of critical test cases has two benefits, one practical and one inferential.
First, it simplifies the task of collecting data on ethnic demographics, mapping them on
electoral constituencies, and coding parties across a historical period when electoral
proportionality remained fairly constant. Second, assuming that the defining ethnic cleavage
remained the same across time, the design involves a quasi-experimental set-up with a
common treatment (electoral reform). Within-case comparison introduces controls for the
type of ethnic cleavage, ethnic demographics (assuming no massive population movements)
and general socio-economic development, which have been generally absent from previous
case study approaches. The cases display good variation on proportionality and ethnic
demography, the two independent variables in the first set of theoretical propositions (see
Figure 8). This allows for across-case comparisons on the first causal link. Because of the
range of electoral systems used, the case material speaks more to arguments about the effects
of proportionality. More limited observations about ordinality can be made for Northern
Ireland and Sri Lanka, where preferential systems have been used. With the exception of
42I am very grateful to Dr. Krister Lundell from Abo Akademi in Finland for providing me with a dataset of
electoral system reforms since 1946. 1 rejected as potential cases those where the electoral reform was between
systems within the same family of formulas (proportional vs. plurality/majority), like Fiji, or where the reform
was still too recent at the time of writing, as in FYR Macedonia. France and New Zealand both implemented
major shifts in proportionality, but in France the reform came before immigrants had become a large minority
with citizenship rights, while New Zealand's reserved seats for Maoris rendered the reform much less relevant
for minority representation. Besides, ethnic divisions in France and New Zealand are far less intense than in the
four cases chosen.
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Northern Ireland in the 1920s, all systems were in place for four or more elections, satisfying
Rein Taagepera's rule of thumb for strategic adjustment.


















Considering the second causal link, I have to be more conservative about the
inferential value of this structured comparison. The levels of violence have varied in all four
cases across time, but the intensities of the conflicts did not reach similar levels-with those
in Sri Lanka and Turkey being much deadlier. In the wider political science literature,
electoral formulas and social cleavages are seen as major determinants of party systems, but
ethnic conflict is more multi-faceted and often internationalized. All four cases have
experienced a fair amount of external influence and intervention.4 3 After analyzing the
evolution of the party system in each case, I will make remarks about the corollaries, and
return to cross-case comparisons in the concluding chapter. I cannot claim, however, that I
designed the study with certain selection criteria in mind for the party system, since
determining party system structure was the main objective of my fieldwork. Nevertheless, the
43Including British colonial rule, British mediation and US covert action in the 1960s, and US and CARICOM
mediation in the 1990s in Guyana; British intervention and a multi-lateral peace process in Northern Ireland
since the 1970s; Soviet and Syrian support for the PKK, interventions in Northern Iraq, and EU pressure on
Turkey; Indian intervention and international mediation efforts in Sri Lanka.
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first causal link is logically prior; the corollaries rest on the propositions, therefore it is
necessary to examine first if the propositions hold.
The study employs a quasi-experimental design with a common treatment for all
cases (electoral reform) that is used to examine "before-and-after" effects. Quasi-experiments
are "observational studies of a phenomenon occurring in a natural setting in which an event
or a choice occurs at some point in time, creating the approximation of an experimental
intervention." 44 Among the various threats to validity in quasi-experimental designs, the most
relevant here are those regarding history, maturation, and testing. 'History' refers to the
possibility that some other important variable changed more or less concurrently with the
test; 'maturation' refers to the possibility that post-test observations are the result of a longer
process with pre-test origins; and 'testing' refers to the situation where the nature of the test
itself may have affected observations. Few quasi-experimental designs in social science can
claim to be free of such confounding influences, but the researcher can recognize them and
try to assess their impact on the validity and generalization of inference. In terms of history,
most electoral reforms, the 'tests' in this study, were not isolated treatments; with the
exception of the 1929 one in Northern Ireland, the rest occurred in the context of larger,
multifaceted interventions (coups in Turkey, constitutional reform in Sri Lanka, the British
government as an external actor in Guyana and Northern Ireland). Only two out of the six
electoral reforms in my case studies (again, Northern Ireland in 1929, and Turkey in 1960)
were not adopted concurrently with rising ethnic tensions. In terms of maturation, a critique
of institutional reforms in societies with ethnic conflict is that they sometimes come too late
to reverse a forewarned disaster.45 Finally, in terms of testing, there is a possible weakness in
sequencing: all cases except Northern Ireland started out with a plurality electoral system and
then moved to a proportional one.
None of these critiques, however, invalidate the study design for purposes of policy
evaluation. Electoral engineering is typically attempted in societies with manifest,
unmanageable ethnic conflicts, and the actors involved rarely limit themselves to an electoral
"Alexander George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), p. 166.
"This critique follows Horowitz's observation about the question of timing, sketched in Ethnic Groups in
Conflict, p. 684, and expanded in "Incentives and Behaviour in the Ethnic Politics of Sri Lanka and Malaysia."
Third World Quarterly vol. 11 no. 4 (October 1989): 18-35.
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intervention alone. Careful examination and close knowledge of each case can reveal if the
electoral instruments had any impact by themselves or in combination with another
concurrent institutional change. 46 The move from plurality to proportionality is not an
anomaly but a common global experience: proportional systems were invented later and
historically succeeded the older plurality ones. And the case material does not support the
sequencing hypothesis that early adoption of a plurality system may have caused the high
ethnic polarization.
It is true that none of these four societies have been stable democracies. All of them
experienced lapses in democratic rule: Guyana in 1968-1992, Northern Ireland in 1969-1998,
Turkey in 1960-1961, 1971, 1980-1983, and 1997, while Sri Lanka was in an intermittent
state of civil war after 1983, which recently reached a dramatic conclusion. But imperfect
democracies are exactly the kind of societies where international actors undertake electoral
engineering experiments. Since the object of the study is to examine the effects of electoral
proportionality on political party structure in ethnically divided states, including cases
without ethnic divisions would not add any analytical or policy relevance. The electoral
system changes were imposed in all cases by an international or domestic actor with a clear
intent to address social conflicts. Typically some parties benefited and others lost, and
fairness to all political forces was not the dominant concern of the reformers. Again, this is
no different from the numerous recent cases where international actors have intervened to
design a target's political institutions. In fact this is exactly what happened with Britain's role
in Northern Ireland, and is also partly true with respect to India's role in Sri Lanka.
Each case involves a number of identical steps, with the aim of providing a degree of
consistency that will facilitate across-case comparison. First, I divide each case into two or
three periods between reforms (two for Guyana and Sri Lanka, three for Turkey and Northern
Ireland), according to the electoral system in place. I identify the salient ethnic cleavages in
the population using ethnographic sources and provide background information about the
nature and evolution of the conflict. Then, for each period, I describe the electoral geography,
by mapping the ethnic groups onto electoral constituencies as well as I can, combining
information from the national census, election and delimitation commission reports, and
46 Such instruments considered in the case studies include mandatory power-sharing (Northern Ireland), semi-
presidentialism (Guyana, Sri Lanka), and bans on political parties (Turkey).
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independent demographic studies. I then code the ethnic composition of each constituency
and characterize the electoral demography overall, noting whether it would be favorable or
unfavorable to the mobilization of each ethnicity. For each period, I study the country's
political history, using primary and secondary sources, in order to identify the ethnic
composition and platforms of all significant political parties that participated in elections. I
track each party's political behavior and evolution on matters related to ethnicity, including
possible splits, merges, and coalition agreements with other parties. I collect constituency-
level election results and analyze them with respect to patterns of ethnic voting. I use this
information to code the political parties by their ethnic voter base according to the typology
developed in this chapter. I describe the theoretical expectations in each period (given the
electoral formula and demography) and compare them to the actual electoral record. Finally,
I compare the pre- and post-reform periods in order to determine whether political party
formation and voting behavior confirm or contradict the hypotheses formulated above.
Each case study involved extensive fieldwork combining archival research and
interviews. The interviews were targeted at four tiers of respondents: political party officials,
civil society leaders, election observers, and ordinary citizens. Interviews in the first three
('elite') tiers were eponymous and respondents were selected rigorously. In the process of
selection I made separate complete lists of all major political parties (current or historical),
key governmental and non-governmental agencies involved in the electoral process, and
important civil society organizations representing each ethnic group. For each of these I
identified one or more leading figures (e.g. party head or general secretary, election
commissioner, director of election observation mission, leader of minority organization) and
possible alternates, in case the top choices declined. Potential respondents were contacted in
this order by telephone or e-mail with a standard communication explaining my background
and the topic of my dissertation. With the exception of Sri Lanka-where my research was
most hampered by the ongoing fighting as the civil war drew to a close-I was able to travel
extensively within each country, to visit various electoral constituencies, and to obtain
interviews with key figures from all political parties, state agencies, and civil society
organizations on my list.
The general goal of the interviews was to corroborate published sources on the actual
conduct and dynamic of elections in each case, to clarify details of particular historical
48
Evangelos Liaras Theory, Hypotheses, and Methods
events, and to elucidate the interplay between candidates and voters with regards to ethnicity.
The interviews were structured, following a series of questions appropriate for each tier and
adjusted to the respondent's personal experience with the electoral process. Interviews with
party officials specifically aimed to elicit information on parties' ethnic agendas and cadre
composition, electoral strategies and ethnic appeals, negotiations and electoral pacts between
parties, party attitudes towards the electoral system, and candidates' experiences with the
campaign in their electoral constituencies. Interviews with election-related agencies focused
on the organization's mandate and technical role in elections, challenges and possible
irregularities encountered (actual or alleged), and personal assessments of the electoral
system and the overall integrity of the electoral process. Interviews with leaders of ethnic
organizations included questions on the organization's structure and membership, its
relationship with political parties, and its general positions on issues pertaining to ethnic and
electoral politics.
For the fourth tier I relied on personal acquaintances made during the course of my
fieldwork, and the interviews were kept anonymous in order to protect the privacy of the
respondents. For this reason, they are cited with their real names altered. The questions I
asked voters revolved around their own ethnic and party affiliations, their voting behavior,
their understanding of the electoral system, and their attitudes on current politics and ethnic
relations. None of these questions posed a danger to the respondents, but in societies
traumatized by ethnic conflict such conversations require a level of familiarity that I could
not have attained in the context of a door-to-door survey. I cannot claim that the selection
process for this tier was rigorous or necessarily representative since it was conditioned on
personal serendipity, although I did make an effort to approach voters from all ethnic groups,
both genders, and different walks of life. I would consider my entire research project highly
deficient if it did not involve contact and engagement with both candidates and voters. At the
end of my travels, I had learned just as much-if not more-from the latter as I had from the
former.
Evangelos Liaras Theory, Hypotheses, and Methods
Chapter 2
GUYANA: THE REIGNING PLURALITY
Guyana is a Caribbean society which is neither an island nor in the Caribbean.
Tucked on the northern coast of South America between Venezuela and Brazil, outside the
chain of the Antilles, its coasts awash with the muddy outpour of the Orinoco River, it is not
naturally endowed as a conventional vacation spot, except for avid eco-tourists. Guyana is a
plantation society in more than just the agricultural sense. Apart from prized sugar, its Dutch
and later British colonial masters also planted it with people from other parts of the world,
Africans and Asians brought in as forced labor. The same ethnic mix is found in neighboring
Trinidad and Suriname; but in Guyana it gave rise to a particularly protracted socio-political
conflict, which has only recently begun to subside. My fieldwork in Guyana took place in the
fall of 2008, two years after the 2006 election-the first non-violent one since the country's
independence. Elections, electoral systems, and accusations of electoral fraud have played a
large role in Guyanese political history. The purpose of this chapter is to schematically
describe them in light of electoral engineering theory.
Ethnic Identities in Guyana
Unlike the other cases in this study, the basic proxy of ethnic division in Guyana is
race. Since colonial times, British Guiana was known by the motto "the land of the six
races." 47 Counts of these have differed, but most include the following: Africans or Afro-
Guyanese, East Indians or Indo-Guyanese, the indigenous Amerindians, Europeans (many of
them Portuguese), Asians (primarily Chinese), and people of mixed racial background. I have
47 'Guiana' was the older spelling which-T retain at times in the text for historical purposes.
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called race a proxy because it is often a shortcut for summarizing the other cultural attributes
of each of these groups or even sometimes a convenient blanket term for merging other
ethnic categories (e.g. ignoring that there are several Amerindian tribes or that initially the
British did not consider the Portuguese 'white'). Nevertheless, these groupings are widely
accepted in Guyanese everyday life, and replicated in official publications and in the social
science literature.
Colonized by the Dutch in the 17th century and captured by the British during the
Napoleonic Wars, Guyana was originally dominated by the sugar economy. Deeming the
indigenous people unsuitable for hard labor (but subsequently using them as slave guards),
the plantation owners imported thousands of African slaves who toiled in the sugar fields
until slavery's abolition in 1834. In the mid- 19h century, freed slaves tried to escape from the
plantation environment and struggled to establish independent farming communities, while
the plantation owners replaced them with new waves of indentured workers-at first
Portuguese and Chinese, but increasingly from the late 19 th century on, East Indian.4 8 As
poor migrants from rural India became the new agricultural working class, the Chinese and
Portuguese shifted to commercial and professional activities; many Africans also moved to
the towns, seeking opportunities in the urban economy and in colonial administration. Social
historians of Guyana have argued that although all these ethnic groups shared a history of
oppressive labor under colonial rule, they did so in separate periods or with different
experiences, often in competition with each other and occupying segmented physical and
cultural spaces.4 9
In 1920, it was indentured labor's turn to be abolished in the British Empire. Some
Indians returned to the subcontinent (as, in theory at least, they all could at the end of their
contract), but most stayed in the new West Indies homeland. A budding trade unionism in the
1920s brought together people from different ethnic groups and eventually, by the 1940s,
gave rise to a national independence movement. Even within trade unionism, however, ethnic
distinctions were present, both in separate organizations (the League of Coloured Peoples vs.
48 For a history of this migratory movement see K. 0. Laurence, A Question ofLabor: Indentured Immigration
into Trinidad and British Guiana, 1875-1917 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994).
49 See Chaitram Singh, Guyana: Politics in a Plantation Society (New York: Praeger; Stanford, CA: Hoover
Institution Press, 1988), pp. 1-11, 26; Steve Garner, Guyana, 1838-1985: Ethnicity, Class and Gender
(Kingston, Miami: Ian Randle Publishers, 2007), pp. 1-71.
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the British Guiana East Indian Association) and in different specializations (with Indians
concentrated in agriculture, and Africans in mining, education, and the civil service).
In 1955, after a bitter confrontation with the colonial authorities, British Guiana's
national movement broke off into two factions: one led by Cheddi Jagan, a US-educated East
Indian dentist, and the other by Forbes Burnham, a UK-educated African lawyer. Jagan's
group kept the original name of the movement, the People's Progressive Party (PPP), while
Burnham's group evolved into the People's National Congress (PNC). By the early 1960s, the
PPP-PNC divide had taken an overtly racial tone, turning every election into an ethnic riot.
PPP had the edge at the ballot box, but cunning maneuvering by Burnham won him British
and American support, allowing him to become prime minister shortly before independence
in 1966 and to subsequently establish a quasi-dictatorship. Democracy returned to Guyana at
the end of the Cold War in 1992, and with it PPP regained a seemingly permanent foothold
on power.
The Indo-Guyanese have been the largest ethnic group in Guyana throughout the 2 0th
century. The second largest group, the Afro-Guyanese, maintain a reservoir of complaints
against them about economic and political domination. Sherwood Lowe, Dean of
Technology at the University of Guyana and an ex-deputy of PNC's moderate faction,
summarizes this view: "it's sheer numbers, by a fluke of history more ships came, more
Indians arrived in Guyana; why then should that give them the right to be supreme
leaders?"50 The Indo-Guyanese counter that during the 28 years of PNC rule it was they who
were the victims of state discrimination. As in other divided societies, perceptions of
unfairness loom larger in the public debate than actual inequalities or the hard data needed to
prove discrimination. Economic studies indicate that the Africans are only marginally poorer
on average than East Indians, that the most disadvantaged group are the Amerindians, and
that the overall correlation between poverty and race is weak.5 On the other hand,
accusations voiced by PNC and Afro-Guyanese civil society organizations that blacks are
discriminated against in loans and government programs are hard to prove because no ethnic
50 Interview with Sherwood Lowe, University of Guyana, 15/9/2008.
5 See John Gafar, "Income Distribution, Inequality, and Poverty during Economic Reforms in Guyana."
Journal ofDeveloping Areas, vol. 38 no. 1 (2004): 55-77.
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data is collected on loans or public procurement bids. Such allegations are not hard to
believe considering that Guyana has one of the most corrupt economies in the Western
hemisphere. A 2006 Americas Barometer survey, however, found no substantial difference
in corruption victimization between Guyana's ethnic groups.54
Racial segregation in Guyana is most acutely seen in trade unionism and in the armed
forces. The umbrella Trade Union Congress (TUC), traditionally African-dominated and
incorporating miners', teachers', and civil service unions, has for a long time been at odds
with the major agricultural unions GAWU and NAACIE which represent East Indians.5 5 The
army and the police are overwhelmingly African, the latter since colonial times.56 One would
expect an East Indian party in power to feel threatened by this imbalance and to want to
address it. PPP General Secretary Donald Ramotar claims that there is widespread hazing and
harassment of non-Africans in the security forces which the government finds hard to
combat. "But we have never asked the police or army to do anything political for us," he
added. Indo-Guyanese opinion on the street is that whenever the PNC organizes riots around
election time, the government is reluctant to ask the army to intervene." As for the police, in
a 2006 World Competitiveness Survey, Guyana ranked last out of 125 countries on police
reliability.58 An Indo-Guyanese professional told me privately: "even if a robber were in my
back yard I would not call the police. They probably wouldn't help a black person either, but
if you're Indian it's twice as bad." 59
The long duel between PPP and PNC has defined ethnic relations in Guyana for
decades. Politically driven riots took place as recently as 2003, and older people have vivid
memories of the violence in the 1960s, when racially mixed communities were torn apart.
52 See two relevant reports by the Ethnic Relations Commission: "Public Consultations on the Perceived Needs
of the African Guyanese Community" (November 13-16, 2007) and Melissa Ifill, "Study to Assess Whether
There Is Any Discrimination in the Award and Distribution of Economic Opportunities in Guyana" (July 24,
2007).
5 Transparency International's 2008 Corruption Perceptions Index (http://www.transparency.org) was harshly
denounced by President Bharrat Jagdeo as untrue.
5 Mark Bynoe and Talia Choy, The Political Culture ofDemocracy in Guyana: 2006, LAPOP, p. 86.
5 Interviews with Norris Whitter and N. K. Gopaul.
56 In 1965 the police was 73.5% African, 19.9% Indian, 4.2% mixed, 0.8% Portuguese, 0.3% European, and
1.3% other. Steve Garner, Guyana, 1838-1985: Ethnicity, Class and Gender, p. 62.
5 A small Indian party, ROAR (Rise Organize and Rebuild Guyana), which won a seat in the 2001 election,
campaigned against PPP on grounds that it fails to protect the lives of East Indians.
58 Bynoe and Choy, The Political Culture ofDemocracy in Guyana: 2006, p. 93.
59 Interviews with Donald Ramotar and Majid.
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The exact numbers of deaths caused by the recurrent civil unrest is not known, but is
probably only in the hundreds.60 In recent years, organized crime has taken more lives.
Guyana's underworld, however, is not race-blind, and crime is also a source of communal
tension. In 2002-2006 the country was shaken by a gang war launched by Indo-Guyanese
drug trafficker 'Roger' Khan against Afro-Guyanese gangs kidnapping Indo-Guyanese
businessmen. Khan was eventually arrested in Suriname and his trial is pending in the US,
but similar cases have stirred racial tensions since.61
More than a tenth of Guyana's population is of mixed racial background. Mixed
people were identified as a separate group in British Caribbean colonies for a long time
before parties and elections were introduced. The authors of the 1946 census cited the
following about their classification of the "mixed race" category:
...the mixed or coloured population is predominantly a European-African mixture.... The line of
demarcation between Mixed and Black is incapable of being strictly defined. If any admixture
of European ancestry were to be the criterion and if the details of ancestry could be known, a
much lower proportion that the census tables reveal would be described as African and a much
higher as mixed. In practice, however, as later generations increase the African proportion, the
children of mixed and Black tend to be classed as Black.62
Mixed or 'colored' people in Guyana have not been as cohesive a group as Africans
or Indians, with their 'own' party or special organizations. The percentage of people
identifying as mixed is highest in Georgetown and in Amerindian areas, particularly the
Northwestern logging region. Mixed marriages are more common in the capital's urban
environment or on the jungle and savannah 'frontier'; coastal rural communities tend to be
more segregated. The ethnic backgrounds of mixed couples have changed over time. In the
2l' century, intermarriage between religions and without conversion is not at all unheard of
and social attitudes towards it are more relaxed. But in earlier times intermarriage was more
60 In the 1964 riots, probably the worst in history, the colonial police officially recorded 176 deaths.
61 For the 'Fineman' Rawlins case, see "Guyana Shooting Rampage Kills 11," BBC World News 27/1/2008;
"Guyana's Crime Challenge," BBC Caribbean 22/22008; and "Guyana Agents Kill Massacre Suspect in Raid,"
International Herald Tribune 28/8/2008.
62 West Indian Census Report 1946, pp. 15-16.
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commonly intra-religious, which explains why mixed people tended to be urban, Christian,
and at least some part white or part black.
In colonial times, mixed people formed a large part of the Creole elite that maintained
good relations with the British. Today, identification with one of the main racial groups is a
personal choice based on social experience and the ethnic politics. Rafael Trotman, a
Fletcher School graduate and co-chairman of the new interracial party Alliance for Change
(AFC), knows that ancestry has definite political repercussions: "it depends what you are
mixed with; if you are mixed Indian-Amerindian, you will not tend towards the PNC."
Trotman is himself of mixed black, white, and Chinese ancestry, and used to be a PNC
deputy before he founded the AFC in 2005. Black voters generally perceive him as black; but
whereas some blacks view him as one of their own who has tried to break away from the
antiquated PNC leadership, others see him as a turncoat who split the black vote in 2006. "In
Guyana," he told me, "I am despised by some quarters of the African community because I
am not black enough." 63
The smaller communities, the Portuguese and Chinese, were the first to go after the
British. PNC policies were bad for private business while the ethnic polarization did not
leave much space for the numerically marginal others. Since the 1990s, fresh immigration
from China has given the Chinese community a breath of life; but the newcomers are not yet
Anglicized and they are more inward-looking than the older generation. 64 While the few
remaining Portuguese are even less visible, immigration from Brazil has given rise to a new
Lusophone community of guest workers along the road from Georgetown to Lethem, on the
Brazilian border in the south. The 2002 census counted the foreign-born population under
6510,000 but UNDP estimates the number to be many times higher in Georgetown alone.
Brazilian immigrants stand out as the only sizable non-Anglophone community. Most
people in Guyana speak some variety of Guyanese English Creole. Like other Caribbean
creoles, it constitutes a dialect continuum ranging across social classes and regions, the
dialect of Berbice (the predominantly Indian northeastern area) being the most poorly
63 Interviews with Rafael Trotman, Raule, Winston, Lloy, and Jason.
64 For accounts of Chinese history in Guyana see Trev Sua-A-Quan, Cane reapers: Chinese Indentured
Immigrants in Guyana (Vancouver: Riftswood Publications, 1999) and Laura Jane Hall, The Chinese in
Guyana: The making of a Creole community (UC Berkeley unpublished PhD thesis, 1995).
65 Guyana 2002 Census ofPopulation, p. 19; interview with Trevor Benn, UNDP, 26/9/2008.
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intelligible even to other Guyanese. 6 Educated Guyanese easily code switch between
Standard English, when talking to a foreigner, and Creole, when talking to a compatriot. The
speech of working class East Indians may be peppered with slang words from Hindi/Urdu,
but knowledge of South Asian languages has steadily declined. Although Indian movies and
sitcoms are popular, there is only limited interest in linguistic revival among younger Indo-
Guyanese. The two most common indigenous languages, Makushi and Wapishana, are not
standardized or taught in the educational system. Amerindians living in ethnically mixed
rural areas or those who have migrated to the larger towns have typically lost contact with
their linguistic heritage. Under such circumstances of gradual assimilation, language has not
played an independent role in ethnic politics, except in those instances when it reinforces the
racial oppositions (e.g. the infamous apan jhaat, "our own kind," a slogan used by PPP
propagandists to rally the Indian vote).
Guyana is very religiously diverse, and in ways that are crosscutting with race.
Churches, mosques, and mandirs are seen side-by-side on public roads. Most Indo-Guyanese
are Hindu, with significant minorities of Muslims and Christians, the latter often descendants
of converts from the colonial period. The Afro-Guyanese are almost universally Christian-a
very small minority identifies as Rastafari. Amerindian society was heavily influenced by
Christian missionary activity, and the rite of passage to integration for many an Amerindian
typically consisted of a missionary school education. The Catholic Church has been very
active in Amerindian areas, but it is not the largest Christian denomination in Guyana; most
Guyanese Christians follow various Protestant creeds (Anglican, Presbyterian, Methodist,
and today increasingly Pentecostal). Compared to Hindus and Muslims, Christians are
religiously fragmented and inter-denominational cooperation is haphazard.67 The Hindu and
Muslim communities are divided organizationally more than dogmatically. However, one
organization has traditionally been the dominant one in each community. 68
66 For a detailed treatment see John Rickford, Dimensions of a Creole Continuum: History, Texts, and
Linguistic Analysis of Guyanese Creole (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1987).
67 The Council of Churches, which vocally opposed the PNC dictatorship, has virtually evaporated today.
68 The Guiana United Sad'r Islamic Anjuman (GUSIAD or Anjuman) was the main Muslim organization until
the 1960s; the Central Islamic Organization of Guyana (CIOG), founded in 1979 in reaction to the divisive
politicization of Anjuman by PPP and PNC, is the most important one today. See Raymond Chickrie, "Islamic
Organizations in Guyana: Seventy Years of History and Politics, 1936-2006," Journal of Muslim Minority
Affairs vol. 27 no. 3 (2007): 401-428. Similarly for Hindus, the Hindu Maha Sabha was superseded in 1975 by
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Remarkably, Muslim and Hindu leaders have so far shielded their communities from
the religious strife plaguing the Indian subcontinent, and have preserved an Indo-Guyanese
image of interfaith harmony. Guyana has not experienced any Hindu-Muslim violence.
Relations between Christianity and these two religions are another matter. Proselytism and
favoritism towards Christians were standard complaints of Hindus and Muslims against the
British colonial authorities. In the 1950s and 60s, at the height of the PPP-PNC struggle, the
racial division also took a religious twist. Forbes Burnham put forward Christianity as an
aspect of cultural affinity between the Afro-Guyanese and the British or the West in general,
casting the PPP as essentially oriental and anti-Western. The PPP's Marxist rhetoric was also
seen as an atheistic threat by devout Guyanese Christians. In the 1970s, however, Christian
leaders joined the opposition against the PNC, and developed a cordial relationship with PPP
which carries on until today. In the last decade, religious leaders have made ad hoc efforts to
meet and make interfaith pleas for calm and restraint during the outbursts of electoral
violence. 69
Ethnic Demographics
Guyana's oblong territory is traversed by four rivers, from west to east: Essequibo,
Demerara, Berbice, and Corentyne, the last marking the border with Suriname. Much of the
interior is jungle or savannah. The bulk of the population is concentrated on the coastal strip,
a marshy flood-prone lowland that must have made the original Dutch colonists feel closer to
home. Europeans always made up a very small proportion of an already sparsely populated
colony. In terms of total land mass, Guyana is the largest member of CARICOM, but its
population hardly exceeds three quarters of a million, and has been stagnant since the 1970s
with high rates of emigration to North America.
Guyana has not had a racial majority during its periods of democratic rule. According
to census data (see Table 1), the East Indians actually became a majority only during the
Burnham years, but have since declined back to a plurality. During the 1950s, blacks still
the Hindu Dharmic Sabha, led by PPP Minister Pandit Persaud. There are virtually no Shia Muslims in Guyana,
but there is an Arya Samaj (reform Hindu) community.
69 Interviews with Bishop Edgehill, Pandit Persaud, and Fazeel Farouz.
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formed an electoral plurality. The figures from 1946 and 1960 overstate the electoral weight
of East Indians, because a larger proportion of East Indians was below voting age due to their
higher birth rate. This Indian demographic time bomb was a major preoccupation for Forbes
Burnham, who managed to get the electoral system changed from SMP to PR in 1964, just in
time before these adolescents reached adulthood-which would guarantee the PPP a majority
of seats by the East Indian vote alone under either electoral formula. Emigration since the
1960s dramatically lowered the numbers of Chinese, Portuguese, and other small minorities,
while the proportion of Amerindians and people of mixed ancestry has been on the rise.























Other 3.9% 2.8% 1.7% 0.8% 0.5% 0.5%
TOTAL 375,701 560,330 699,844 759,567 718,406 751,223
Table 2: Religion in the Guyanese census, 1946-2002
1946 1960 1970 1980 1991 2002
Christian 57.5% 56.7% 45.7% 42.4% 42.5% 57.4%
Hindu 31.9% 33.4% 37.3% 37.1% 35% 28.4%
Muslim 7.9% 8.8% 'other' 8.7% 8% 7.2%
Other 2.7% 1.1% 17% 11.8% 14.5% 7.1%
TOTAL 375,701 560,330 701,718 758,619 718,406 751,223
The religious picture is different: Guyana has consistently been a predominantly
Christian society (see Table 2). The census data on religion from 1970, 1980, and 1991 are





1970 1980 1991 2002
trickled to census responses, inflating the 'none' and 'other' categories, while in 1970 Muslims
were not reported as a separate group. Emigration has affected all religious communities,
but Evangelical missionary activity over time has more effectively targeted Hindus. As
already mentioned, a great denominational diversity belies the apparent Christian majority.
The largest denominations in the 2002 census were Pentecostals (17%), Catholics (8.1%),
and Anglicans (7%). In 1960, the situation was much different: the three largest were
Anglicans (19.6%), Catholics (14.9%), and Methodists (4.5%).71
Guyana's regional ethnic distribution during the 20th century changed only as a result
of urbanization. The two main cities, Georgetown and New Amsterdam, traditionally had a
strong African character and a high proportion of Europeans, Asians and people of mixed
ancestry. East Indians still predominate in the agricultural areas along the Demerara and
Berbice Rivers and the mouth of the Essequibo, but the community has gradually become
more urban and professional, increasing its presence in Georgetown and supplanting the
Chinese and the Portuguese. The interior is primarily inhabited by the Amerindian tribes,
except for the mining region around Linden, which is overwhelmingly African.
The ethnic geography of Guyanese elections is difficult to pinpoint during the SMP
period because the number of single-member districts changed from one election to the next
and the constituency boundaries did not coincide with census enumeration districts. An
important piece of information comes from a 1950 colonial report which estimated the ethnic
composition of the 14 districts used in 1947, based on 1946 census data with adjustment for
the estimated number of people reaching voting age by 1952 (when the next election was
72
expected). The purpose of this report was to inform the decision of the colonial authorities
on whether or not to extend universal suffrage, since the 1947 election had been conducted
with strict literacy requirements. The next election actually took place in 1953 and the British
drew new electoral boundaries for it; but the young PPP was still united at that time and
voting did not follow racial lines. The report's estimates are particularly useful for the
70 For the confrontation between the PNC and the Council of Churches see "Religion and Politics" in Guyana
and Belize: Country Studies, Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, edited by Tim Merrill
(Washington, DC: US GPO, 1993).
7' Guyana Census of Population 2002, p. 7; British Guiana Populations Census 1960, Table 6.
72 British Guiana, The Electoral Districts: Race, Age, Literacy, Gainful Occupation (Georgetown: Bureau of
Public Information, 1950). Cheddi Jagan Research Center, elections file.
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subsequent 1957 election, which was held with the original 14 districts; this was the defining
election for Guyana's political history, as Jagan and Burnham clashed for the first time after
the PPP breakup.
Table 3: Estimated ethnic composition of Guyana's single-member districts in 1952
CONSTITUENCY East Indian African
East Berbice 72% 23%
New Amsterdam 16% 66%
Berbice River 36% 48%
West Berbice 39% 55%
Eastern Demerara 51% 41%
Central Demerara 44% 44%
Georgetown North 10% 54%
Georgetown Central 7% 54%
Georgetown South 12% 63%
Demerara River 45% 44%
Demerara-Essequibo 67% 29%
Essequibo River 37% 43%
Western Essequibo 43% 37%


















Overall, there were three constituencies with an East Indian majority and two with an
East Indian plurality; five had African majorities and three African pluralities (a paper-thin
one in Central Demerara); only one had an Amerindian majority (Northwest). The districts
were of unequal sizes and PPP had a good basis for screaming gerrymandering, as the largest
district was the overwhelmingly Indian East Berbice, whereas the smallest districts, New
Amsterdam and Berbice River (six times smaller than East Berbice), had an African majority
and plurality respectively. This was clearly not an electoral landscape that favored an East
Indian party. It did favor an African party, particularly if most voters of mixed race were
part-black, as the 1946 census asserted. Assuming symmetric turnout, a purely East Indian
60
party could not gain more than six out of the fourteen seats, but an African one had a good
chance of winning seven. The potential for cross-racial voting was very significant, since five
(more than one third) of the constituencies had no racial majority, and they would decide the
winner of the election.
For the 1961 elections, the British enlarged the legislative council to 35 seats and
drew new constituencies. I was able to estimate the ethnic composition of half of them by
comparing data from the 1960 census with maps provided by the Lands and Surveys
Commission.73 Again, the electoral demography carried significant potential for cross-ethnic
voting, with several constituencies having no racial majority or only a thin one. If voting took
place solely along ethnic lines, the breakdown still favored an African party, because the East
Indian vote was more geographically concentrated.
Table 4: Ethnic composition of half of Guyana's single-member districts in 1961
CONSTITUENCY East Indian African Amerindian Mixed Other
Georgetown North 16.6 41.8 0.3 26.9 14.5
Georgetown Central 15.9 40.2 0.4 27.6 15.8
Georgetown South 27.3 46.8 0.4 19.5 6.1
Werk-en-Rust 11.9 53.7 0.3 27.3 6.8
Upper Demerara River 14.4 57.3 3.5 21.5 3.3
Boerasirie 71.6 22.4 0.3 4.8 0.9
New Amsterdam 24.7 53.9 0.2 17.9 3.2
Corentyne West 85.2 11.1 0.3 2.9 0.5
Corentyne Central 69.6 25.3 0.1 4.5 0.5
Berbice West 56.7 37.1 0.1 5.6 0.5
Berbice River 37.8 38.7 5.4 17.3 0.7
Berbice East 79.1 15.2 0.1 5.1 0.5
Canals Polder 64.6 30.0 0.1 4.0 1.2
Essequibo Islands 74.1 14.7 0.6 10.3 0.3
North West 3.2 8.0 61.1 26.5 1.2
Mazaruni-Potaro 9.3 43.1 23.1 22.3 2.1
Rupununi 0.2 1.7 89.9 6.2 2.0
Dharam Seelochann from the Bureau of Statistics and Mr. Dennis Case from
the Lands and Surveys Commission for their help.
7I am particularly grateful to Mr.
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The 1964 transitional election was conducted with national-list PR and 53 seats. The
national list gives tremendous power to party chairs, because candidates' names are (since
1968) presented to voters alphabetically, not in order of priority. After seats have been
apportioned by the largest remainder-Hare method, the party leaders choose which of the
candidates on their party lists will fill the seats. PPP and PNC are both leader-centered parties
uninterested in changing this rule.
In 1980, Burnham added another twelve seats elected indirectly by regional councils.
This remained the case until 2001. In 1999 the Constitution Reform Commission debated
proposals for electoral modifications, with smaller opposition parties pressing for more
regional district seats. 4 The law passed for the 2001 election made only mild changes in this
direction, keeping the overall size of parliament at 65 seats, but introducing direct elections
for the regional seats and increasing their number from 12 to 25 (thereby decreasing the
national list seats to from 53 to 40).
Table 5: Ethnic composition and seat distribution of Guyana's new regional districts
TOTAL 43.5 30.2 16.7 0.5
74Interviews with Rupert Roopnaraine and Haslyn Paris.
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Region 1 1.4 2.3 62.2 33.9 0.2 2
Region 2 47.9 13.4 16.3 22.1 0.3 2
Region 3 65.5 21.2 2 11 0.3 3
Region 4 37.5 41.7 1.7 18.4 0.7 7
Region 5 57.8 32.5 2 7.6 0.1 2
Region 6 68.7 21.1 1.6 8.4 0.2 3
Region 7 8.9 11.6 41.7 37.6 0.1 2
Region 8 2.2 7 75.9 13.9 1 1
Region 9 0.5 1.2 89.2 8.9 0.2 1
Region 10 3.1 55 7.1 34.5 0.4 2
Evangelos Liaras
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The ethnic composition of Guyana's ten administrative regions and their
corresponding number of seats is shown in Table 5.75 The regions are very unequal in
population size and the apportionment favors Amerindian districts (region 4 containing
Georgetown and over 300,000 residents returns seven seats whereas region 8 with 10,000
inhabitants returns one). Most districts are dominated (1, 8, and 9 by the Amerindians, 3, 5
and 6 by the Indo-Guyanese, and the mining region 10 by the Afro-Guyanese) but the
allocation allows one seat to go to the second largest ethnic group, except in the single-seat
districts 8 and 9 which are in any case overwhelmingly Amerindian. Georgetown, (region 4),
however, has no racial majority, nor does the country as a whole, which decides the 40
national list seats. A party relying only on the East Indian vote would fall many seats short of
a majority in Guyana's parliament. Therefore the overall potential for cross-ethnic voting or
post-election cross-ethnic coalitions remains high.
Electoral Systems and Political Parties in Guyana
In 1947 the British organized the first elections in Guiana with 14 single member
districts and very restricted suffrage in order to introduce a consultative body for the colony.
In 1948, Guyanese trade union leaders joined to form the Political Affairs Committee, which
in 1950 morphed into the People's Progressive Party (PPP). Among its founding members
were Cheddi Jagan and his American wife Janet (Guiana Sugar Workers Union), Ashton
Chase (British Guiana Labour Union) and Forbes Burnham.76 PPP pressed the British for
greater inclusion and a commitment to decolonization.
]S' Period: 1953-1963
The British Colonial Office created a constitution for Guyana and granted universal
suffrage in 1953. The elections that year were contested along class lines between PPP and
7 Source: Explanation of Guyana's Current Electoral System (GECOM publication) and Guyana Census of
Population 2002, p. 28. The locations of the regions and their names are show on Map 1.
76 The marriage of a Guyanese Indian to a Chicago Jew was fairly scandalous for 1940s standards and Janet
Jagan became the object of fascination for British and American intelligence agents on grounds of her key
organizational role in the party and her private life. The Jagans undoubtedly shared an ideological commitment
to Marxism, which has always been mentioned in PPP's constitution.
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the National Democratic Party (NDP), the political arm of the League of Coloured Peoples,
which represented urban professionals and Africans working for the colonial civil service.
PPP won a landslide victory and Cheddi Jagan became first minister, only to be sacked a few
months later when London suspended the constitution. In the following years PPP protested
and negotiated with the British, but also suffered from internal dissent. Having failed to win
the party leadership in 1953, Forbes Burnham called a congress of his supporters in
Georgetown in 1955, which elected him leader of a breakaway faction. The split was, on the
surface, ideological, not racial. Burnham argued that he had more moderate positions than
Jagan, who was a self-identified communist. The black unionist Ashton Chase remained
loyal to Jagan, while prominent Indian lawyer Jai Narine Singh joined Burnham.
In 1957 the British organized new elections for a smaller legislature, with the
constituencies used back in 1947. NDP's conservative voter base was divided between the
predominantly black middle class United Democratic Party (UDP) and the National Labour
Front (NLF), which, despite its name, was backed by business and led by Georgetown's
Christian Indian mayor Sir Lionel Alfred Luckhoo. Jagan and Burnham put forward multi-
ethnic candidate rosters, leading to some interesting results. The overwhelmingly black South
Georgetown constituency was carried by J. N. Singh, who beat UDP leader and head of the
League of Coloured People John Carter. Turnout for the elections was low, as many PPP
voters had been disappointed by the party's split. Despite its protests against gerrymandering,
Jagan's faction won a majority of seats and formed a government that tried to work with the
British.
But Burnham's ideological opening had tactical ramifications that accelerated the
racialization of Guyanese politics. In 1958 Burnham named his faction the People's National
Congress (PNC), while J. N. Singh resigned, protesting the party's 'Africanization'; he was
replaced as secretary by the Pan-Africanist intellectual Sydney King (who later changed his
name to Eusi Kwayana). In 1959 Burnham scored a success by getting UDP to join him.
Similar efforts to win over the Portuguese did not bear fruit. The business community viewed
Burnham only slightly less suspiciously than it did Jagan. In 1960 the Portuguese beverage
magnate Peter D'Aguiar formed the United Force (UF). D'Aguiar was involved in Catholic
charities in Amerindian areas, and had resources and infrastructure to campaign in those
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remote constituencies where the PPP usually didn't even field candidates. UF was blunt about
its opposition to independence, its disapproval of Jagan, and its capitalist inclinations. 77
By 1961, the racial character of the three parties had been consolidated, and the
election was marred by riots, looting, and arson. The electoral districts were increased to 35
to address PPP's gerrymandering complaints. The voting age, however, remained at 21, a
measure which clearly favored Burnham. 78 PPP won with a very narrow margin, but the SMP
system gave it a comfortable majority of 20 seats.79 PNC began campaigning for the adoption
of proportional representation, which Jagan opposed. Despite having lost most of his African
support, Jagan insisted on preserving the multi-racial character of PPP. At the 1962 party
congress he backed the incumbent party chairman Brindley Benn against his conservative
Home Affairs Minister Balram Singh Rai. The clash with Rai became so acrimonious that
Jagan dismissed him from the cabinet. Meanwhile, the US government began to play closer
attention to the situation in Guyana. After Cuba, the Kennedy administration was determined
not to allow a second Marxist regime in the Caribbean. The US pressured Britain to prevent
Guyana from becoming independent with Jagan at the helm.
PR and Independence: 1963-1967
Strikes organized by TUC and outbreaks of rioting continued throughout Jagan's third
tenure. The PNC relentlessly accused the PPP of racial domination.81 Having reached a
deadlock in talks on the electoral formula and possible power-sharing, Jagan and Burnham
77 As UF's 1964 manifesto declared, "the ideal state is a property owning democracy" (p. 17). Today the party
website (http://www.tufsite.com/) commemorates Peter D'Aguiar's "vision of a free market economy led by
People's Enterprise Capitalism, western democratic ideals and a belief in the Almighty."
78 The 1961 constitution also created a senate which was not elected but appointed by the political parties.
79 In all but one of these twenty contests PPP won by a clear majority, not just a plurality of the vote.
80 For a detailed history of this period see Singh, Politics in a Plantation Society, pp. 13-38; Thomas Spinner, A
Political and Social History of Guyana, 1945-1983 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984), pp. 17-112; Reynold
Burrowes, The Wild Coast: An Account ofPolitics in Guyana (Cambridge, MA: Schenkman Publishing, 1984),
pp. 19-202; Ralph Premdas, Ethnic Conflict and Development: the Case of Guyana (Aldershot: Avebury, 1995),
pp. 35-111; Garner, Guyana, 1838-1985, pp. 73-129; and Steven Rabe, U.S. Intervention in British Guiana: A
Cold War Story (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2005).
81 Sydney King even petitioned foreign governments to partition Guyana into three zones (one Indian, one
African, and a 'free' mixed one). When he pushed further by opposing independence for Guyana for fear of
Indian domination of Africans, Burnham expelled him from PNC.
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relegated the decision to British Colonial Secretary Duncan Sandys, who incorporated PR
without a threshold into Guiana's 1963 constitution.
The 1964 election was the most bitterly contested until that time, with unprecedented
violence that caused the racial segregation of previously mixed communities. CIA polls
ahead of the election had predicted that "Indian support for the Burnham PNC party is
practically non-existent" and recommended that all measures should be taken to attract
Indian votes away from Jagan.82 Financial and organizational support was offered to PNC
and UF, and two parties specifically appealing to Indian voters made a disappointing debut:
the Guyana United Muslim Party (GUMP) and the Justice Party (JP) led by Balram Singh
Rai and Jai Narine Singh, who argued that the PPP was communist, hence anti-Hindu. These
US-funded efforts were to no avail, as PPP still received the highest number of votes and
seats. But PR cost PPP its legislative majority. In a glaring display of partiality, the colonial
governor Sir Richard Luyt bypassed Jagan and invited Burnham, who had announced a
coalition with UF, to form a government. With a more pro-Western government in power,
the British kept true to their promise and granted independence in 1966.
Faced with strikes and sugar cane burning by GAWU, Burnham declared a state of
emergency. His next move was to split his coalition partner by getting some UF deputies,
including the Muslim Minister of Trade Mohamed Kassim, to join the PNC. From that point
on UF fell into disarray. D'Aguiar resigned, sold off his companies and moved to Portugal.
His name is preserved on the bottles of Guyana's (now nationalized) finest rum. Aubrey
Collins, then member of UF's executive committee, told me that he believed the party had no
other choice: "If we had backed PPP, it would have been a non-starter. The Americans would
have blocked us and harassed us in all sorts of ways." 83
The PNC Years: 1968-1992
After D'Aguiar's departure, PNC ruled alone but continued to feign democracy.
Opposition parties were not banned and elections continued, although ballot boxes were
82 Central Intelligence Agency, British Guiana Survey, March, 1964, Vol. 1 -Analysis of Tabulations. Cheddi
Jagan Research Center (copy from LBJ Library).
83 Interview with Aubrey Collins, 9/10/08; Spinner, A Political and Social History of Guyana, pp. 113-131;
Singh, Politics in a Plantation Society, pp. 29-38; Burrowes, The Wild Coast, pp. 217-221.
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removed by the military and stuffed in secret locations. Burnham introduced or expanded
voting by proxy, by mail, and voting from overseas. In theory, these measures were supposed
to facilitate political participation by the diaspora and to protect the secrecy of the vote in
small communities. In practice, they were used to manipulate results, and were naturally
protested by the opposition (see PPP poster). In 1969, the ranch owners and their Amerindian
workers in the southern district of Rupununi staged a revolt declaring secession in response
to the rigged 1968 election. The army swiftly recaptured Lethem and the rebels fled to Brazil.
After the Rupununi revolt, oppression increased. Burnham proclaimed Guyana a republic
with him as president and promulgated a new constitution in 1980.84
The most important new arrival in Guyana's political scene during the PNC years was
the Working People's Alliance (WPA). Founded in 1974 by small breakaway groups from
the PPP and PNC, it sought to bridge the racial divide on a socialist platform. Led by the
charismatic Pan-Africanist historian Walter Rodney, the WPA quickly gathered a number of
Afro-Guyanese figures disillusioned with the PNC, like Sydney King (by now known as Eusi
Kwayana). With prominent Afro-Guyanese in its ranks, WPA was a different threat to PNC
than PPP, as it exposed the regime's growing unpopularity. Unlike the PPP, the WPA was
also committed to armed struggle. Its leadership was arrested after setting fire to the Ministry
of National Development in 1979 and Walter Rodney was killed by a bomb explosion-a
suspected assassination-during the 1980 election campaign.
The PNC's ideological position swerved during the Cold War. Having risen to power
thanks to US and British aid, from the late 1960s on Burnham embarked on a socialist path
that brought him closer to the Eastern bloc. The nationalization of the bauxite industry (in
which the Soviet Union eventually invested), economic protectionism, and good relations
with Cuba (including refueling for Cuban aircraft en route to Angola) were probably not the
policies that the CIA were expecting from Burnham in the early 60s. While relations with the
US grew chillier in the 1970s and 80s, Burnham defended his policies as necessary for
Guyana's economic development, arguing that the PPP, if in power, would have been even
more pro-Soviet. Burnham's economic policy was catastrophic and the standard of living fell.
Opposition to the PNC gradually widened. Originally centered around the Indian sugar trade
84 For a history of Guyana under Burnham see Singh, Politics in a Plantation Society, pp. 39-138 and Premdas,
Ethnic Conflict and Development: the Case of Guyana, pp. 112-141.
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Janet Jagan and PPP supporters in London in 1962 picketing against PK
Photo Courtesy: Cheddi Jagan Research Center. Copyright: Nadira Jagan
An interracial alliance against the PNC; Walter Rodney meeting Cheddi Jagan in 1974
Photo courtesy: Cheddi Jagan Research Center; no copyright
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unions, by the 1970s it had expanded to the Guyana Council of Churches, and by the 1980s
to the black trade unions, which had once been bulwarks of the regime.85
Paradoxically, the PPP, WPA, and PNC at some level recognized one another as
leftist parties that had all grown out of Guyana's national liberation movement. In the bizarre
universe of Guyanese politics, their leaders would all travel to Havana to attend conferences
of Marxist Caribbean parties, while their supporters were involved in a death struggle back
home. The Soviet Union was eager to see the leftist parties of Guyana make peace, and to
that effect mediated secret negotiations between Burnham and the opposition in 1984-85 for
a power-sharing agreement. But Burnham died in 1985, and his successor, former Prime
Minister Desmond Hoyte decided to slowly liberalize the economy, sensing that the tide was
turning against socialism. Leftist unity was no longer an important goal and the negotiations
with PPP were scrapped.86 On the opposition side, PPP and WPA remained in contact and
agreements for a united anti-PNC front ebbed and flowed, while mutual mistrust was lurking;
Guyana's transition back to democracy was not destined to be led by a PPP-WPA coalition.
The 2 "d PR Period: 1992-
At the end of the Cold War, Guyana was a part of democratization's third wave that
did not get much airtime. One of the few outsiders paying attention was former US President
Jimmy Carter, who personally intervened to broker an agreement between Hoyte and the
opposition in 1990. US support for PNC had long evaporated, and now without the Soviet
boogieman the PPP did not look all that menacing. The "Carter Formula" proposed the
creation of a Guyana Election Commission (GECOM), with three members approved by the
governing party and three by the opposition, to oversee free elections. Hoyte conceded, but
the opposition front squabbled over the selection of the presidential candidate. For PPP,
Cheddi Jagan was the obvious choice, a vindication for his long-term exclusion from the
reins of government.87 WPA and other smaller groups disagreed, believing that Jagan was a
85 Garner, Guyana, 1838-1985, pp. 253-272; Singh, Politics in a Plantation Society, pp. 90-97.
86 Halim Majeed, Forbes Burnham: National Reconciliation and National Unity, 1984-1985 (New York: Global
Communications Publishing, 2005) and interview with Elvin McDavid. McDavid, the PNC negotiator and
Burnham's personal advisor, was removed by Hoyte and appointed ambassador to Zambia.
87 For a critique of PPP's stance see David Hinds, "Problems of Democratic Transition in Guyana: Mistakes and
Miscalculations in 1992" Social and Economic Studies, vol. 54 no. 1 (2005): 67-82.
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divisive figure who could not attract the Afro-Guyanese vote. PPP toyed with the idea of
proposing a black candidate, either the veteran PPP trade unionist Ashton Chase or the WPA
academic Clive Thomas, but such thoughts were dropped in the end; Cheddi Jagan's icon was
irresistible, and PPP felt confident that Indo-Guyanese numbers would carry the day in a free
election. One of the few black opposition figures who embraced Cheddi's candidacy was
Sam Hinds, a member of WPA. He and other individuals joined the ranks of the PPP as a
loose group of allies called 'Civic' (a term which from then on appears next to PPP on the
ballot without actually constituting a party).88
PPP won the 1992 election and every election ever since. Cheddi Jagan triumphantly
assumed the post he had been denied at independence, and was succeeded by his wife Janet
upon his death in 1997. PPP has governed without vindictiveness, although its opponents
accuse it of inverting PNC's discrimination by now favoring East Indians. PNC staged major
demonstrations after the 1997 election, claiming disenfranchisement due to the introduction
of voter identification cards. CARICOM intervened in 1999 to break the deadlock, obtaining
a commitment from Janet Jagan and Hoyte to jointly oversee constitutional reforms. The
amendments passed in 2001 created regional electoral districts (explained in a previous
section) and an Ethnic Relations Commission to address issues of racial discrimination. The
semi-presidential nature of the 1980 constitution was retained, although Guyana's president
appears so powerful only because of PPP's perennial parliamentary majority. 89 In 1998
Guyana's supreme court declared the voter identification requirement unconstitutional but
rejected PNC's demand to annul the 1997 elections. 90
For PPP the black vote is hard to obtain, but in Amerindian areas its cross-ethnic
appeals have gained resounding success. Educational and health projects and an Amerindian
Act delineating indigenous lands in negotiation with the local communities have made the
PPP government popular, allowing it to eclipse TUF in the competition for the Amerindian
vote. It is difficult and perhaps unfair to question how much of this was due to sincere
interest in national development and how much can be attributed to shrewd calculation.
88 Interviews with Sam Hinds, N. K. Gopaul, Clive Thomas, and Rupert Roopnaraine.
89 The president is elected from the party that wins a plurality of votes in the legislative election, but must resign
if the government loses a vote of confidence. Cohabitation is therefore impossible, and since the PPP has not
had the need to form coalitions, PPP presidents need not make many compromises.
90 "Esther Pereira Case" High Court of the Supreme Court of Juricature No. 36-P 1998 Demerara
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Donald Ramotar, PPP's general secretary, does not deny that the Amerindian vote makes the
difference: "if we didn't get these cross-over votes, we couldn't have a majority within the
country; the Indo-Guyanese make up less than fifty percent of the population in Guyana." 91
Vincent Alexander, former PNC vice-chairman, put it cynically: "the Amerindians vote for
whomever has the resources." 92 Carolyn Rodrigues, the most prominent Amerindian in the
PPP cabinet, who worked on the indigenous lands bill as Minister of Amerindian Affairs,
deems this view "an insult to the intelligence of Amerindian people." 93 Young, energetic, and
not officially a member of the party, she is living proof of PPP's flexible winning approach
towards Amerindians in the last decade. Still, her skills and dedication do not mean that the
PNC remarks are fundamentally untrue. State resources are a powerful asset which both PPP
and PNC knew how to use. Many Amerindians live in closely-knit rural communities with
strong group pressures. Roy, a young Amerindian tourist guide in region 8, told me about
voting in his village: "Everyone votes for the same party. During the PNC government, PNC
built the school and everyone voted PNC. Now PPP built the health care center and everyone
votes PPP."94
Until 2006, small parties did not fare well in post-transition Guyanese elections. After
Walter Rodney's death, the WPA never gathered a strong following, and it stopped
participating in elections in 2006. With the Portuguese gone and the Amerindians voting for
PPP, TUF is no longer a significant force. Its current leader, Manzoor Nadir, an Indo-
Guyanese Muslim, serves as labor minister in the PPP government and leaves open the
possibility of quitting the party leadership to join the PPP in the future. 95 This will be an
ironic end for the party of business that theoretically stands on the opposite end of the
ideological spectrum from PPP Marxists. The political mobilization and advancement of a
younger generation of Amerindians has clearly worked against a party that had a somewhat
patronizing relationship with them. In Nadir's own words, "there is an idea that Amerindians
should only be represented by Amerindians," which was not the case in D'Aguiar's days in
91 Interview with Donald Ramotar, Freedom House, Georgetown, 25/9/2008.
92 Interview with Vincent Alexander, University of Guyana, 9/10/2008.
9 Interview with Carolyn Rodrigues, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 17/10/2008.
94 Interview with Roy, Kaieteur Falls, 19/10/2008.
95 PPP has a majority without TUF's additional seat. Manzoor Nadir calls it "a coalition not out of necessity, but
inclusiveness."
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the 1960s. But an effort to create a purely Amerindian party, GAP (Guyana Action Party,
originally planned to stand for Guyana Amerindian Party), also did not bode too well. GAP
won one seat running on a joint ticket with WPA in 2001, and once again in alliance with
ROAR in 2006. The party's leader, Paul Hardy, currently spends more time working in Brazil
than campaigning in Guyana.
The biggest overturn came from within the larger parties in 2005. Rafael Trotman, a
disheartened member of PNC's younger generation, joined forces with WPA deputy Sheila
Holder and PPP deputy Khemraj Ramjattan, who had been at odds with his own party's
leadership, to form a new party with an explicitly inter-ethnic agenda: the Alliance for
Change (AFC). Thanks particularly to Trotman's popularity, the party gained just over 8% of
the vote and five seats in the election within one year of its formation, a much more
impressive result than established parties like WPA or TUF had achieved. According to
Trotman and Ramjattan, polls privately commissioned for the party showed that the AFC
drew most of its support from voters of mixed ancestry. The party is understandably
reluctant, however, to adopt a "mixed people's" platform, which would reinforce racialism
and hem in the AFC's great expectations. It remains to be seen whether the AFC can become
kingmaker or even break Guyana's entrenched two-party system. There is good reason to
believe that it cannot, and detractors who accuse Trotman of dividing the African vote are
probably correct on the facts. The AFC picked up seats lost by the PNC and its leaders
recognize that they cannot succeed unless they also capture part of PPP's voter base. Their
plan for the 2011 election is to put up Ramjattan instead of Trotman as the party's
presidential candidate, hoping that this will have the intended psychological effect on Indian
voters.96
Ethnicity and Elections in Guyana: An Appraisal
Guyana's overall racial demography has been undominated throughout its democratic
history. The existence of regional majorities meant that half or more of the legislative seats
were safe contests for one of the two major ethnic groups under SMP. Nationwide list PR
96 Interviews with Rafael Trotman and Khemraj Ramjattan.
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since 1964 has made regional demographics less important. The creation of regional districts
did not significantly change things, except by giving an advantage to a party that commands
the Amerindian vote. In a society where two rival ethnic groups-neither of which
constituted a majority-vied for political control, SMP allowed the real possibility of a
hegemonic party forming a government on its own with only a plurality of votes. This is
unlikely under PR, forcing parties to seek votes across racial groups or to form cross-racial
coalitions with other parties. Given the racial deadlock, if politicians instrumentally searched
for alternative identity categories to form electoral majorities, religion would be an obvious
choice. Considering Guyana's demographics, this could happen in two possible ways. Either
with a party rallying a Christian identity, to capitalize on the Christian religious majority; or
with a Muslim party attempting to crosscut the racial divide and gain leverage as a crucial
coalition partner for the larger parties.
Religion has indeed been politically mobilized in Guyana, with various rates of
success. The PPP in the 1950s carried the banner of Hindu and Muslim grievances and
Cheddi Jagan gained popularity by introducing various measures limiting the control of
Christian missionaries over education. Hinduism has been most closely associated with the
PPP; it is fair to say that since its creation, PPP has commanded the Hindu vote even more
securely that it has the East Indian vote overall. It is no coincidence that Pandit Reepu
Daman Persaud, the most prominent Hindu leader in Guyana, is a historical member of PPP.
The most effective instance of Christian political mobilization was the United Force, an
essentially Catholic party which briefly married the Amerindian masses with the Portuguese
bourgeoisie in the 1960s. Christianity, mingled with anti-communism, played an ideological
role in the brief PNC-TUF coalition in 1964, PPP and Hinduism being associated then with
Nehru's India and nonalignment. 97 But Christianity overall, as opposed to UF's Catholicism,
has never been the driving platform of any political party in Guyana. Spanning the three main
racial groups, Christianity never developed into a salient ethnic identity in its own right. This
may seem like a natural consequence of Guyana's denominational fragmentation. It is worth
97 Afro-Guyanese negative reflexes towards Hinduism are still present today in some quarters. For a recent
polemical exposition, see Kean Gibson, "The Dualism of Good and Evil and East Indian Insecurity in Guyana,"
Journal ofBlack Studies, vol. 36 no. 3 (2006): 362-381.
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noting, however, that at the same time Indian identity in Guyana has remained politically
cohesive across three religions (Hinduism, Islam, and Christianity).
Muslims are another interesting case for the lack of sectarian political mobilization.
Two efforts to rally them around a separate party (the GUMP in the 1960s and the UMP
recently) were both total failures. Burnham's attempt to drive a wedge between Hindus and
Muslims in order to weaken the PPP also failed in the long term. 98 A party commanding the
Muslim vote would theoretically be kingmaker between PPP and PNC, and PR should have
made such a Muslim party more feasible. However, even though such thoughts have
certainly been aired, they have not yet gained momentum within the Muslim community.99
Indo-Guyanese Muslims seem happy enough with PPP rule to not wish to upset the status
quo. Contrasting religion with race, Guyana's political history demonstrates that many
minimum-winning coalitions may be numerically possible, but the entrenchment of ethnic
identities along a certain dimension can keep them securely unrealized.100
Both PPP and PNC are eager to project that they are multi-ethnic parties open to the
other group, and keep token personalities in prominent positions (Prime Minister Sam Hinds
in PPP, Vice-Chairman Winston Murray in PNC). It is generally understood that this is just a
facade. Sam Hinds, who is one quarter Portuguese and attended an overwhelmingly Indo-
Guyanese Presbyterian mission school, speaks openly about his distance from the Afro-
Guyanese electorate: "I am not close to the black community... Most black Guyanese would
find that I am different."' 0 '
It is an accepted reality that voting since the 1960s has been heavily along racial
lines.102 PPP deputy Moses Nagamootoo pertinently observes:
98 Interview with Elvin McDavid.
99 Interview with Fazeel Farouz, President of Central Islamic Organization of Guyana, Georgetown, 15/10/2008.
1 Guyana is therefore a counterexample for the framework Dan Posner presented in Institutions and Ethnic
Politics in Africa (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
' Interview with Sam Hinds, Prime Minister's Office, Georgetown, 1/10/2008.
102 For evidence on the 1961 and 1964 elections, see Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, pp. 321-322 and
Premdas, Ethnic Conflict and Development, pp. 60-72. Former GECOM member Haslyn Paris calculated that in
1992 in the 59 polling divisions of Georgetown the correlation between the PPP vote and percentage of East
Indians was 0.89 and that between the PNC vote and percentage of Africans was 0.83. Such detailed data are
not currently available to outside researchers due to pending PNC court appeals on past general elections. In the
2006 Americas Barometer survey, among respondents declaring a party affiliation, 85.7% of Indo-Guyanese
supported the PPP, while 76.1% of Afro-Guyanese supported the PNC (p. 135).
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In 1964 the PNC got 40% of the vote which was exactly the percentage of Africans; in 1992
after 30 years of dictatorship, the crushing of an African rebellion, the assassination of Walter
Rodney, and structural adjustment which hurt Africans, Hoyte again got 40%103
That being said, PPP has historically been much more successful at cross-ethnic
appeals than the PNC in free elections. After the Burnham split, PPP defended its multi-
ethnic character and still managed to attract black votes in 1957, which probably won it the
election, despite unfairly drawn constituencies. The party lost its non-Indian support at the
height of the race riots in the 1960s, while facing an orchestrated propaganda campaign
funded by formidable outside powers. In the 1990s, PPP reestablished its multi-ethnic reach,
capturing the Amerindian vote (which it could not do in the 1960s for lack of resources and
the advantageous position of UF's Catholic leadership), and even claiming some African
votes. PPP's ability to muster the Indian vote with an unarguably ethnic agenda and then
reach out to other groups on a Guyanese Marxist platform has stood the test of time under
different electoral systems. The East Indians' position as the single largest ethnic bloc gives
the PPP an electoral advantage, but one that could easily have been squandered if PPP had
alienated all other groups, since Indians are a plurality, not a majority in Guyana.
In contrast, the PNC was able to broaden its ethnic support only under undemocratic
conditions, by cajoling some East Indians and Amerindians into accepting its patronage.
Since 1992, it has shrunk back to its African power base, and is unable to break out of it. This
is not just due to a lack of state resources, but is also a failure of leadership, and the historical
legacy of Burnham's oppression. For all their cries of discrimination, Africans are aware that
it was their party, not PPP, that suspended democracy, and this is something that East Indian
and Amerindian voters are not yet ready to forgive. The PNC has historically alienated non-
African voters, and this, not the Indians' demographic supremacy, is the reason for its
exclusion from power.
Regarding the theoretical hypotheses, Guyana's ethno-electoral heterogeneity
remained high throughout, while proportionality changed. Propositions 1 and 2 would predict
that after the PR reform, the number of parties would increase, separate parties representing
103 Interview with Moses Nagamootoo, 3/11/2008. His arithmetic is technically incorrect according to the
census, but it reasonably includes mixed people with African ancestry in the PNC's voter base.
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Amerindians and perhaps also mixed people would emerge, and more parties would compete
for the votes of the two major groups-East Indians and Africans. Comparing the first and
second electoral periods, most of these predictions did not materialize. The effective number
of parties by vote share decreased in the PR period, and Guyana's two-party system has been
preserved for four consecutive elections after the democratic transition. 104 A competitor to
PPP for the Indo-Guyanese vote (ROAR) arose but was unsuccessful. It remains to be seen
whether the AFC will increase competition for votes within the African community, which is
the most likely one to be looking for alternatives in its frustration. Survey data indicates that
AFC's support came overwhelmingly from African and Mixed voters, whereas its Indo-
Guyanese support was minimal."05
Proposition 3 is also not supported, considering that the trend towards racial voting
began before the PR reform. During the SMP period the electoral demography was very
conducive to cross-ethnic appeals and parties initially put forward multi-racial candidate
rosters. But racial voting increased over time along with racial polarization, and the electoral
incentives were not enough to hold the tide. In the PR period, on the other hand, higher
proportionality did not hamper the PPP's ability to win cross-ethnic votes and to out-compete
small parties for the Amerindian vote-under an electoral regime that actually favors such
parties.
The empirical evidence for Proposition 4 is ambiguous. In the SMP period, PPP was
successful in winning the most ethnically mixed constituencies (Berbice River, Eastern
Demerara, Essequibo River, Western Essequibo) but it is not clear if this was due to cross-
ethnic voting or higher East Indian turnout.106 PPP was aware that these were strategic seats
that had to be won. In 1961 PPP chose not to run candidates in the urban centers, where East
Indians were a minority. In the PR period, considering the entire country as an undominated
electoral district, cross-ethnic voting is significant, but this is only due to the behavior of the
smaller groups, the Amerindians and the Mixed; in Georgetown, the country's most
ethnically mixed area, voting is very racially polarized.
104 The average Laakso-Taagepera index for the effective number of parties by votes share is 2.76 for the period
1953-1961 and 2.21 for 1992-2006; it is 2.57 for 1964. By seat share it is 2.03 for 1953-1961 and 2.22 for 1992-
2006; it was highest at 2.53 for 1964.
105 The Political Culture of Democracy in Guyana: 2006, p. 135.
106 Turnout in 1957 was particularly low. See Table 7.
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Regarding the corollaries, none of them hold true. Although the conflict in Guyana
has remained at a low level, it did not decrease after the introduction of PR, even if the 1964
election, with its Cold War climate and inimical outside intervention, is omitted and one
looks only at the post-1992 period. The same phenomena (racial polemic, riots, and
accusations of electoral fraud) continued unabated. Under SMP, PNC had some reason to
complain that the electoral system made an ethnic plurality a permanent majority; under PR,
this argument no longer holds, and the situation has not changed. The only thing that may be
changing is PNC's intensity of resentment, which has more to do with the international
environment. In the 1960s, Britain and the US were easily swayed by anti-communism into
supporting Burnham. After the Cold War ended, the international environment has become
much more genuinely conducive to mediation and impartiality towards the Guyanese parties.
The absence of violence in 2006 can be largely attributed to these international influences,
either direct (through pressure on the PNC leadership) or indirect (through mediated
constitutional reforms giving the opposition more say in appointments). Regarding the role of
cross-ethnic appeals by multi-ethnic parties, those made to Amerindians by TUF or PPP have
been inconsequential for the primary racial divide between East Indians and Africans. No
party has been able to bridge this divide since 1957, under either electoral system.
In his seminal survey of ethnic conflict, Donald Horowitz presented Guyana in the
1960s as a quintessential case of an ossified ethnic party system.10 7 This is still true today,
but not because all Guyanese vote for an ethnic party affiliated with their group. Rather it is
so because most people vote along ethnic lines, but the party of the largest group regularly
manages to attract other voters as well. Unless these patterns of ethnic voting drastically
change, the PPP is bound to monopolize government. Realizing that they cannot win
elections or annul them in court, the PNC in the last few years has been moving more and
more in the direction of pressing for a power-sharing agreement. PPP, which eagerly engaged
in such negotiations under desperate circumstances in 1964 and 1984, is now cold towards
the idea. Most PPP leaders claim that the current institutional arrangements suffice. "Our
constitution gives the opposition many rights in appointments," Donald Ramotar told me.
"We have more inclusiveness than other Caribbean states." In our interview on the other side
107 Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, Chapter 7.
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of Georgetown, the opposition leader Robert Corbin rattled ominously that unless the PNC is
included in government, "there will be an explosion; mark my words." His threats may be a
hollow show. In the 2006 elections Corbin followed a policy of restraint, under pressure from
Guyana's foreign donors, according to observers.108 The 2006 election saw the lowest turnout
since the democratic transition. Without the opposition inciting confrontation, Guyana had a
calm election for the first time in half a century. Dr. Sherwood Lowe quit the PNC that same
year, believing that the party had been spending too much effort quibbling elections and was
not focused on pursuing power-sharing with PPP. "Our problem is not the electoral system,"
he says, "it's our system of government. I've read about all electoral systems; a change
would not make a difference."109
108 Terrence Simmons and Roxanne Myers, From Violent to Peaceful Elections: a Preliminary Look at Peace
Building Initiatives in Guyana (Georgetown: UNDP, 2007), p. 11.
109 Interviews with Donald Ramotar, Robert Corbin, and Sherwood Lowe.
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Table 7: Summary of Guyanese parliamentary election results, 1953-2006 (vote share/seats)
SMP Period, 1953-1963
NDP Others
1953 51.0% 18 13.2% 2 35.9% 4
PPP-Jagan PPP-Burnham UDP NLF Others
1957 47.5% 9 25.5% 3 8.2% 1 11.5% 1 7.3% 0
PPP PNC TUF
1961 42.6% 20 41.0% 11 16.3% 4
Transitional PR Election
PPP PNC TUF Others
1964 45.8% 24 40.5% 22 12.4% 7 1.2% 0
PR Period, 1992-2006
PPP/Civic PNC/Reform WPA/GAP TUF Others*
1992 53.5% 35 42.3% 27 2.0% 2 1.0% 1 1.2% 0















Seats for 1992 and 1997 include the 12 indirectly elected regional seats. Vote shares for 2001
and 2006 are for the national list; regional votes shares were almost identical.
*The 5 seats listed in 2006 were won by AFC.
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Chapter 3
NORTHERN IRELAND: THE LAW OF THE WEAK MIDDLE
Northern Ireland stands out from my other case studies due to its location in the
developed world as well as the comprehensive nature of its current peace settlement which
brought an end to a long cycle of sectarian violence, even if it is not necessarily considered
final by many observers and participants. My fieldwork in the province took place in the
spring and summer of 2008, amidst very modest celebrations marking the tenth anniversary
of the Good Friday Agreement (GFA). The conflict in Northern Ireland has been one of the
most scrutinized and well-documented in the world, with several excellent studies on its
electoral aspects. To the best of my knowledge, though, none of them has tried to assess the
impact of its electoral reforms in a macro-historical framework. The present chapter is my
effort to fill this gap.
Religion and Identity in Northern Ireland
Unlike all other cases included in this study, Northern Ireland is a society with a
single ethnic cleavage. Jim Gibney, from the executive committee of Sinn F6in, a party that
historically constituted the political wing of the Irish Republic Army (IRA), put it starkly:
"The constitutional question is the overriding question. It overrides every election that we
fight here."110 Most people know of the conflict in Northern Ireland as one between
Protestants and Catholics, and researchers often feel the need to clarify the terms they use for
the two communities. Following a widespread convention, I will use 'Protestant' and
110 Interview with Jim Gibney, Culturann, West Belfast, 10/7/2008.
'Catholic' almost interchangeably with the respective terms 'unionist' and 'nationalist'; this
should not obscure the fact that the object of contention is an entirely secular one.
Northern Ireland is the remnant of a larger historical conflict once encompassing the
entire island, during which religious denomination functioned as a proxy for different ethnic
backgrounds (Irish, English, and Scottish). Its origins date to the complete subjugation of
Ireland to the English crown and the plantation of Ulster, its northern province, with English
and Scottish settlers in the 17th century. As the Irish language receded with the advance of
English, religion remained as the primary 'ethnic' marker."' The extension of England's
religious wars to Ireland is still echoed in the traditions of the Protestant community, such as
the controversial 12th of July parades marking the 1690 Battle of the Boyne. Formal religious
discrimination in the United Kingdom ended in the 19th century, and the Irish question
evolved into a problem of self-determination focused on agitation for Home Rule. This in
turn gave rise to the division between nationalists (wanting an autonomous united Ireland)
and unionists (wanting to preserve British rule), with the fault lines typically drawn along
religious affiliations. Before the First World War, the more radical branch of nationalists
termed 'republicans' (wanting an independent Ireland) crystallized into Sinn Fein. At the end
of an IRA insurrection that spilled into communal violence in the north, the 1921 Anglo-Irish
Treaty created the Irish Free State, excluding six counties (out of the nine comprising Ulster)
where most unionists lived. These counties (Antrim, Down, Londonderry, Armagh, Tyrone,
and Fermanagh) became Northern Ireland. The bitter disagreement over the acceptability of
this territorial sacrifice to obtain independence became the defining political cleavage in
post-war Ireland.
Between the 1920s and the 1960s Northern Ireland was a self-governing part of the
United Kingdom with a parliament located at Stormont, west of the capital, Belfast. The
attitude of the Catholic minority to the Protestant-dominated state was a mixture of
indignation, protest, and abstention from the political process. In the late 1960s, inspired by
the Civil Rights movement in the United States, a generation of younger Catholics led a
campaign of civil disobedience marred by confrontations with the police, soon followed by a
m The last native speakers of Irish Gaelic in Northern Ireland died during the 20th century, but the teaching and
use of the language in public signs has become a symbolic issue for nationalists. See The Irish Language in
Northern Ireland, edited by Aodan Mac P6ilin (Belfast: Ultach Trust, 1997).
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resurgent IRA and the introduction of British troops. Bombings and shootings cost the lives
of 3,500 people over the next thirty years, with their peak in the early 1970s-a relatively
low-intensity conflict dubbed The Troubles which nonetheless scarred relations between the
two communities. The IRA eventually declared a ceasefire, and a protracted peace process
culminated in the GFA in spring 1998.112 Stormont reopened and devolved government
returned to the province, with some interruptions due to ongoing disputes.
Even on an island that continues to be one of the most devout parts of the Western
world, religiosity has declined over time. Sectarian and ethnic identities are not always
congruent: a few Catholics may be immigrants from England, while a handful of Protestants
(particularly Presbyterians, who did not align with Anglicans until the late 19'h century)
played important roles in the early phases of Irish nationalism. Still, the approximate overlap
of religious background with positions on the constitutional question remains salient (see
Table 1). Since the outbreak of communal conflict, Protestants have become much more
likely to identify as British and not as Irish, with the reverse being true for Catholics. Figures
from recent surveys also suggest that among those who do not identify with either religion
the proportion of people with unionist leanings is significantly higher." 3
Table 1: Political identity by religion (Northern Ireland Life & Times Survey 2003)
Religion Nationalist Unionist Neither Other
Catholic 60% - 36% 1%
Protestant 1% 69% 29% 2%
No religion 9% 22% 66% 3%
As religion structured communal life and defined political orientations among a
population with no physical differentiations, people in Northern Ireland developed ways of
deducing one another's sectarian identities; an intricate social practice referred to as 'telling'
is elegantly captured in verse by Nobel Laureate Seamus Heaney:
112 For a history of the organization, see Richard English, Armed Struggle: the History of the IRA (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2003).
113 For a more extensive treatment, see Claire Mitchell, Religion, Identity, and Politics in Northern Ireland:
Boundaries ofBelonging and Belief (Aldershot, England, and Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2006).
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Manoeuvring to find out name and school,
Subtle discrimination by addresses
With hardly an exception to the rule
That Norman, Ken and Sidney signalled Prod
And Seamus (call me Sean) was sure-fire Pape" 4
An important historical aspect of the social division in Northern Ireland has been the
existence of sectarian societies devoted to the promotion of the respective community's
goals, closely associated with political parties and either with the state security apparatus (for
unionists) or with paramilitary groups (both nationalists and unionists). On the unionist side,
the key organization has been the Orange Order, an international society of Irish Protestants
with branches in other English speaking countries, which was formally linked to the Unionist
Party until 2004.115 On the nationalist side, the Ancient Order of Hibernians played a similar
role in the early 2 0 th century, but its influence on the Nationalist Party declined over time.
The Republican Clubs served as meeting places for IRA sympathizers, although they never
formed a coherent body comparable to the Orange Order.
Once separated by just a street, but living segregated lives, many working class
communities in today's peaceful Belfast are still divided by barbed wire barricades ("peace
walls") built since the 1970s to keep restless youngsters in the respective Protestant and
Catholic neighborhoods out of trouble. With all its confrontational tactics that at times-
particularly in the earlier stages-fueled rather than tamed the conflict, in the long term the
British intervention prompted major social changes in Northern Ireland. In the first Stormont
era, Catholics used to accuse Protestants for a host of discriminatory practices with respect to
voting rights and electoral gerrymandering, policing, housing, public sector employment, and
control of education.1 16 Under pressure from London and particularly after Stormont was
"4 "Whatever You Say, Say Nothing" (1975), quoted in Miles Hewstone et al., "Intergroup Contact in a
Divided Society: Challenging Segregation in Northern Ireland ", published in The Social Psychology of
Inclusion and Exclusion, edited by D. Abrams, J. M. Marques, and M. A. Hogg (Philadelphia: Psychology
Press, 2005).
115 For an excellent survey, see Eric P. Kaufmann, The Orange Order: a Contemporary Northern Irish History
(Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2007).
116 For a review of the debate on the true extent of these allegations, see John Whyte, "How Much
Discrimination Was There under the Unionist Regime, 1921-1968?" pp. 1-35., Contemporary Irish Studies,
edited by Tom Gallagher and James O'Connell (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1983) and Jonathan




suspended and replaced by direct rule, the British government took measures to address these
concerns. Protestants organizations have claimed that their community is now the target of
reverse discrimination. 1 7 No-one can deny, however, that in the last decade Northern Ireland
has enjoyed the fruits of peace and experienced unprecedented development, as evidenced by
sprawling new construction and a more cosmopolitan lifestyle, all largely financed with
money poured in from the outside. Sean Brennan, a Catholic friend, was very sarcastic on
this point: "When I was growing up, pizza and hamburger were foreign foods and we were
excited when we had them. Now I laugh at people who go out to restaurants and say 'oh, this
wasn't very well cooked'." Common membership in the EU, a flexible citizenship policy
allowing double passports, and harmonious relations between London and Dublin have all
rendered the constitutional question less relevant. Noeleen Diver, a middle-aged lady who
used to work for a public agency overseeing equitable housing and is now a member of an
inter-communal NGO, summarized this spirit: "I believe in the United States of Europe and
in a world where it will not matter which state we live in."
Sectarian Demographics
Northern Ireland is a majority-Protestant society by design. However, the margin of
Protestant dominance has declined over time, from two-thirds in the 1920s to possibly a mere
plurality today. Until the 1960s higher birth rates among Catholics were offset by equally
higher rates of emigration. Protestant emigration increased to match it with the outbreak of
the Troubles. This has left nationalists with a gestating hope that, thanks to their slow
increase, the constitutional status of the province may change one day through a favorable
plebiscite. The umbrella term "Protestant and other Christian" is often used to include not
only the three main Protestant churches (Presbyterian, Church of Ireland, and Methodist), but
non-Catholics as a whole. This was historically a valid simplification, given that the number
of non-Christians was minuscule and non-Catholic inhabitants were collectively assumed to
be loyal to the crown. In reaction to British authorities during the Troubles, many people
refused to answer the religion question on the census, inflating the 'none' category (see Table
"7 Interview with Drew Nelson, Grand Secretary of the Orange Order, East Belfast, 26/6/2008.
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2).' In addition to stated religion, the 2001 census included a question on family religious
background, recording 53.1% as Protestant and other Christian, 43.8% as Roman Catholic,
and 3.1% as none or other. Immigration since the 1990s has enriched the ethnic mix, making
headlines in 2007 when Anna Lo of the cross-communal Alliance Party became the first
Chinese-born woman elected to a European legislature. Nevertheless, non-whites comprised
less than one percent of the total population in the 2001 census.
Table 2: Religion in the Northern Ireland census, 1926-2001



























3.9 4.1 0.2 66.3
4.3 4.5 0.2 66.3
4.9 4.6 0.4 65.2
5.0 5.0 1.9 63.2







The Protestant demographic preponderance is not uniform at the regional level. The
River Bann marks the point of transition, the east (including Belfast) being more Protestant
and the west more Catholic. Nevertheless, due to Belfast's demographic size, most Catholics
actually live cast of the Bann. The areas bordering the Republic of Ireland (South Armagh,
118 A number of studies have tried to calculate the 'true' percentages of Protestants and Catholics in the 1971,
1981, and 1991 censuses. See Paul Compton, Northern Ireland: a Census Atlas (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan,
1978); David Eversley and Valerie Herr, The Roman Catholic Population of Northern Ireland in 1981: A
Revised Estimate (Belfast: Fair Employment Agency, 1985); Paul Compton and John Power, "Estimates of the
Religious Composition of Northern Ireland Local Government Districts in 1981 and the Change in the
Geographical Pattern of Religious Composition between 1971 and 1981," Economic and Social Review 17:2
(Spring 1986): 87-105; and M. P. A. Macourt, "Using Census Data: Religion as a Key Variable in Studies of
Northern Ireland," Environment and Planning April 1995 vol. 27 no. 4: 593-614. In light of the 2001 census,
these studies probably underestimate the sincerity of the 'none' response. Nevertheless, I have used their
estimates of the Catholic population as the basis of calculations in the concluding chapter.
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South Down, Fermanagh, the city of Derry or Londonderry as Protestants call it, and parts of
Tyrone) are predominantly Catholic."' 9
The 1920 Government of Ireland Act determined that Northern Ireland and the Free
State would use the Single Transferrable Vote (STV) system of proportional representation
for their parliamentary elections, but permitted a future change in the electoral formula. The
nine existent Westminster constituencies in Northern Ireland were used to elect 48 members
(see Map 1), with an additional four from the Protestant-dominated Queen's University. 2
SMP continued to be used for elections to the British parliament. The religious breakdown of
these original STV constituencies according to the 1926 census is shown in Table 3. More
than half of them were almost evenly split or contained a significant Catholic minority.
Considering the proportional and preferential nature of the STV electoral system this
configuration ensured minority representation and provided many opportunities for cross-
sectarian appeals and voting. In the wake of partition, however, the political climate in the
1920s was very tense and this potential was not realized.
Table 3: Religious composition of Northern Ireland's constituencies, 1926
Constituency Population Catholic Protestant Seats
Antrim 191643 20.15 79.85 7
Armagh 110070 45.42 54.58 4
Down 209228 30.39 69.61 8
Fermanagh & Tyrone 190776 55.63 44.37 8
Londonderry 139693 47.54 52.46 5
Belfast North 100917 13.29 86.71 4
Belfast East 93622 17.74 82.26 4
Belfast South 91018 13.52 86.48 4
Belfast West 129594 41.17 58.83 4
In 1929 the governing Unionist Party abolished STV in an electoral reform aimed at
stifling opposition within the unionist camp. SMP was adopted for Stormont elections on the
basis of 48 single-member constituencies (see Map 2). Their religious composition was never
published and it is impossible to determine with accuracy from census data. It was broadly
119 The decision on how many counties to include was strategic on the part of northern unionists: few enough to
ensure a Protestant majority, while also forming an economically viable territory (cf. the creation of Lebanon).
1 There was also a 24-member senate, indirectly elected by the parliament; this was abolished in 1973.
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understood, however, by contemporary politicians, giving rise to many uncontested elections.
Table 4 which compares the religious composition of Belfast's STV constituencies with the
wards that comprised them provides an illustration.12 ' The residence patterns of Protestants
and Catholics were more segregated at lower levels of aggregation, and as a result on average
smaller geographic units tended to be less mixed. 22 Thanks to their preponderance west of
the Bann, the Catholics' parliamentary representation as a whole was affected only by the
loss of one seat. But whereas STV constituencies made voting by members of both
communities meaningful across the board (except in parts of Belfast where Catholics were
too few to gain a seat), the vast majority of the narrower SMP contests were guaranteed
victories for one or the other community. Most importantly, SMP made it harder for small
parties relying on the Protestant vote to gain seats and upset the Unionist Party majority.
Table 4: Religious breakdown of Belfast constituencies by wards, 1926 census
Westminster Protestant Catholic Wards Protestant Catholic
Clifton 74.6 25.4
Belfast North 86.7 13.3 Duncairn 90.1 9.9
Shankill 95.5 4.5
Dock 58.2 41.8




Belfast West 58.8 41.2 StAnne's 61.6 38.4




Belfast South 86.5 13.5 Ormeau 93 7
I Windsor 83.5 16.5
12 Only four of the wards (Dock, Cromac, Windsor, and Falls) coincided with their homonymous
constituencies. Ormeau was divided into two constituencies, while others were carved out of parts of wards in
ways that make it impossible to determine their exact religious composition.
122 Note how the highly mixed constituency of Belfast West consisted of a number of much more homogeneous
wards. The average fractionalization (ELF) index of Belfast's STV constituencies according to these figures
was 0.31; the same average for its wards was lower, 0.24.
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In response to the outbreak of the Troubles, STV was reintroduced in 1973 on the
basis of the twelve Westminster constituencies existing at the time. These were modified in
the 1990s to produce the current eighteen constituencies (see Map 3) used to elect six MLAs
each for the Northern Ireland Legislative Assembly (for a total of 108), and one MP each for
the UK national parliament. The religious background of the population in each constituency
according to the 2001 census is shown in Table 5. Seven out of the eighteen constituencies
feature at least a three-quarters majority, making it unlikely that the minority community
there will elect more than one deputy.' 23 The rest, however, have only a thin majority or a
substantial minority and present a significant potential for electoral appeals and voting across
sectarian lines, similar to the situation in the 1920s.124





















































123 These roughly correspond to the areas where elections were typically uncontested under SMP, but at least
now the minority community is guaranteed some representation.
124 The average ELF index for these constituencies based on the 2001 census figures is 0.43, compared to 0.40
based on the 1926 census for the old STV constituencies shown in Table 3.
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South Antrim 99,810 29.7 66.0 4.3
South Down 104,658 66.3 31.8 1.8
Strangford 98,158 15.4 80.0 4.7
Upper Bann 102,947 42.9 54.7 2.4
West Tyrone 86,200 67.8 31.3 1
Electoral Systems and Political Parties in Northern Ireland
STV was invented in England in the 191h century and championed by election reform
proponent Thomas Hare. At the time of its adoption in Ireland it was only used in Tasmania.
STV is a system that combines proportionality and preference voting. Unlike list PR, ballots
do not consist of party lists, but include the names of all candidates from all parties running
in the constituency. Voters mark their preferences with numbers next to the candidates'
names (marking such preferences beyond the first is optional in Northern Ireland). For seat
allocation, candidates who obtain a number of first preferences above a district quota are
elected.125 If seats remain unfilled, the votes of the elected candidates in excess of the quota
are redistributed to the remaining candidates according to their lower preferences and totals
are recalculated to check if any of the remaining candidates has reached the quota. If seats
still remain unfilled, the candidate with the lowest number of first preferences is eliminated,
and his or her votes are redistributed to the remaining candidates again according to lower
preferences. This process is repeated until all seats are filled or until there are no remaining
candidates.
First Period, 1921-1929
The 1921 election took place throughout the island in an atmosphere of communal
violence and fighting between British security forces and the IRA. Northern unionist leader
James Craig declared that it was in effect a plebiscite over "Who is for Empire and who is for
25 The Droop quota equal to votes +1.
seats +1)
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a Republic?" Joe Devlin, Belfast's prominent nationalist politician who had supported Irish
autonomy within the United Kingdom, made a deal with Sinn Fein to avoid intra-Catholic
competition, accepting Sinn Fdin's condition to boycott the Northern Ireland parliament after
the election. The Unionist Party secured its (largest ever since) majority of seats and began
its monopoly of government.12 6 Vote transfers between the two camps were infinitesimal. 27
By late 1922 fighting in the north had ended, as the Free State sank into civil war over
the question of the Anglo-Irish Treaty. The pro-treaty forces prevailed and Sinn F6in broke
up. But a lingering possibility remained for a boundary commission to re-examine the border
between north and south. Northern Catholics from the border areas hoped to be transferred to
the Republic; Belfast Catholics, on the other hand, feared that this would further diminish
their weight as a minority within the north. The boundary commission idea was eventually
scrapped in 1925 when Dublin realized that London would not consent to ceding Fermanagh
and Tyrone (the counties with marginal Catholic majorities) and thus reduce Northern Ireland
to a rump state. The issue, however, had exposed the internal divisions within the Nationalist
Party (NP), which would characterize all its future history.128 Under Devlin's leadership, the
party aimed to be the voice of all northern nationalists, but lacked adequate organization and
was plagued by the fundamental question of abstention. Abstentionists believed that "by
taking their seats in a Northern Ireland parliament Nationalists would be effectively
recognizing the permanency of partition," while Devlin argued that "permanent abstention
means permanent disenfranchisement."1 29 After the 1925 election, with Sinn Fein in disarray,
NP became the dominant voice of the Catholic community. Its MPs gradually took their seats
in Stormont, although they continued to boycott Westminster.
Apart from the Official Unionists (who were affiliated with the Conservative Party in
Britain) and the Nationalists, Northern Ireland's nascent party system included Independent
126 For a comprehensive party history, see Graham Walker, A History of the Ulster Unionist Party: Protest,
Pragmatism, and Pessimism (Manchester, New York: Manchester University Press, 2004).
127 See Robert Osborne, "Voting Behaviour in Northern Ireland 1921-1977," in Intergration and Division:
Geographical Perspectives on the Northern Ireland Problem, edited by Frederick W. Boal and J. Neville H.
Douglas (London: Academic Press, 1982), p. 149.
128 For the beginnings of nationalist politics in Northern Ireland, see Eamon Phoenix, Northern Nationalism:
Nationalist Politics, Partition, and the Catholic Minority in Northern Ireland, 1890-1940 (Belfast: Ulster
Historical Foundation, 1994).
129 Brendan Lynn, Holding the ground: the Nationalist Party in Northern Ireland 1945-72 (Aldershot, England:
Ashgate, 1997), p. 3.
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Unionists and the Northern Ireland Labour Party (NILP). The former often campaigned on
issues of class inequalities within the Protestant community, but remained staunch supporters
of the northern state. The latter was an ideological kin but never formally an affiliate of its
British counterpart. Having shunned Ireland's partition, the British Labour Party maintained
a neutral stance and left NILP to its own devices. NILP's power base was naturally among
the Belfast working class. In 1925 the Unionist Party lost four seats to Independent Unionists
and three to NILP, all in the Belfast area. These losses were seen as a clear threat.
As early as 1922 the Unionist Party abolished STV in local elections and shrewdly
gerrymandered the districts for urban and rural councils, most blatantly in the case of Derry,
whose council passed to the control of the city's Protestant minority. In 1929, SMP replaced
STV for Stormont elections as well (except for the seats of Queen's University). Among the
new 48 constituencies drawn up, gerrymandering against Catholics was flagrant only in
Fermanagh, which was divided into one overwhelmingly Catholic constituency and two with
a slim Protestant majority. Craig stated that it was not his intention to alter the sectarian
balance in the legislature. On the contrary, he said,
What I want to get in this House, and what I believe we will get very much better in this
House under the old-fashioned plain and simple system, are men who are for the Union
on one hand, or who are against it and want to go into a Dublin parliament on the other.
Devlin also understood that "this thing is not to wipe us out. It is to wipe out what are
called the Independent and Labour members." 3 1 Nevertheless, the reform dashed any hopes
that the Unionist majority might be overturned in the near future by an alliance between the
Nationalists and Labour.132
130 Even though data on religious composition are not available, this is obvious from election results and can be
deduced from the 1911 census. See Robert Osborne, "The Northern Ireland Parliamentary Electoral System: the
1929 Reapportionment," Irish Geography vol. 12 (1979): 42-56 and Margaret O'Callaghan, "Franchise Reform:
'First Past the Post' and the Strange Case of Unionist Ireland." Parliamentary History, vol. 16 (1997): 85-106.
County Armagh was a more debatable case: having a small Protestant majority, it returned three Protestants and
one Catholic under SMP.
131 Paul Mitchell and Gordon Gillespie, "The Electoral Systems" in Politics in Northern Ireland, edited by Paul
Mitchell and Rick Wilford, (Oxford: Westview Press, 1999), p. 69.
132 Thomas Hennessey, A History ofNorthern Ireland (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), pp. 43-55.
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Second Period, 1929-1969
The Depression and the Second World War brought more strains to inter-communal
relations." In 1932, after a row with the speaker, Joe Devlin left parliament again, and never
returned. That same year Eamon de Valera, leader of the anti-Treaty party, won the election
in the Republic and followed a confrontational course. In 1933, as prime minister of Ireland,
he stood for election and won a Stormont seat in Northern Ireland (South Down) on an
abstentionist ticket. To prevent such occurrences, Unionists passed the 1934 Representation
of the People's Act, requiring prospective candidates to sign a declaration affirming that they
would take their seats if elected. In summer 1935 NILP's offices were raided by a Protestant
mob and rioting broke out when the 12 1h of July parade was fired at in Belfast. In 1937 de
Valera's new constitution of Ireland replaced the British king with a president and declared
that the entire island constituted national territory. But De Valera did not agree to admit
Nationalist MPs from the north into the Irish parliament. During the war, he kept the
Republic neutral, while NP opposed the introduction of conscription in the north. Unionists
took pride in the contribution that Northern Ireland made to the British war effort, thanks to
its shipyards and its strategic location guarding the passage between Ireland and Scotland.
Unionists regarded the Labour victory in the UK election in 1945 with apprehension,
considering Labour's historical stance on the Irish question. Nationalists were encouraged;
NP returned to Stormont and launched an Anti-Partition League (APL) aimed at reuniting all
northern Catholics. Eddie McAteer, MP from Mid-Londonderry and head of APL, became a
leading nationalist figure. But nothing came out of this excitement. In 1948 Ireland officially
declared sovereignty in foreign relations, its last vestige of belonging to the United Kingdom.
In turn the British parliament passed the 1949 Ireland Act, which accepted this new situation
and declared that Northern Ireland's status could only be changed with the consent of its
parliament. In the 1950s the division between the NP and the pro-IRA republicans returned.
A negotiation thriller took place before every election period to determine if both sides would
put forward candidates (and risk dividing the Catholic vote in mixed constituencies) or if one
133 For a history of this early period see Patrick Buckland, The Factory of Grievances: Devolved Government in
Northern Ireland, 1921-1939 (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1979).
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side would stand down. In December 1955 IRA militants launched a border campaign against
Northern Ireland. Fearing a confrontation with Britain, the Republic arrested and jailed the
IRA leadership and the campaign had fizzled by 1958.
NILP's vote share during this period has been characterized as "a virtual barometer of
communal tension." 134 Although it contained Catholics and espoused bi-communalism in its
class struggle, NILP drew most of its support from Protestants.13 5 The party was unable to
overcome the sectarian divide. Its leader, Harry Midgley, lost his seat to a unionist in 1938
because his support for the Republicans against Franco in Spain alienated the Catholic voters.
He later resigned from NILP and founded the Commonwealth Labour Party (CWLP), with
the aim of working for labor interests within unionism. In 1947 he disbanded CWLP
altogether and simply joined the Unionist cabinet, expressing his vocal disdain for the
minority. NILP had avoided taking a stance on the constitutional issue until 1949, when the
party conference voted for the union in response to the Irish Republic's declaration of full
sovereignty. NILP consequently lost much of its Catholic support in Belfast to Paddy
Devlin's Irish Labour Party (ILP) and Harry Diamond's Socialist Republican Party (SRP).
Like NILP, however, labor republicanism was also primarily a Belfast phenomenon. When
Harry Diamond and ILP's Gerry Fitt joined forces in 1964 to form the Republican Labour
Party (RLP), the joke was that "two one-man parties became a two-man party." 136
Between the 1930s and the 1960s, elections in Northern Ireland were characterized
by low turnout (see Table 10) and a stable pattern of nationalist and unionist support (see
Map 2). Around two fifths of the seats went uncontested-sometimes more, sometimes less,
depending on the degree of intra-communal divisions.m Nationalists typically did not
contest in Protestant-majority areas where NILP fielded candidates in order not to divide the
anti-Unionist vote. Nationalists and Unionists clashed only in the few constituencies where
the sectarian split was close and different communal turnout rates could make a difference.
34 Paul Mitchell, "The Party System and Party Competition" in Mitchell and Wilford, Politics in Northern
Ireland, p. 95.
135 For a history of the party, see Aaron Edward, A History of the Northern Ireland Labour Party: Democratic
Socialism and Sectarianism (Manchester University Press, 2009).
136 Paul Arthur, "Political Parties: Elections and Strategies" in Northern Ireland Politics, edited by Arthur
Aughey and Duncan Morrow (London and New York: Longman, 1996), p. 68.
137 For comprehensive results constituency by constituency see Sydney Elliott, Northern Ireland Parliamentary
Election Results, 1921-1972 (Chichester: Political Reference Publications, 1973)
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NILP and labor republicans clashed only in the Belfast Docks, the single constituency whose
population shifted from majority Protestant to majority Catholic in this thirty-year period.13 8
In the late 1950s and early 1960s NILP regrouped and achieved its most impressive
results, gaining four seats in Belfast and becoming the official opposition.' 39 Unionist Prime
Minister Terrence O'Neil sought to stem this tide by introducing reforms and expanding
social welfare. In 1964 the British Labour Party came to power in London once again, and
pushed him in the same direction, but hesitated to interfere heavy-handedly. In the late 1960s
the traditional party system imploded as a wave of new social movements precipitated a
spiral of escalation. NP was facing criticism from a progressive segment of the Catholic
community that reacted to the party's unconstructive abstention. Some critics gathered
around the National Democratic Party (NDP), while others took the path of activism, inspired
by the Civil Rights Movement in the United States. In 1968 the Northern Ireland Civil Rights
Association (NICRA) started staging marches as part of a civil disobedience campaign aimed
at attracting publicity in Britain and abroad.14 0 The unionist government banned the marches,
demonstrators clashed with the police in Derry, and rioting became endemic by 1969. The
activists protested discriminatory employment and housing practices as well as the
disenfranchisement of tenants and the corporate vote in local elections, crying for "one man,
one vote." A change in the electoral formula was not a core demand. As Prof. Paul Arthur of
the University of Ulster, then a member of the radical leftist group People's Democracy,
remembers, "We were not looking for an alternative electoral system, just equity."' 4 '
O'Neil appealed for calm and promised reforms which conservative unionists thought
went too far and nationalists thought did not go far enough. He called an election in February
1969 that had record turnout and manifested the fissures in the traditional parties. Unionist
candidates were divided between pro- and anti-O'Neil factions, and the prime minister
almost lost his seat to Ian Paisley, the vehemently anti-Catholic founder of the Free
Presbyterian Church. In Derry, NP chairman Eddie McAteer lost his seat to independent John
138 Osborne, "Voting Behavior in Northern Ireland," pp. 143-148.
139 Despite being the second largest party in Stormont, NP rejected this role until 1965.
140 For an exhaustive monograph placing the events in the global perspective of that dramatic year, see Simon
Prince, Northern Ireland's 68: Civil Rights, Global Revolt, and the Origins of the Troubles (Dublin and
Portland OR: Irish Academic Press, 2007).
141 Interviews with Paul Arthur and Austin Currie.
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Hume.142 SMP constrained this fragmentation and returned the same Unionist majority, but
faced with internal dissent in his party O'Neil resigned, as British troops arrived to enforce
order.
The Troubles and British Intervention, 1969-19 73
Constitutional constraints initially prevented London from intervening in the affairs
of its devolved province, but the outbreak of violence and a renewed IRA bombing campaign
made the situation critical. In 1969 the IRA (and later Sinn Fein) broke up into two factions,
the Official IRA, which took a Marxist path, and the more traditionalist Provisional IRA. The
Protestant community's sense of siege triggered the formation of loyalist paramilitaries, most
notably the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) and the Ulster Defense Association (UDA). In
1972 the Official IRA declared a ceasefire, but the Provisionals carried on. The neutrality of
the British army was irrevocably compromised after thirteen civil rights protesters, many of
them teenagers, were shot dead in Derry in an incident commemorated as Bloody Sunday. As
the Northern Ireland government refused to give up control of its security powers to London,
the British government suspended Stormont and introduced direct rule.143 The need for a
radical overhaul of Northern Ireland's political system was recognized by British officials,
leading to a number of proposals including power sharing and the reintroduction of STV.144
Meanwhile, Northern Ireland's political landscape was changing rapidly. In 1970 the
Alliance Party of Northern Ireland (APNI) was founded by pro-O'Neil unionists and liberals.
Progressive nationalists and labor republicans including John Hume, Gerry Fitt, and civil
rights leader Austin Currie joined to form the Social Democratic and Labour Party
(SDLP). 45 Both parties had cross-sectarian ambitions. Only Alliance succeeded in this goal,
but its appeal was restricted to the moderate middle-class. Thanks to the popularity of the
civil rights movement, SDLP grew to become the main moderate voice of the nationalist
142 On the demise of the Nationalist Party, see Brendan Lynn, Holding the Ground: the Nationalist Party in
Northern Ireland, 1945-72 (Aldershot, England: Ashgate, 1997), pp. 171-237.
14 Hennessey, History ofNorthern Ireland, pp. 171-222.
144 The electoral reform was spelled out in the White Paper produced by the Northern Ireland Office, Northern
Ireland Constitutional Proposals (London: HMSO, 1973), Paragraph 6.
145 For SDLP's foundation and early years, see Ian McAllister, The Northern Ireland Social Democratic and
Labour Party: Political Opposition in a Divided Society (London and Basingstoke: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1977).
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community, pressing for reforms while also denouncing IRA violence. APNI accepted the
union as the status quo, although its position today is that it is neither unionist nor nationalist.
SDLP accepted the principle of Protestant consent, but still espoused the dream of a united
Ireland.14 6 On SDLP's failure to cross the sectarian divide, Austin Currie told me: "It was my
hope and others' that the logic of our argument would appeal to reasonable unionists. But
unfortunately there were few reasonable unionists." To the right flank of the Ulster
Unionists, Ian Paisley's movement took the name Democratic Unionist Party (DUP). When
all of these parties were launched, the electoral reform was entirely unanticipated. As APNI
leader David Ford told me, "At the party's first annual conference in 1971 the call for STV
was narrowly defeated. It was voted the following year. Our expectation was that we would
win under FPTP. Now that looks distressingly naive..." 4 The only new party formed after
the announcement of the return to PR was the militant unionist Ulster Vanguard.14
Third Period, 1973-2007
In the 1973 election held under STV, SDLP gained a percentage similar to NP's in
1925, as Catholic votes were again mobilized in Protestant majority areas. Unionists were
divided between pro- and anti-White Paper factions, DUP, and Vanguard, with APNI making
an impressive showing. UP leader Brian Faulkner, who had resigned from the O'Neil cabinet
protesting concessions to the Catholics, now found himself at Sunningdale, in England,
negotiating a power-sharing executive with the SDLP. The agreement included a provision
for a cross-border Council of Ireland, a largely cosmetic concession to nationalists which had
been an unimplemented part of the 1920 Government of Ireland Act. Hard line unionists
interpreted this as an ominous sign, citing the Republic's constitutionally enshrined territorial
146 In his article "Horowitz's Theory of Ethnic Party Competition and the Case of the Northern Ireland Social
Democratic and Labour Party, 1970-1979," Nationalism and Ethnic Politics vol. 14 no. 4 (October 2008): 549-
578, P. J. McLoughlin uses Horowitz's logic of centrifugal pull to explain SLDP's position in the absence of
strong electoral competition for the nationalist vote in the 1970s.
147 Interviews with Austin Currie and David Ford.
148 In our interview current UUP leaded Sir Reg Empey and former chairman of Vanguard confirmed that at its
formation in 1973 the party expected to benefit from the reform: "STV indeed helped Vanguard and UUUP.
DUP was formed before the change took place; Vanguard wasn't. PR encouraged that with its lower threshold."
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claim on the north. A massive Protestant strike with the slogan "Dublin is just a Sunningdale
away" forced Faulkner to resign and the agreement to collapse.149
British efforts to reconstitute Stormont in the 1970s and early 80s failed miserably.15 0
The (Ulster) Unionist Party (from now on designated as UUP) was taken over by the faction
resisting power-sharing with the Catholics. With the unionist majority against an agreement,
elections in 1975 for a constitutional forum led nowhere. A major development in the 1980s
was the abandonment of abstention by the republicans. Beginning with a 1981 Westminster
by-election (when an IRA prisoner on hunger strike, Bobby Sands, stood and won, dying a
month later), republicans shifted to an "armalite and ballot box strategy" whose purpose was
to demonstrate that they enjoyed popular backing. Sinn Fein (SF) became an electoral factor
again, mobilizing those Catholics who had traditionally abstained-around one third of the
community or one tenth of the total vote. The same strategy on the loyalist side did not pay
off, as most Protestant voters disapproved of the involvement of paramilitaries in politics.15 1
Although Margaret Thatcher's term was generally characterized by confrontational rhetoric
in Northern Ireland, she did conclude a historic agreement in 1985 with Irish Prime Minister
Garret FitzGerald. In exchange for a recognition of its advisory role on the question, Ireland
formally accepted the principle of consent, i.e. that the unionist majority had a veto over the
province's constitutional status. Nevertheless, the recognition of the Republic's role in the
governance of the north led to protests and electoral collusion between DUP and UUP. While
Vanguard remerged with UUP, Paisley became synonymous with the phrase "Ulster says no"
and DUP gathered in its ranks most of the hard line elements of unionism. 52 Like the NP of
old, SDLP had been boycotting the assembly produced by the 1982 election; after the Anglo-
Irish agreement, the unionists also walked out on the British.
149 For a critical account condemning SDLP for pushing the Irish unification agenda too far in this negotiation,
see P. J. McLoughlin, "'Dublin is Just a Sunnigdale Away'? The SDLP and the Failure of
Northern Ireland's Sunningdale Experiment," Twentieth Century British History vol. 20 no. 1
(2009): 74-96.
150 On this period, see Rick Wilford, "Regional Assemblies and Parliament" in Mitchell and Wilford, Politics in
Northern Ireland, pp. 117-141 and Cornelious O'Leary, Sydney Elliott, and Rick Wilford. The Northern Ireland
Assembly 1982-1986: A Constitutional Experiment (London: C. Hurst & Co., 1988).
"' Fearing a British withdrawal, UDA in the 1980s had even supported the idea of an independent Ulster.
152 For a recent biography, see Steve Bruce, Paisley: Religion and Politics in Northern Ireland (Oxford, New
York: Oxford University Press, 2007).
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London's and Dublin's opinions on the future of the province were converging, but
two key hurdles remained: ending the IRA campaign, and persuading unionists to accept
power sharing. In the late 1980s, an ongoing dialogue between SDLP leader John Hume and
Sinn Fein's president Gerry Adams mended fences inside the nationalist community, while
secret negotiations with London led to an IRA ceasefire in 1994.15' To facilitate peace talks,
the British called a special election for a Northern Ireland Forum in 1996 with list PR instead
of STV, and a bonus of two seats for the ten parties polling highest. The goal of this formula
was to include small parties affiliated with loyalist paramilitaries like the UVF's Progressive
Unionist Party (PUP) and UDA's Ulster Democratic Party (UDP), but also alternative voices
like the Northern Ireland Women's Coalition (NIWC).15 The idea was also that by enlarging
the number of participants, SF would feel more pressure not to leave the table.155 Former
NIWC co-chair Bronagh Hinds acknowledges that, "If it had been a normal type of election I
doubt that we would have gotten in." 1 56 Although the small parties played a constructive role,
much of the heavy lifting had to be done by John Hume and UUP's David Trimble, a former
member of Vanguard who came to accept power sharing.157 The peace process bore its long
awaited fruits in 1998, with the signing of the Belfast (or Good Friday) Agreement.15 8 i
simultaneous referenda the Republic of Ireland amended its constitution to remove its claim
on the north, and Northern Ireland's population approved of the deal with a margin of 71% in
favor and 29% against.159
153 See Gerard Murray and Jonathan Tongue, Sinn Fein and the SDLP: From Alienation to Participation (New
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005) and Richard English, Armed Struggle: The History of the IRA (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2003). The ceasefire was ended in 1996 with IRA bombings in London and
Manchester, but resumed in 1997.
154 On PUP, see James McAuley, "'Just Fighting to Survive: Loyalist Military Politics and the Progressive
Unionist Party," Terrorism and Political Violence vol. 16 no. 3 (Autumn 2004): 522-543; on NIWC, see Kate
Fearon, Women's Work: The Story of the Northern Ireland Women's Coalition (Belfast: Blackstaff Press, 1999)
and Yvonne Galligan, "Women in Northern Ireland's politics: feminising an armed patriarchy?" in M. Sawer,
M. Tremblay, and L. Trimble, Representing Women in Parliament (London: Routledge, 2006).
155 Interview with Chris MacCabe, then director of the Northern Ireland Office.
156 Interview with Bronagh Hinds, 1/7/2008.
157 For a biography, see Frank Millar, David Trimble: the Price ofPeace (Dublin: Liffey Press, 2004).
158 For an account of the nerve-wracking negotiations, see Jonathan Powell, Great Hatred, Little Room: Making
Peace in Northern Ireland. (London: The Bodley Head, 2008).
159 A subsequent study has shown that the 'no' vote was higher among Protestants, but the agreement was
probably supported by a slim majority of the Protestant community; it was overwhelmingly supported by
Catholics. See Bernadette Hayes and Ian McAllister, "Who Voted for Peace? Public Support for the 1998
Northern Ireland Agreement," Irish Political Studies vol. 16 no. 1 (2001): 73-93.
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DUP was the only major party opposed to the agreement. In the election that followed
within a month, UUP and SDLP remained the dominant voices of the two camps, but vote
transfers between the moderate parties were minimal. The cohabitation in the power-sharing
government proved difficult, and serious disagreements about weapons decommissioning led
the British government to suspend the assembly for a few months in 2000, and for a much
longer period between 2002 and 2007. In subsequent elections APNI remained weak, NIWC
lost its seats, and UUP and SDLP were overtaken by their respective hardliner rivals. DUP
capitalized on simmering qualms about the agreement among Protestants. 160 Meanwhile, SF
demonstrated superior organization to SDLP and reaped the benefits of its turn to mainstream
politics. 16 After consolidating their position within their respective communities in 2007,
DUP and SF finally agreed to co-lead the power-sharing executive-a historic first. Their
cooperation has been far from smooth, but at least devolved government has returned to
Northern Ireland. The provisions of the GFA requiring separate communal majorities for
controversial issues have been criticized for producing deadlock and putting middle-ground
parties like APNI in an awkward position.162 Occasional talk about replacing the mandatory
grand coalition with a two-thirds qualified majority rule (a "voluntary coalition" in local
parlance) echoes similar ideas from the 1970s and is rejected as 'fiction' by nationalists.163
Electoral Engineering in Northern Ireland: An Appraisal
The prevailing climate of opinion among scholars of Northern Ireland is to view SMP
negatively and to welcome the return of STV, with few dissenting voices. It is not possible to
claim that the electoral system did not matter at all in Northern Ireland; but how much it
160 Bernadette Hayes, Ian MacAllister, and Lizanne Dowds. "The Erosion of Consent: Protestant
Disillusionment with the 1998 Northern Ireland Agreement." Journal of Elections, Public Opinions and Parties
vol. 15 no. 2 (September 2005): 147 -167; Cathy Gormley-Heenan, and Roger Macginty, "Ethnic Outbidding
and Party Modernization: Understanding the Democratic Unionist Party's Electoral Success in the Post-
Agreement Environment," Ethnopolitics, vol. 7, no. 1 (March 2008): 43-61.
161 Agnes Maillot, New Sinn Fein: Irish Republicanism in the Twenty-First Century (London and New York:
Routledge, 2005); Kevin Bean, The New Politics of Sinn Fein (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2008).
162 In 2001 three of APNI's Stormont deputies declared themselves 'unionist' to ensure a unionist majority in
support for the reelection of David Trimble as First Minister. See Jocelyn Evans and Jonathan Tonge, "The
Future of the 'Radical Centre' in Northern Ireland after the Good Friday Agreement," Political Studies vol. 51
no. 1 (March 2003): 26-50.
163 APNI favors this possibility which would probably guarantee it a permanent place in the coalition.
Interviews with David Ford, Carmel Hanna, Alex Maskey, and Richard Bullick.
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mattered for the course of the conflict is very much an open question. In logic, the law of the
excluded middle refers to the impossibility of a third option between a proposition and its
negation. To carry the pun to sectarian politics, it is often lamented that the middle ground
(APNI and other small parties today, NILP in the past) has been excluded from power as the
impossible third option between two irreconcilable extremes (unionism and nationalism). In
places like Northern Ireland the tragedy is not that the middle ground is really inconceivable,
but rather that it is so perennially weak. Electoral systems came and went, but the incentives
they provided did not change this sad reality. As Table 6 shows, survey data corroborate that
the sectarian character of Northern Ireland's party system has remained intact.
Table 6: Religious vs. party affiliation (Northern Ireland Life & Times Survey, 2003)
Party Protestant Catholic No religion
UUP 34% - 9%
DUP 28% - 8%
PUP 1% - 1%
SDLP 2% 39% 10%
SF - 23% 9%
APNI 5% 2% 12%
NIWC 1% 2% 4%
Other 6% 5% 6%
N/A 24% 28% 42%
Total 100% 100% 100%
My focus in this chapter has been on the parliament/assembly of Northern Ireland, the
key legislative body in those periods when the province functioned as an autonomous self-
contained entity. Westminster elections have been relatively peripheral due to the province's
devolved constitutional status.'64 As explained, gerrymandering was primarily a problem in
local, not parliamentary elections in Northern Ireland, and it certainly would not have been
sustained if the province's legislature were not monopolized by Unionists. In such a society
with a single ethnic cleavage, class was the only viable candidate for cross-sectarian political
mobilization. Labor politics (with NILP prominent) provided some hope in this direction
164 The Conservative Party's support for unionism was intertwined with its historical alliance with the Unionist
Party; as sympathetic as the Labour Party was to Catholics, it was certainly not anti-union.
104
Evangelos Liaras
before 1969. The Troubles caused the working class to bifurcate, but brought part of the
middle class together in APNI. 165 The Troubles also triggered the breakup of the traditional
blocks into moderate (SDLP, UUP) and hardliner (SF, DUP) parties. The question then for
electoral design is whether these forces (cross-sectarian and moderate sectarian parties) were
aided or hurt by the electoral formula used for parliamentary elections and whether they
could have performed better under a different formula.
Northern Ireland's demographic makeup provides a high degree of sectarian mixing
in large geographic units, which diminishes significantly if constituencies become smaller, as
was the case under SMP. Considering the hypotheses laid out in the theoretical chapter, the
expectation from propositions 3 and 4 is that cross-sectarian voting would remain generally
low under SMP and PR, possibly rising slightly under PR through the operation of STV, a
preferential system, in mixed constituencies. Cross-sectarian voting in Northern Ireland has
indeed been low, but the most successful cross-sectarian party in history by vote share was
NILP, which polled up to a fifth or a quarter of the vote in the early 1960s, compared to one
tenth of the vote for APNI in the late 1970s and early 80s. 166 This counterintuitive situation is
due to the fact that SMP, by creating overwhelmingly mono-sectarian constituencies, allowed
Protestant voters to focus on intra-sectarian divisions, with the small Catholic minority in the
constituency either abstaining or supporting Labour. Unfortunately, small district magnitude
simultaneously hurt NILP by depriving it of seats analogous to its vote share. However, it is
difficult to claim counterfactually that Labour would have made a bigger impact if STV had
continued to be used in the 1960s, because electoral contests in larger constituencies would
heighten the sectarian divide (as they did in the 1920s, when Labour did miserably). A study
of voting patterns under STV has indicated that in mixed constituencies support for DUP
165 Intra-communal class differences were originally present between DUP and UUP, and to a lesser extent SF
and SDLP, but recent research indicates that the relationship between class and party affiliation has declined.
Geoffrey Evans and Mary Duffy, "Beyond the Sectarian Divide: the Social Bases and Political Consequences of
Nationalist and Unionist Party Competition in Northern Ireland," British Journal ofPolitical Science vol. 27 no.
1 (January 1997): 47-81; James Tilley, Geoffrey Evans, and Claire Mitchell, "Consociationalism and the
Evolution of Political Cleavages in Northern Ireland, 1989-2004," British Journal of Political Science, vol. 38
no. 4 (October 2008): 699-717.
166 It should be noted, however, that turnout was lower in the early 1960s. In terms of votes cast, in their heyday
both NILP and APNI hovered around 50,000-60,000 votes.
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among Protestants and SF among Catholics is actually higher.167 This, as well as NILP's
good performance in the predominantly Protestant parts of Belfast in the 1950s and 60s, is
evidence against Proposition 4 (the mixed constituency hypothesis) in Northern Ireland. As
for APNI, it is severely disadvantaged by SMP in Westminster elections and depends on PR
to obtain seats in the current Assembly. Its closest ideological predecessor, the Ulster Liberal
Party, performed even worse under SMP in the 1960s.
STV is a complicated system and deserves some detailed discussion. Its preferential
aspects have not made much of an impact in Northern Ireland both because of the strong
sectarian divide and because the party strategists have astutely realized that they stand to gain
more from capitalizing on STV's proportionality; thus they focus on voters' first preferences.
Even small parties have to maximize first preferences-to stay in the counting and benefit
from transfers. As Green Party MLA Brian Wilson explained, "The important thing is to get
a good first preference vote. The middle ground gets preferences from everywhere as long as
you don't get knocked out. But you need enough first preferences for that." 68 Ben Reilly, a
major advocate of preferential voting systems in the scholarly literature, has noted that,
Another reason for the varying degrees of success of preferential voting... is the existence
of a small but influential group of moderate voters, who will sometimes cast their ballot on
issues other than ethnicity and appear prepared to respond to cross-ethnic appeals.
The catch here is that "rewards to moderation" presuppose a minimum existing moderation.
Moderate candidates that fail to receive enough first preferences are eliminated first. Peter
Emerson, a maverick electoral reform activist, who is sometimes derided for his passionate
support of the qualified Borda count, is right in pointing out that "you can be everyone's
second preference and get eliminated in the first round."1 69
The major parties have honed their skills at estimating their support in a constituency,
running exactly the number of candidates that they can elect based on this level of support,
and instructing their voters in different localities to put different candidates as their first
167 Donald Beuadette and Andrew Kirkpatrick, "Group Threat in Northern Ireland: Examining Vote Shares of
Radical Parties," unpublished paper presented at the APSA 2008 conference.
168 Interview with Brian Wilson, Stormont, 25/6/2008.
169 Interview with Peter Emerson.
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preferences, so that all of the party's candidates meet the quota from the first round. Jimmy
Spratt, DUP's MLA from South Belfast, could not emphasize this more: "You have to have
very close vote management in council and assembly elections under STV." SF is widely
admired for having perfected this art to a margin of a few hundred votes. Alex Maskey, also
elected in South Belfast, takes pride in the success of the party machine: "People who accuse
us of vote management miss the point. This is a bigger project. It speaks to the sophistication
of our electorate." Unionist detractors claim that SF polling agents know their constituencies
so well that they can see who has not voted on election day from the register, call up the local
party bosses and ask them to drive up to people's homes and fetch them to the polling station.
Seamus, a young SF supporter from the staunchly republican borderlands of South Armagh,
corroborated these rumors: "where I'm from you cannot not vote," he told me.
Most people put down preferences only for candidates of one party (a practice called
'plumping') or, if they transfer to other parties, they keep their vote "within the community."
Typically 70-85% of transferred votes stay within the party. Cross-community voting is rare.
It is seen in some constituencies where one community is too small a minority (i.e. where the
system is least proportional by nature of the demography).17 0 Table 7 shows the distribution
of vote transfers between parties (called "terminal transfers" in STV parlance) as calculated
by Sydney Elliott from Queen's University.17 1 The previous to last column shows the
percentage of non-transferrable votes, i.e. those where the voter engaged in some degree of
plumping and did not put down enough lower preferences. The last column indicates terminal
transfers as a percentage of the total first preferences that the party received in the election.
The table shows that the tendency is indeed mostly centripetal. DUP voters transfer to
UUP, and SF voters transfer to SDLP. UUP voters transfer in both directions, to DUP and to
SDLP (in 2003, relations between the two unionist parties were bad and all transfers went
centripetally to SDLP). SDLP voters behave in a similar fashion, but they do not return the
favor to UUP; for those who transfer to the center, the preferred alternate is APNI. The
problem then is not that STV transfers are not in the 'desired' direction for encouraging
170 This is the case for Protestants in Derry, where UUP voters transfer preferences to SDLP to thwart SF.
171 Sydney Elliott, "The Electoral Dynamics of the Belfast Agreement," in The Northern Ireland Question: The
Peace Process and the Belfast Agreement, edited by Brian Barton and Patrick J. Roche (Basingstoke, New
York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2009).
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moderation, but that their magnitude is too low to make a great difference. In terms offirst
preferences in these two elections, the moderate parties were overtaken by DUP and SF. It is
definitely true that DUP and SF have toned down their rhetoric in recent years and that public
opinion in Northern Ireland as a whole has converged on certain key issues (the value of
North-South links, power-sharing, and weapons decommissioning). To explain the paradox
of moderate voters switching to the extreme parties, Paul Mitchell, Jeffrey Evans, and
Brendan O'Leary have argued that DUP and SF possess an "ethnic valence" factor, a
reputation for being the tough bargainers for their respective community's interests.m
Although this is a valid point, it does not change the fact that voters chose to reward the
parties that caused deadlock and the suspension of Stormont-and that the electoral system
could not translate voter preferences otherwise. Being able to default to direct rule from
London and having guaranteed a level of peace through the GFA, Northern Irish voters
enjoyed a luxury that citizens of many other divided societies cannot afford. It is hard to say
if voters would have behaved more moderately if there were no GFA and the only alternative
to power sharing was again chaos.
Table 7: Distribution of terminal vote transfers in the 2003 and 2007 assembly elections
(adapted from Sydney Elliott, "The Electoral Dynamics of the Belfast Agreement")
2003 Election
From/To DUP UUP Other U SDLP SF APNI Non-trans % trans
DUP 38.8% 12.3% 2.7% 1.1% 1.7% 39.5% 9.4%
UUP - 0.4% 41.8% 0.6% 2.4% 54.8% 5.7%
SDLP 0.3% 15.6% 0.6% 42.1% 23.5% 13.8% 4.0%
SF 0.3% 0.9% 0.1% 83.4% 1.9% 13.5% 3.6%
2007 Election
From/To DUP UUP SDLP SF APNI Non-trans % trans
DUP 75.5% 6.5% 0.2% 0.4% 15.8% 3.2%
UUP 49% 19% 0.8% - 25.6% 12.9%
SDLP 2% 14% _ _ 13.8% 16.9% 36.3% 11.1%
SF 1.2% 1% 67% _ __ 3.4% 23% 6.2%
172 Paul Mitchell, Jeffrey Evans, and Brendan O'Leary in "Extremist Outbidding in Ethnic Party Systems is not
Inevitable: Tribune Parties in Northern Ireland." Political Studies vol. 57 no. 2 (December 2008): 397-421.
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Regarding the effects of the electoral formula on the number of parties, propositions 1
and 2 would predict a significant decrease in party fragmentation after 1929 and a converse
increase after the 1973 reform. The former did not take place but the latter did.173 The lack of
effect from the first reform may be due to the early abolition of STV. This is a weakness in
my study design, being the only case of a reform that came too soon to allow me to observe
the previous system in operation for at least four elections. Although it is impossible to guess
how voting would have evolved if STV had continued past 1929, it is important to observe
that SMP did not prevent new parties from challenging the UP and NP in the second period.
SMP helped UP and NP to maintain their hegemonic positions in terms of seat allocation, but
it did not have the strategic effect of discouraging other parties from entering the electoral
race. PR after 1973 perhaps sustained the high degree of party fragmentation, but as close
examination of the historical record and interviews with key participants showed, it did not
cause it. The fragmentation of the party system started in 1969-when the PR reform was
unanticipated-and it was caused by intra-communal divisions over the proper response to
the civil rights violence.
In terms of the corollaries, STV in the 1920s did not guarantee perfectly proportional
minority representation because Belfast districts were small (four-member). Catholics could
thus only hope to gain 12 seats, whereas they claimed they should be entitled to at least 16
(one third of 48). Under SMP, they could secure 11, only a marginal deterioration, although
SMP certainly drove up voter abstention in strongly dominated constituencies. The sectarian
seat distribution became exactly proportional only in the 1990s when district magnitude was
set uniformly at six. Historically, however, the central problem was the Catholics' permanent
exclusion from power, not whether or not their parliamentary representation was perfectly
proportional. For this reason, obtaining a commitment to power sharing from unionists has
been a much more important issue for nationalists than district magnitude. There is no doubt
that weak support for cross-sectarian parties or for cross-sectarian alliances of moderate
sectarian parties negatively affected conflict dynamics. But this problem cannot easily be
attributed to the proportionality of STV; it has been a recurrent feature of Northern Ireland's
173 The effective number of parties by vote share was 2.33 in 1921-1929, 3.13 in 1929-1969, and 5.39 in 1973-
2007; by seat share it was 1.98 in 1921-1929, 1.93 in 1929-1969, and 4.88 in 1973-2007.
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party system across electoral formulas. NILP's relative success under SMP was probably due
to the reduction in the ethnic heterogeneity of constituencies rather than to incentives for
strategic voting provided by low proportionality.
What can surely be attributed to STV is an advantage given to small parties. The
proliferation of parties in Northern Ireland today is often seen as a positive sign of pluralism.
British officials welcomed the contributions of APNI, NIWC, and PUP to the peace process.
However, forgetting that Vanguard, DUP, and Sinn Fdin also used to be small parties that
benefited from PR and wrecked the peace process for two decades would amount to a grave
historical omission. SDLP deputy leader Seamus Mallon famously characterized the GFA as
"Sunningdale for slow learners." Veteran politicians who were involved in that abortive
attempt at power-sharing in 1973 are particularly bitter about the way it was ripped to shreds
by unionist strikers and republican bombers. Granted, the Republic of Ireland had not yet
officially given up its territorial claim on Northern Ireland. But this claim was largely
symbolic, while SDLP, the party whose inclusion in government was the bone of contention,
had endorsed the principle of consent. In our interview, Unionist leader Reg Empey admitted
in a low voice that Vanguard and its offshoot party, the UUUP, "probably were a mistake."
Austin Currie asked me persistently: "I dare you to show me the difference between current
and then arrangements. What is it that justified the loss of one life, never mind 3,000? " For
all the knowledge I gained about Northern Ireland during the course of my research, I do not
have a good answer to this question.
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Table 9: Northern Ireland parliament/assembly summary election results, 1921-2007
First Period, 1921-1929 (vote share/seats)
Election UP NILP NP SF Other U Other R Other
1921 66.9 40 0.6 0 11.8 6 20.5 6 0.2 0 - - - --
1925 55.0 32 4.7 3 23.8 10 - - 9.0 4 5.3 222 1
Second Period, 1929-1969 (vote share/seats)
Election UP ULP NILP NP Other U Other R Other
1929 50.8 37 6.2 0 8.0 1 11.7 11 14.3 3 1.3 0 7.7 0
1933 43.5 36 - - 8.5 2 13.1 9 21.3 3 13.4 2 0.2 0
1938 56.8 39 - - 5.7 1 4.9 8 28.7 3 - - 3.9 1
1945 50.4 33 - - 18.5 2 9.1 10 12.8 3 2.6 1 6.6 3
1949 62.7 37 - - 7.1 0 26.8 9 0.6 2 0.0 1 2.8 3
1953 48.6 38 - - 12.1 0 10.8 7 12.8 1 13 4 2.7 2
1958 44.0 37 0.3 0 15.8 4 14.9 7 8.8 0 9.3 2 6.9 2
1962 48.8 34 3.6 1 25.4 4 15.1 9- - 3.6 2 3.5 2
1965 59.1 36 3.9 1 20.4 2 8.2 9 - - 5.9 3 2.5 1
1969 48.2 36 1.3 0 8.1 2 7.6 6 19.4 3 11.7 2 3.9 3
Third Period, 1973-2007 (vote share/seats)
Election DUP UUP APNI SDLP SF Other U Other
1973 10.8 8 25.3 24 9.2 8 22.1 19 - - 26.7 18 6.8 1
1975 14.8 12 25.4 19 9.8 8 23.7 17 - - 22.3 21 4.0 1
1982 23.0 21 29.7 26 9.3 10 18.8 14 10.1 5 5.6 2 3.4 0
1996* 18.8 24 24.2 30 6.5 7 21.4 21 15.5 17 10.4 7 3.5 4
1998 18.0 20 21.3 28 6.5 6 22.0 24 17.7 18 11.5 10 3.2 2
2003 25.7 30 22.7 27 3.7 6 17.0 18 23.5 24 2.8 2 4.8 1
2007 30.1 36 14.9 18 5.2 7 15.2 16 26.2 28 2.8 1 5.5 2
* The 1996 election for the Northern
list PR; two bonus seats were awarded
Ireland Forum was a special election conducted with
to the each of the top ten parties
Abbreviations: Other U = Other Unionist, Other R = Other Republican
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Map 1: Northern Ireland's constituencies, 1921-1929 (Source: ARK Northern Ireland)
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Map 2: Northern Ireland's constituencies, 1929-1969 (Source: ARK Northern Ireland)
Note: Dark shade indicates the eleven constituencies consistently won by nationalists, white
those won by unionists or Labour. Dock (lightly shaded in Belfast) was the only constituency
that changed sides due to a demographic shift in the Catholics' favor by the 1960s.
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Map 3: Northern Ireland's constituencies since 1998 (Source: ARK Northern Ireland)
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Northern Ireland political posters (clockwise from top left): Ian Paisley 1960s poster; 1972
Alliance poster; 1975 unionist poster denouncing the Sunningdale Agreement; poster from
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Chapter 4
TURKEY: CROSSCUTTING CLEAVAGES REVISITED
A large middle-income country that implemented two major electoral reforms in the
course of its modem political history, Turkey was the case I was most familiar with at the
beginning of this research project. It also seemed to me the most daunting, both for language
reasons (little did I know about Irish English at the time) and because, being Greek, my own
ethnic background did not make me neutral in the eyes of respondents. My fieldwork in
Turkey took place in three localities (Ankara, Istanbul, and Diyarbakir) in fall 2007-winter
2008. It was a difficult period marked by constant skirmishes between the army and the
PKK, Turkish air strikes against guerrilla bases in Northern Iraq, and political polarization as
the governing Islamic party held a constitutional referendum, which the opposition bitterly
opposed, while the judiciary filed closure cases against the Kurdish minority party, and later
the Islamic party as well. For those who know Turkey, this was a hot, but not unusual period;
the country has been in turmoil over these issues for the last three decades. In this chapter I
will present them specifically under the lens of electoral politics.
Ethnic Identities in Turkey
In Ottoman times, Anatolia was a religiously diverse region, but after the maelstrom
of the First World War, it was ethnically cleansed of its Christian minorities. By the 1930s
only small communities of Armenians, Greeks, and Jews remained in Istanbul, and the
Turkish Republic emerged as a unitary state with a homogenizing ideology and an
overwhelmingly Muslim population. According to the constitution, "everyone bound to the
Turkish state through the bond of citizenship is a Turk." 7 4 Turkish has for long been the only
174 Constitution of the Republic of Turkey, Article 66.
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official language; primary instruction in other languages is restricted to the non-Muslim
minorities of Istanbul and certain foreign language schools.175
Despite this veneer of homogeneity, Turkish society encapsulates several Muslim
ethnic groups. Some are native to the Black Sea region, like the Caucasian Laz around Rize,
the Armenian-speaking Hemshin in nearby Artvin, and the Greek-speaking Muslims of
Trabzon. Others descend from Muslim refugees who streamed into Anatolia from the 1 8 th
century onwards as the Ottoman Empire contracted: Circassians, Crimean Tatars, Albanians,
Bulgarian, Bosnian, and Cretan Muslims. Most of these refugees settled in towns in the
Marmara and Aegean regions. Today, their communities are considered highly assimilated
and their numbers are too small to have notable political impact.' 7 6 Speakers of Arabic, living
in lands across the border with Syria, have historically been more numerous, making up just
over one percent of the total population in 1965. Although it is commonly known that many
people from these regions, particularly the Hatay province annexed by Turkey in 1939, have
Arab ancestry, they are assimilated today and Arab identity has not become politicized. 77
Leaving these small minorities aside, this study will focus on two large groups found
in Eastern Turkey, one linguistic and one confessional: the Kurds and the Alevis. Both have
developed a conscious and highly politicized identity and their position in Turkish society
continues to be controversial. There is some overlap between the two, so that the categories
'Alevi' and 'Kurd' are not mutually exclusive. Activists from both of these groups claim that
their people have been historically oppressed by the majority population in Turkey,
consisting of people who are native speakers of Turkish and follow the Sunni Islamic
tradition. In this discussion, I will also treat Sunni Turkish speakers as the majority group, the
"7 Ibid, Articles 3 and 42.
176 For more information on some of these minorities see Peter Andrews, Ethnic Groups in the Republic of
Turkey (Wiesbaden: L. Reichert, 1989); Samim Akg6nil, Tfirkiye Rumlari (Istanbul: iletigim, 2007); Arsen
Avagyan, (erkesler (Istanbul: Belge Yayinlari, 2004); Stanford Shaw, The Jews of the Ottoman Empire and
the Turkish Republic (New York: New York University Press, 1991); Alexandre Toumarkine, Les Lazes en
Turquie (Istanbul: Les editions Isis, 1995); Hovann Simonian, ed., The Hemshin: History, Society, and
Identity in the Highlands of Northeast Turkey (London and New York: Routledge, 2006); and "Balkan and
Caucasian Immigrant Associations" in Civil Society in the Grip of Nationalism: Studies on Political Culture
in Contemporary Turkey, edited by Stefanos Yerasimos, Gfinter Seufert, and Karin Vorhoff (Istanbul: Orient-
Institut, 2000).
177 I know of no cultural or political organization claiming to represent Arabs in Turkey today. Nusairi Arabs
have adopted a broader Alevi identity. See Marianne Arinberg-Laanatza, "Alevis in Turkey-Alawites in
Syria: Similarities and Differences," in Olsson, Ozdalga and Raudvere eds., Alevi Identity pp. 151-166.
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unmarked category in Turkish society, but will not focus on them or explore Sunni faith as an
ethnic characteristic. 178
The Kurds are said to be one of the largest ethnic groups in the world agitating for
self-determination. Within Turkey's context, I will use the term Kurd to describe people who
either speak a dialect of Kurdish or claim Kurdish-speaking ancestry. The predominant
Kurdish dialect in Turkey is Kurmanji, or Northern Kurdish, which is substantially different
from the Sorani or Southern Kurdish dialect spoken by most Kurds of Iraq. Zazaki or Dimli,
spoken in an area from Diyarbakir to Erzincan, is an Iranian language unintelligible with
Kurmanji, but in recent decades Zaza people generally self-identify as Kurdish. 17 9 Sunni
Islam (of the Saafi, not Hanafi school as in the rest of Turkey) is the predominant religion
among Turkey's Kurds, while a minority of Kurds, more commonly Zazas, are Alevi.
Kurdish-speaking areas were historically divided between the Ottoman and Persian
Empires but the small semi-autonomous Kurdish principalities were brought under direct
Ottoman control only in the mid-19th century. Educated Kurdish diaspora communities in
Istanbul and Cairo created the first nationalist organizations in the late 1 9 th and early 2 0 th
centuries. The Turkish War of Independence in 1919-1922 was waged by Mustafa Kemal on
an explicit platform of alliance between Anatolian Muslims, Turks and Kurds alike. After the
establishment of the republic in 1923, however, the rhetoric changed and Kurdish demands
for autonomy were rejected. Several revolts broke out in the 1920s and 30s but the Kurds'
linguistic, confessional, and tribal fragmentation meant that each movement gained support
only among a certain segment (Alevi, Zaza Sunni, or Kurmanji Sunni) and was subsequently
defeated in detail. Dersim, the most rebellious Alevi region, was finally reduced in 1938 and
renamed Tunceli. Kurdish notable families were exiled to other parts of Turkey, Turkish-
178Although the conflict between secularism and Sunni religiosity is a contentious aspect of Turkish politics, it
is very hard to track "atheism" or "Sunni fundamentalism" as identities bearing ethnic characteristics in the
Turkish populace; survey research seems to indicate that Sunni self-definition has a more continuous
distribution. See for example Ali (arkoglu and Ersin Kalaycioglu, Turkish Democracy Today: Elections,
Protest, and Stability in an Islamic Society ( I.B. Tauris, 2007), pp. 120-130, whose 2002 data showed that
98% of their respondents believed in God, 55% objected to their daughter marrying a non-Muslim, 30% never
went to mosque, and 16.5% desired a state based on Islamic sharia law.
179 See Paul White, "The Debate on the Identity of Alevi Kurds" in Turkey's Alevi Enigma: a Comprehensive
Overview, edited by Paul White and Joost Jongerden (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2003).
'
80David McDowall, A Modem History of the Kurds (London: I.B. Tauris, 2004), pp. 8-12.
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speaking state officials were brought in as settlers, and use of Kurdish for state purposes was
banned.'81 The term 'Kurd' remained an official taboo throughout the Cold War.
After the 1980 coup, the Turkish military took a tougher stance and in 1984 the
Marxist-inspired PKK (Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan-Kurdistan Workers Party) began its
armed campaign which has since cost approximately 40,000 lives. Albeit decapitated after
the capture of its idolized leader, Abdullah Ocalan, in 1999, PKK persists with border raids
and occasional bombings. The Kurdish question has traumatized Turkish society; attitudes
towards Kurds range from tolerance to outright hostility. The presence of independent
Kurdish deputies in parliament since the July 2007 election has also been divisive. Language
rights, demands for regional autonomy, and accusations of harboring terrorism are the bones
of contention.
Unlike Kurds, Alevis make no territorial demands and are broadly considered loyal to
the Turkish Republic.182 Alevism refers to the heterodox religious practices of some
originally rural Anatolian populations, whose exact origins are obscure. Heterodox Turkic
nomads known as Kizilbag ('Redheads') gave rise to the Safavid dynasty of Iran and were
persecuted as heretics by the Ottomans during their wars with Persia in the 16th century. A
central religious figure for many Alevis is Haci Bektag Veli (1209-1271), the mystic pilgrim
founder of the Bektashi Sufi order, which held great sway over the Ottoman Janissary
corps.183 The Bektashi lodges were suppressed together with the Janissaries in 1826,
officially closed together with all religious orders by Ataturk in 1925, and restored for
museum purposes beginning in the 1950s. Turkish scholars in the 1920s associated Alevi
practices with pre-Islamic Turkic shamanism originating in Central Asia, and claimed Alevis
as the purest of Turks.184 But historians note that, through the Bektashi order, Alevism also
181McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds, chapter 9; Paul White, Primitive Rebels or Revolutionary
Modernizers? The Kurdish National Movement in Turkey (New York: Zed Books 2000).
182 Alevi Kurds are an exception; TIKKO, the primarily Alevi Kurdish armed wing of the Communist Party of
Turkey/Marxist-Leninist, collaborated with PKK until the Turkish army leveled its rural bases in Tunceli in
1994. See Michiel Leezenberg, "Kurdish Alevis and the Kurdish Nationalist Movement in the 1990s," in
Turkey's Alevi Enigma, pp. 197-212.
183Children of non-Muslims recruited through a child levy and raised as servants of the Ottoman Sultan.
184Ali Yaman and Aykan Erdemir. Alevism-Bektashism: A BriefIntroduction (Istanbul: England Alevi Cultural
Center and Cemevi, 2006) pp. 25-26.
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attracted Anatolian Christians, particularly Armenians, converting to Islam in the Ottoman
period-an ancestry that Alevis today are often cognizant of.185
Alevis (literally "followers of Ali") may use different names for themselves in
different localities (Bektagi, Kizilba§, Tahtaci, Nusairi) but an evolving cultural movement
has fostered a sense of community among previously isolated groups. Apart from special
reverence for Imam Ali, the son-in-law of the Prophet Muhammad, practices that set them
apart from Sunnis include different holidays and fasting schedules, extensive use of music
and dance and non-segregation of sexes in ceremonies, pilgrimage to the tombs of Alevi holy
figures instead of Mecca, and greater openness to Christianity and Judaism. Alevi worship
(cem) takes place in an assembly house (cemevi) and is led by hereditary elders (dede) from
families claiming ancestry to Ali. Alevis, however, may also attend ceremonies at Sunni
mosques, and like other non-orthodox groups in Islam may exercise takiye (Arabic taqiyya),
i.e. concealment of their religious identity in predominantly Sunni environments. 18
As mentioned, the Alevi community in Turkey includes people of Turkish, Kurdish,
and Arabic origin. Some Alevi scholars strongly object to the term 'ethnic' when referring to
Alevis, given the group's tolerance to its linguistic diversity.187 Nevertheless, it is also the
case that whereas the Bektashi order accepted disciples on a voluntary basis, Alevi identity
has generally been considered hereditary.'" Most Alevis consider themselves Muslims of a
different denomination (mezhep) than Sunnis, a minority consider themselves closer to
Shiism, while a more radical wing places Alevism outside Islam.189 Mehmet, a 32-year-old
Alevi from Sivas, is among the latter: "we are not Muslim," he told me, "we just honor Ali
because he was open-minded."' 90 Such views came to prominence in the turbulent 1970s,
when a younger generation of Alevis became involved in Marxist movements.
185Ir6ne M61ikoff, "Bektashi/Kizilba : Historical Bipartition and its Consequences" in Olsson, Ozdalga and
Raudvere, Alevi Identity, p. 6-7; interviews with Enver and Fuat.
186For more information see Alevi Identity: Cultural, Religious, and Social Perspectives, edited by Tord Olsson,
Elizabeth Ozdalga and Catharina Raudvere (Istanbul: Swedish Research Institute, 1998); David Shankland
The Alevis in Turkey: The Emergence of a Secular Islamic Tradition (London, New York: Routledge-Curzon,
2003); Ali Yaman, Alevilik ve Kizlbaghk Tarihi (Istanbul: Noktakitap, 2007).
187For example, Yaman and Erdemir, Alevism-Bektashism, pp. 28-29.
188"Anyone can become a Bektashi but one cannot become an Alevi if one is not born an Alevi." Ir6ne
M6likoff, "Bektashi/Kizilba§: Historical Bipartition and its Consequences" in Alevi Identity, p. 6.
189See Faruk Bilici, "The Function of Alevi-Bektashi Theology in Modern Turkey", Reha Camuroglu, "Alevi
Revivalism in Turkey," and Fuat Bozkurt, "State-Community Relations and the Restructuring of Alevism," in
Olsson, Ozdalga and Raudvere, Alevi Identity, pp. 51-62 and 79-96.
190Interview with Mehmet.
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Alevi grievances revolve around the recognition and equality of their community in
present-day Turkey. Alevis criticize the state for favoritism towards Sunnis, exemplified by
Sunni domination of the Directorate of Religious Affairs (DIB-Diyanet Igleri Bakanlgi).
They complain that the school curriculum, which includes compulsory education courses,
does not incorporate Alevi beliefs, that the state funds mosques in Alevi areas but not Alevi
religious activities, and that successive right-wing governments have tried to assimilate
Alevis to the Sunni faith.191 For these reasons, Alevis are particularly sensitive to the
principle of secularism and suspicious of the Islamic party currently in government. Sevgi, a
28-year-old female state employee told me: "I do not feel comfortable revealing my religious
identity at work; saying you are Alevi is a sure way to stunt your career in the public
sector."' 92
Like Kurds, Alevis became more radicalized through leftist movements in the 1970s,
which the military clamped down on after the 1980 coup. While younger generations cling
less to the tradional religious beliefs, Alevis are known to for their leftist inclinations and
attitudes towards them are not always friendly. Firat, a 26-year-old Sunni from Yozgat, a
mixed Sunni-Alevi area, told me openly: "I don't like Alevis. They don't really believe in
anything anymore. They just try to preserve an idea that they are somehow a separate
community."193
Ethnic Demographics
Administrative districts in Turkey have been used as electoral constituencies under all
electoral systems but the exact numbers and location of Alevis and Kurds are hard to assess.
The Turkish census stopped recording language after 1965 while census information on
Alevism was never collected. The accuracy of Turkish census figures is doubted by Turkish
experts, due to past inconsistencies and built-in incentives for local authorities to both over-
191Yalman and Erdemir, Alevism-Bektashism, pp. 9-13, 57-58; Harald Shaler, "Secularism and Ethnicity: Alevis
and Social Democrats in Search of an Alliance," in Civil Society in the Grip of Nationalism: Studies on
Political Culture in Contemporary Turkey, edited by Stefanos Yerasimos, Gunter Seufert, Karin Vorhoff,
(Istanbul: Orient-Institut, 2000), pp. 197-250.




report and under-report figures. 194 Urbanization has intensified since the 1960s with large
numbers of people from the east moving to major urban centers in the west and south of the
country. Because of restrictions on ethnic expression, survey data on ethnicity are
problematic and the ethnic background of individual candidates may be hard to determine,
although the ethnic agendas of political parties are more obvious. Despite these
shortcomings, census, survey data and anthropological research give at least a general picture
of the numbers and location of Kurds and Alevis, providing some clues to their electoral
behavior.
Turkish censuses from the 1950s and early 60s counted speakers of Kurdish (usually
grouping Kurmanji and Zaza) somewhere between 7 and 9 percent of the total population,
but with significant fluctuations which appear incongruent. These summary figures can be
seen on Table 1.195 Correcting and extrapolating from census data, incorporating migration
and higher birth rates in the southeast, Servet Mutlu has estimated Kurdish speakers as 12.6
percent of the population in 1990.196 This figure is corroborated by a 2002 country-wide
randomized cluster survey by Ersin Kalaycioglu and Ali ;arkoglu in which 12.8 percent of
the sample reported knowledge of Kurdish. 197 From the 1960s on, Kurds have migrated to
larger (Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir) and smaller (Adana, Mersin, Antalya) urban centers, often
clustering in shanty town slums. The conflict in the southeast accelerated this exodus in the
1990s, generating a large number of IDPs (between 1 and 1.5 million according to unofficial
estimates).198 Although a significant minority has thus relocated west, most Kurds still live in
the southeast where they constitute a local majority.199 It should be noted, however, that the
southeast is linguistically mixed as well and that due to linguistic assimilation many people
who claim Kurdish ancestry do not speak Kurdish.20 0
194See Qarkoglu and Erdogan, "Fairness in the Apportionment of Seats in the Turkish Legislature: Is There
Room for Improvement?" New Perspectives on Turkey Vol. 19 No. 1 (December 1998): 97-124.
195Source: TOiK. These figures include only first-language speakers. Figures on second best-spoken language
(which were not collected in 1950) would raise the percentage of Kurds to 8.9% in 1965 as well.
196Servet Mutlu, "The Kurds in Turkey: a Demographic Study," International Journal of Middle Eastern
Studies, vol. 28, no. 4. (Nov., 1996): 517-541.
197Ali Carkoglu and Ersin Kalaycioglu, Turkish Democracy Today: Elections, Protest, and Stability in an
Islamic Society (London: I.B. Tauris, 2007), p. 13
198Joost Jongerden, The Settlement Issue in Turkey and the Kurds (Leiden: Brill, 2007), pp. 79-80.
199Mutlu (p. 533) estimated that 81.8% of Turkey's Kurds lived in the Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia regions
in 1965, but only 65.2% did so in 1990.
200A 2007 survey conducted by Metropoll (www.metropoll.com.tr) in southeastern Anatolia reported that 52.8
percent of respondents spoke Kurmanji, 7.4 percent Zazaki, and 13.5 Arabic. The administrative Southeastern
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Table 1: Census figures on speakers of different languages in Turkey, 1950-1965
Year Turkish Kurdish Other Total
1950 18,254,851 (87.1%) 1,855,169 (8.9%) 837,468 (4.0%) 20,947,188
1955 21,622,292 (89.9%) 1,679,265 (7.0%) 763,196 (3.2%) 24,064,763
1960 25,172,535 (90.7%) 1,847,674 (6.7%) 734,611 (2.6%) 27,754,820
1965 28,289,680 (90.1%) 2,370,233 (7.6%) 731,508 (2.3%) 31,391,421
Using Servet Mutlu's estimates, the regional distribution of Kurdish speakers by
electoral district can be seen on Maps 1-2.201 Throughout the multiparty period, Kurds have
probably formed the majority in the provinces of Diyarbakir, Mardin, Van, Hakkari, Siirt,
Bitlis, Bing61, Mug, Agri, Tunceli (and in Simak, Batman, and Igdir, which were created
later) and a minority with electoral weight in adjacent provinces.
The number of Alevis is much harder to pinpoint. Experts tend to converge on an
estimate of approximately 15 percent of Turkey's population, but in surveys explicitly asking
about sectarian affiliation the percentage of respondents openly declaring an Alevi identity is
much lower. Although Alevi groups have traditionally lived throughout Turkey, their greater
concentrations were within a geographic triangle starting from (orum northeast of Ankara,
and extending east to Erzurum and south all the way to Hatay. Only in the province of
Tunceli are Alevis believed to form a decisive majority. In all other provinces, including their
most populous heartland, Sivas, Alevi villages are in close proximity with Sunni ones. From
the 1950s on, Alevis have been migrating to the major urban centers. It is possible that more
Alevis today live in Ankara, Istanbul, Izmir, and Mersin than in the east, but similar (and
dubious) claims are made for Kurds. The traditional Alevi homelands lie to the northwest of
the Kurdish ones, with the overlap occurring along Erzurum, Erzincan, Tunceli, Bing6l, Mug,
Elazig, Malatya, and Adiyaman provinces. The number of Kurdish Alevis is the hardest to
estimate, but most authors believe the overlap to be symmetric: around one fifth of Alevis are
probably Kurdish and one fifth of Kurds are probably Alevis.20 1 If that is true, Alevi Kurds
must constitute about 2.5-3 percent of Turkey's population.
Region, however, does not correspond well to the Kurdish-speaking region of Turkey, as it excludes some
predominantly Kurdish provinces and includes some predominantly Turkish ones.
201Dark gray designates provinces with a Kurdish majority and medium gray those where a theoretical party
winning all the Kurdish vote could pass the district threshold and elect one or more deputies under PR.
For more information see Shankland, The Alevis in Turkey, p. 20-21; Ali Carkoglu, "Political Preferences of
the Turkish Electorate: Reflections of an Alevi-Sunni Cleavage," Turkish Studies, vol. 6, no. 2, (June 2005):
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Although similar in size, the Alevi and Kurdish minorities in Turkey therefore have
different geographic profiles. Kurdish speakers are clustered in the southeast whereas Alevis
are dispersed among Sunni majorities in all provinces save Tunceli-which is exceptional in
being both overwhelmingly Alevi and predominantly Kurdish. A handful of eastern
provinces (Erzincan, Elazig, Malatya, Adiyaman, Urfa) may be undominated with Sunni
Turkish pluralities and both Kurdish and Alevi minorities.
Electoral Systems and Political Parties in Turkey
From 1925 to 1946 Turkey was a one-party state led by the Republican People's
Party (CHP-Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi), originally founded by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk and
inherited by his second-in-command, Ismet in6nui, upon Ataturk's death in 1939. Despite the
closure of the Bektashi lodges, Alevis were generally supportive of the republic, which
abolished the Caliphate and preached citizen and gender equality.2 03 The abolition of the
Caliphate was a rallying point for rebelling Sunni Kurdish leaders, but their revolts were
crushed, while certain Kurdish tribes were co-opted by the state. After the Second World
War, under both domestic and international pressure, the CHP allowed opposition parties to
form. The first election in 1946 was by all accounts rigged, but in 1950 CHP lost power to
the Demokrat Parti (DP), which had been formed by disgruntled former CHP members,
many of them rural landowners.
1st Period: 1950-1960
Turkey's electoral system and constitution in the first multi-party period were
inherited from the one-party state. Elections took place in multi-member constituencies under
a Block Vote system that allowed voters to vote for as many candidates as there were seats.
273-292; Reha §lamuroglu, "Alevi Revivalism in Turkey," in Alevi Identiy, pp. 79-84; Harald Schiler,
"Secularism and Ethnicity: Alevis and Social Democrats in Search of an Alliance," in Civil Society in the
Grip ofNationalism, pp. 237-241.
203See Krisztina Kehl-Bodrogi, "Atatfirk and the Alevis: a Holy Alliance?" in Turkey's Alevi Enigma, pp.53-69,
and Rabia Harmanshah, Rabia, "Redefining the Past: How Bektashis Accommodated the Abolition of their
Religious Order," (Paper presented at 4 0 th MESA Annual Meeting, Boston, November 2006).
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However, ballots were printed by political parties, so that in practice the system became
equivalent to the Party Block, whereby the party with the largest number of votes gained all
seats in the constituency. The extremely majoritarian nature of the electoral formula and
disaffection with past CHP authoritarianism combined to give the DP very large majorities in
1950, 1954, and 1957.
The DP reversed many CHP policies during its decade-long reign. It favored rural
over urban areas, agriculture over industry, and the private sector over state enterprises; it
took a more lenient stance towards Islam despite maintaining secularism, and abandoned
Ataturk's foreign policy of neutrality, joining NATO in 1952. But Turkey's authoritarian
legacy and the extreme prerogatives afforded to the executive led to the abuse of power by
the DP governments. As restrictions on opposition parties became asphyxiating and the DP
was considering a motion to confiscate the CHP's assets, the military intervened in 1960 with
a coup that brought down and banned the DP, executing its top three leaders and jailing
hundreds of others.
Parliaments and elections in the 1950s were dominated by the rival giants, the DP and
the CHP. Neither party had an exclusive ethnic base. The vote in Kurdish areas was just as
divided as in other parts of the country, while the DP attracted many Alevi figures who were
repulsed by the hardships suffered by the predominantly rural Alevi population under the
CHP one-party rule. Smaller parties formed in this period were electorally unsuccessful and
did not have an ethnic character either. The right-wing conservative Nation Party (MP-
Millet Partisi) was closed down in 1954 for its Islamic inclinations and reopened as the
Republican Nation Party (CMP-Cumhuriyetgi Millet Partisi); it only gained seats in its
founder's constituency, Kirgehir, in Central Anatolia, a region that became the cradle of the
Turkish far right. The Freedom Party (HP-Hiirriyet Partisi) was formed in 1956 by former
DP deputies revolting against the party's dictatorial behavior. It had a country-wide
organization, including in Kurdish areas, but failed to attract much of the DP vote or gain any
regional foothold. The HP dissolved after the 1957 election and its deputies joined the
CHP. 204
204Erik J. Ziircher, Turkey: A Modern History, (London: L B. Tauris, 2004) pp. 231-252; Mustafa Albayrak, Turk
Siyasi Tarihinde Demokrat Parti (1946-1950) (Ankara: Phoenix, 2004); Burak Ozgetin, Democracy and
Opposition in Turkey: Locating the Freedom Party, METU Master's Thesis, September 2004.
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Kurdish politics until the 1960s were dominated by powerful landowning families
and their clientelist relations with the state. The economy in the southeast was
overwhelmingly agricultural and land distribution extremely skewed. With most of the
population being rural, landowners controlled and could deliver votes to either the DP or the
CHP in return for political favors. The CHP had established such links with tribal leaders
after crushing the Kurdish rebellions, and with the DP ascendant, opposing tribes found a
natural ally. Intellectual publications and short-lived journals in Kurdish began to appear in
the late 1950s but no Kurdish political movement emerged. The DP dominated elections in
the southeast, as in the rest of Turkey, but it continued the CHP policy of not acknowledging
Kurds as a separate ethnic group.20 5
2"d Period: 1960-1980
The 1960 coup ushered in a period of greater political liberty thanks to constitutional
and legal reforms introduced by a short-lived military junta. The state recognized the role of
political parties, but required them to abide by the principle of the country's indivisibility.
The electoral law was changed to PR using the d'Hondt highest average method, with a quota
threshold for each district equal to the ratio of total votes to seats. A party that did not make
the threshold could not receive a seat in the district. The change in the electoral system was
designed to forbid overwhelming majorities like those achieved by the DP and to help the
CHP, the military's favorite, form a government. The CHP indeed came first in the 1961
election and formed a coalition with the New Turkey Party (YTP-Yeni Tirkiye Partisi),
consisting of former DP politicians some of whom had been in the defunct HP. But the core
of the DP reconstituted itself as the Justice Party (AP-Adalet Partisi), which evolved into
the main right-wing party during this period. Before the 1965 election, the CHP introduced a
national remainder in the electoral law, i.e. a pool of seats that would correct for loss of
proportionality caused by the district threshold. The Justice Party, led by Stileyman Demirel,
still managed to win a clear majority and form single-party governments in 1965 and 1969.
205McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds, pp. 399-407; Kutad, A. "Patron-Client Relations: the State of the
Art and Research in Eastern Turkey," in Engin Akarli and Gabriel Ben-Dor eds, Poltiical Participation in
Turkey (Istanbul: Bogazici University Press, 1975) pp. 61-87.
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The AP abolished the national remainder in 1968 but smaller parties took this law to the
constitutional court, which in turn ruled against the district threshold. The 1969, 1973, and
1977 elections were conducted with d'Hondt PR without any thresholds. Despite these small
changes, Turkey's electoral system during this period was overall the most proportional in its
modem political history. This generous proportionality was later held responsible for the
political instability that led to the collapse of the Second Turkish Republic. 20 6
From the 1960s on Turkey experienced increased industrialization, domestic
migration, urbanization, and a growth in its student population and work force. Student
movements and trade unions became active, political journals and mass circulation
newspapers appeared, and Cold War tensions took a strong domestic dimension. Discussions
of ethnicity, until now taboo, began to surface. As AP recaptured the voter base of the old
DP, YTP became dominated by Yusuf Azizoglu, a wealthy landowner from Diyarbakir, who
had been accused of ethnic favoritism while serving as health minister in the CHP-YTP
coalition government.207 YTP broke with CHP and essentially continued as an undeclared
party of Kurdish notables, until it joined the AP in 1969. In its literature, YTP never used the
word 'Kurd' and only spoke of vaguely of the need to economically develop the eastern
provinces.208
Marxism provided an ideological reference point and a vocabulary for young
intellectuals, particularly those coming from the minorities of the east. In this atmosphere,
new parties were formed and were able to enter parliament thanks to the permissive electoral
system. On the left, the Turkish Worker's Party (TIP-Tfrkiye &i Partisi) founded in 1961,
brought together trade unionists, student groups, and Kurdish intellectuals in a party that was
Marxist in all but name. TIP began to speak about the oppression of eastern minorities in its
electoral campaigns, while its Kurdish student members in Istanbul and Ankara founded the
Revolutionary Eastern Culture Hearths (DDKO-Devrimci Dogu Kiltir Ocaklari). In its
fourth congress in 1970 the party made an all-out declaration on the Kurdish question,
affirming that "Kurdish people are living in the east of Turkey" and that "handling the
206William Hale, "The Role of the Electoral System in Turkish Politics," International Journal of Middle East
Studies Vol. 11, No. 3 (May 1980): 401417.
207Azizoglu's Kurdish background "was mentioned with a low voice" in YTP (interview with Feride Agar).
208Yeni Tfrkiye Partisi Segim Beyanamesi 1965, Yeni Tirkiye Partisi 4. Buyuk Kongresi'nin Agig Konugmasi
ve Buyuk Turk Milletine Bildirisi (Mayis 1969), Yeni Tnirkiye Partisi 1969 Segim Bildirisi.
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'Eastern question' as an issue of regional development is nothing but an extension of the
chauvinist-nationalist views and stance of the ruling class bosses." 209 This declaration
became the official reason for TiP's suppression by the constitutional court in 1971 on
grounds of advancing separatism.
Despite these bold moves, TiP had only managed to swing a small portion of the
Kurdish and Alevi vote in its favor. 1 The party served primarily as a preparatory school for
the next generation of the Kurdish far left. After TiP's demise, the nascent Kurdish youth
movement progressively distanced itself from the Turkish left, seeking to voice its own
particular ethnic concerns. By the late 1970s, the first independent radical leftist Kurdish
candidates that did not hail from notable families appeared in the southeast.21
TiP was not the only party to mix leftist and ethnic rhetoric in this period. The Unity
Party (TBP-Tiirkiye Birlik Partisi) was founded in 1966 by Alevis determined to seek
greater equality and freedom of religious expression. Although it made gains in the 1969
election, the BP did not enjoy broad backing from Alevi civil society. It soon started
suffering from defections and criticism, both within and outside the Alevi community, that it
was promoting sectarianism. The party progressively took a leftist stance, expressing a
younger generation of Alevis frustrated with the conservatism and low educational level of
the hereditary dedes. During the 1970s support for the party collapsed as Alevi voters turned
decisively to the CHP.m
Far right-wing parties also made their appearance, giving the Turkish political system
its present multi-polar character. The Republican Peasant Nation Party (CKMP-
Cumhuriyetgi Kdyla Millet Partisi), successor to the CMP, was taken over in 1965 by
Alparslan Tirkes, a frustrated Turkish-Cypriot colonel marginalized after the 1960 coup, and
renamed the Nationalist Action Party (MHP-Milliyetgi Hareket Partisi) in 1969. The first
Islamic party was founded by Necmettin Erbakan in 1970, closed down and reopened in
209Tnrkiye 1I i Partisi 4. Biyik Kongresi, TIP Archive, Tarih Vakfi. Ironically, materialist explanations and
antidotes for separatism are primarily the standard of the right, not the far left, in Turkey.
2 1 Artun Onsal, Tfirkiye I gi Partisi (1961-1971) (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfi Yurt Yaymlan, 2002) pp. 17-18, 111,
273; interviews with Tarik Ziya Ekinci and Naci Kutlay.
2 1
'See Gilles Dorronsoro and Nicole F. Watts, "Toward Kurdish Distinctiveness in Electoral Politics: the 1977
Local Elections in Diyarbakir," International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies vol. 41 no. 3 (August 2009):
457-478.
2m2Kelime Ata, Alevilerin ilk Siyasal Denemesi: (Tirkiye) Birlik Partisi (1966-1980) (Istanbul: Kelime
Yayinevi, 2007); interview with Mustafa Timisi.
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1972 as the National Salvation Party (MSP-Milli Selamet Partisi). In the 1970s left-wing
and right-wing extremism escalated as the economy was hit by the oil shocks. The military
stepped in, removed Demirel, banned TIP, and swore in a caretaker government in 1971, but
the situation worsened thereafter. CHP itself swayed left in 1972, replacing In6nil with
Blent Ecevit. Employing leftist rhetoric on equality and development, Ecevit's CHP
attracted the Alevi vote, but usually found itself in opposition to right-wing "national front"
coalitions consisting of AP, MHP, and MSP. The CHP's leftist turn led its right wing to split
and form the Republican Trust Party (CGP-Cumhuriyetgi Given Partisi), which included
some influential Kurds.2 13 The vote in the southeast remained fragmented between various
parties and independent candidates. University takeovers, kidnappings and robberies by
revolutionary groups, clashes between rightwing and leftwing militias, massacres of Alevis
in eastern towns, and political assassinations had taken civil war proportions by 1980. The
military decided to put a temporary stop to Turkish democracy in September of that year. 214
3 rd Period: 1980-present
The 1980 junta banned all political parties and imprisoned thousands of their
members. The military declared martial law and passed a new constitution and several
decrees, including one entirely banning the use of Kurdish. A new electoral law in 1983
maintained d'Hondt PR but introduced a nation-wide 10 percent threshold designed to
eliminate fringe parties from parliament. The formula became even less proportional when a
district quota (kontenjan) was added in 1987. The law did allow independent candidates to be
elected, but this was facilitated only when the district quota was abolished in 1995.21s
Government in the 1980s was dominated by the Motherland Party (ANAP-
Anavatan Partisi) and its leader Turgut Ozal, a technocrat with religious ties and partially
Kurdish (assimilated) descent. Pursuing privatization and free-market reforms, ANAP's
ideology also stressed Islam as an integral part of Turkish culture, during a period when
mS. Gilden Ayman, Cumhuriyetgi Gfiven Partisi [The Republican Trust Party], Master's Thesis, istanbul
University Political Science Department (Istanbul: Istanbul University Social Science Institute, 1987).
214 Zfircher, Turkey: A Modern History, pp. 253-291.
215Republic of Turkey, Statute No: 2839, Parliamentary Elections Law (http://www.ysk.gov.tr); Erol Tuncer,
Osmanh'dan Giniimfize Segimler (1877-2002) (Ankara: TESAV, 2003) pp. 122-123.
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leftist Kurdish separatism reached its height. From 1984 on, the southeast became a combat
zone between the Turkish military and the Marxist PKK (Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan) led by
216Abdullah Ocalan. But the military gradually ceded direct political control; in 1987 the ban
on old politicians was lifted and multiple parties were allowed to participate in elections.
Despite reduced proportionality, Turkish politics in the 1990s were again characterized by
coalition governments and the number of parties in parliament did not decrease. In fact, the
coup contributed to the fragmentation, splitting the old center-right and center-left in two. On
the right, Demirel founded the True Path Party (DYP-Dogru Yol Partisi), accusing ANAP
of collaborating with the military. Similar personal feuds on the left kept the Social-democrat
People's Party (SHP-Sosyaldemokrat Halkgz Partisi), later renamed CHP and chaired by
ismet in6n0i's son, separate from the Democratic Left Party (DSP-Demokratik Sol Partisi)
led by a disgruntled resurgent Ecevit. 217
While the military struggle went on and culminated in the capture of Ocalan in 1999,
the Kurdish movement entered civilian politics. In 1987, SHP tried to promote a political
solution to the insurgency and to approach the Kurdish population with a manifesto, but was
ultimately unable to negotiate a middle ground between its socialist ideology and its
commitment to Kemalist unitary nationalism. Kurdish deputies defected from SHP in 1990
but subsequent negotiations allowed them to run on SHP lists again in the 1991 elections.
The pact was shattered when five of them brazenly took their parliamentary oath in Kurdish
and were detained and eventually tried. The Kurdish contingent eventually broke off to form
a separate party that was repeatedly banned and reestablished with new names, the most
long-lived of them being People's Democracy Party (HADEP- Halkin Demokrasi Partisi).
The detachment of the Kurdish faction was greeted with relief in the SHP, which suffered
electoral losses in the western provinces after this abortive affair and underwent a period of
crisis.21 As for HADEP, it performed well in local elections in the southeast but persistently
failed to enter parliament due to the high barrier.219 Reconstituting itself as the Democratic
Society Party (DTP-Demokratik Toplum Partisi) in 2005, it entered its candidates as
2 16 McDowall, A Modern History ofthe Kurds, pp. 420-449.
217 Ziircher, Turkey: A Modern History, pp. 292-342.
2 18 Erdal In6ni, Andar ve Dalianceler (Istanbul: Yorum, 1999) pp. 239-261; interview with Korel G6ymen.
2 19Aylin Guney, "The People's Democracy Party," in Political Parties in Turkey, pp. 122-137.
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independents in the 2007 elections and formed a parliamentary group of twenty deputies. But
within a few months its leader was arrested and it was again threatened with closure. 20
Meanwhile, in 2004 the PKK repudiated the ceasefire it had declared after Ocalan's capture
and resumed attacks in the southeast from its bases in Northern Iraq.
The biggest development of the 1990s was undoubtedly the rise of the religious
right.22 ' Despite being ousted from government by the military in 1997, Necmettin Erbakan's
party continued to poll well, shutting down and reopening with different names. Whereas
scandals and a financial crisis in 2001 discredited DYP, ANAP, and DSP, the Islamic party
built a reputation for good governance and attendance to the poor, increasing its votes both in
major urban centers and in the southeast. 22 2 While other parties collapsed after the 2001
banking fiasco, the Islamic party underwent a take-over by its younger and more progressive
wing led by former Istanbul mayor Tayyip Erdogan. His Justice and Development Party
(AKP-Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi), regrouped the right-wing vote and secured one-party
majorities in 2002 and 2007. Riding the wave of modern trends, AKP has adopted a tolerant
stance on questions of ethnicity, which its virulent nationalist critics deplore by dubbing it
"the Arab-Kurdish Party."2 23
An Alevi cultural revival movement has been flourishing in Turkey and abroad,
primarily in Germany, since the mid-1980s. Journals and books, media outlets, and pious
foundations have established a presence, giving the community more visibility than ever
before. Alevis initially rallied around the SHP but their confidence in the party's ability to
protect them was shaken in 1993, when right-wing extremists set fire on a hotel during an
Alevi festival in Sivas. SHP/CHP lost votes and there was even a short-lived attempt to
recreate an all-Alevi party (the Peace Party-Bary Partisi) in 1995-1999, but it was a one-
man show and even less successful than the Unity Party of old. Today, the bulk of Alevi
organizations and voters have returned to the CHP, constituting at least one third of its voter
220
"Turkey arrests Kurdish leader," The New York Times, December 19, 2007.
221Ali (arkoglu and Ilgaz Ergen, "The Rise of Right-of-Center Parties and the Nationalization of Electoral
Forces in Turkey," New Perspectives on Turkey Vol. 26 (2002): 95-137.
22 2Birol Yegilada, The Virtue Party, in Political Parties in Turkey, pp. 62-81; Fehmi Calmuk, Erbakan'in
Kfirtleri [Erbakan's Kurds] (Istanbul: Metis Yaymlari, 2001).
2Ergnn Poyraz, Hilafet Ordusundan Arap Kart Partisine (Istanbul: Toplumsal Ddnuiium, 2004).
224Yalman and Erdemir, Alevism-Bektashism, pp. 50-56; Karin Vornhoff, "Academic and Journalistic
Publications on the Alevi and Bektashi of Turkey," in Alevi Identity, pp. 23-50.
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base. But some Alevi votes go to other parties, and AKP has made clumsy efforts to woo
them in its favor by airing promises to grant cemevis official status as houses of worship. 2 2 6
Increasingly since the 1991 and particularly after legal reforms introduced in 2002,
publications and broadcasts in Kurdish are allowed and instruction in Kurdish is now
possible in private settings. Recognizing that the language ban was a mistake Turkish
government officials claim today that the conditions in southeastern Turkey have changed,
that the PKK represents a marginal fanatical minority, and that the state guarantees equality
and rights for citizens of Kurdish origin. Kurdish nationalist critics point out that Kurdish is
still not an official language, and that decades-long assimilation policies have caused a
weakening of Kurdish identity which the state has to redress. "In what kind of country are we
living? A mayor in Antalya can publish a brochure in English but not in Kurdish," shouted a
DTP deputy in a recent session.2 27 Referring to a new draft constitution, the veteran Kurdish
politician Ahmet Turk said: "The new constitution should be built on the understanding of a
two nation-state. It won't be realistic to write the new constitution on the basis of the
existence of one nation in the country."228 Regional autonomy demands, a mainstay of the
Kurdish left, are still a red flag for all Turkish governments. As for the high electoral
threshold, though the Council of Europe has criticized Turkey, an effort by DTP politicians
to take this cause to the European Court of Human Rights recently failed, when the court
ruled that Turkey is not in violation of international conventions. 229
After weathering a protracted confrontation with the military and the CHP opposition
over presidential succession in 2007, AKP called a successful referendum that introduced
direct election of the president. It also launched a public television channel in Kurdish, and
has been working on additional reforms, including dropping the designation of Turkish as the
only official language from the constitution. DTP has found itself on the same side with AKP
on some issues, but relations between the two parties are far from cordial. Tayyip Erdogan
2 2 5Necdat Erder, Tirkiye'de Siyasi Partiler Yanday/Segmen Profili (Istanbul: TOSES, 2002), p. 79.
2 26Reha Qamuroglu, a respected Alevi intellectual and AKP deputy, announced a much-publicized initiative to
this effect, which was met with resistance from Alevi organizations and eventually came to nothing. See "EU
monitors Alevi reform," Turkish Daily News, November 29, 2007; "Alevi 'Once Hak' Diyor" Milliyet,
December 3 2007.
227
"DTP, AKP in quarrel over ban on Kurdish language," Turkish Daily News, January 12, 2008
228 "PM slams pro-Kurdish party's stance on PKK," Turkish Daily News, January 9, 2008.
229 European Court of Human Rights, Case of Yumak and Sadak v. Turkey (8 July 2008).
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has not hesitated to order military operations against PKK bases in Northern Iraq or to call
DTP deputies terrorists.23 0 Granted, the material spoils of office have played no small role in
winning Kurdish votes for AKP. To its credit, however, the Islamic party is attempting what
no other right-wing party dared to do in the past: use its electoral appeal in the southeast to
reconcile minority cultural demands. When the left tried the same twenty years earlier, it
quickly receded. Times have changed in the long interim. Democracy became more
consolidated, external pressure through the (by no means certain) prospect of EU accession
bore some fruit, and Turkish society is now much more accepting of its own ethnic diversity.
Ethnicity and Elections in Turkey: An Appraisal
Turkey stands out from other cases in that the majority community has bridging
ethnic attributes with both minorities, in a pattern of crosscutting cleavages: Turkish Sunnis
share a common native language with Alevi Turks and a common faith with Kurdish Sunnis.
Political scientists often consider crosscutting cleavages advantageous for overcoming ethnic
divisions, but clearly in Turkey they were insufficient to avert conflict.2 3' Bridging appeals
have been employed by the secular left on Alevis, and by the religious right on Sunni Kurds.
In the historical section I used the terms center-left, center-right, far left and far right
(religious and nationalist), which are commonly accepted among Turkish political scientists,
to ideologically place Turkish political parties, regardless of their unremitting name changes.
A summary of Turkish party system history is presented in Tables 2-4.m
In the 1950s, a strongly majoritarian electoral formula condemned any party with
geographically dispersed electoral support to certain failure. It is therefore not surprising that
no ethnic Alevi party was formed, and that Alevi politicians sought membership in the two
major contender parties, with preference for the DP. The same does not hold for Kurds,
whose demographic concentration would have guaranteed representation to an ethnic
230 "DTP Spreads Protests," Turkish Daily News, Monday, November 3, 2008.
231See John McGarry, Brendan O'Leary, and Richard Simeon, "Integration or Accommodation? The Enduring
Debate in Conflict Regulation," in Constitutional Design in Divided Societies, edited by Sujit Choudhry
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 85.
232 have excluded the first post-coup election of 1983 from the analysis because the ban on veteran politicians
and the severe restrictions on party registration made it hardly a free contest.
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Kurdish hegemonic party. The biggest factor, however, in the 1950s were not the electoral
incentives, but the low level of political and social development in the east. Kurdish society
in particular was completely dominated by landlord families and still reeling from two
decades of disastrous revolts.
The PR period in 1960-1980 was, notwithstanding fluctuations in the electoral law,
the best time for small parties to flourish, while coalition governments gave them extra
leverage. Urbanization and social mobility also facilitated ethnic awareness among Alevis
and Kurds. Agonist parties theoretically could try their lot in successive elections, until
voters realized that they were worth supporting. Indeed, some small parties succeeded, but
they came from the far right (MHP and MSP) and were expressing extremist positions within
the Sunni Turkish majority. Alevi organizations reacted to the rise of the right by turning
decisively to CHP, which became a magnet for them in the 1970s.2 33 Kurdish politics
remained divided and dominated by notable families, who oscillated between various parties.
Landowner candidates often ran on a different party's ballot from one election to the next,
and none of them voiced Kurdish claims until the late 70s. TiP, the Marxist party that dared
to do so, only won one seat in 1965 in Diyarbakir thanks to the rural votes of its well-to-do
Kurdish candidate's home town.234
The electoral system since 1983 is more complicated because it combines PR with a
country-wide threshold reducing proportionality. It therefore forces parties and voters to
consider the entire country as a constituency, within which both Kurds and Alevis are
dominated minorities. Given the complete lack of official data and the muffling of ethnic
expression, I think it is fair to say than neither Kurdish nor Alevi voters have a clear idea of
their exact numbers, although if a hegemonic party could rally either identity it would most
likely cross the ten percent barrier.
But in either case, such a calculation is politically irrelevant. Most Alevis today have
avowed loyalties with the center-left. Alevi civil society organizations feel comfortable
associating with the party of Ataturk, which embraces a secular agenda and incorporates
233Alevi leftwing voting behavior has been amply recorded by both countrywide and village- and suburb-
specific research. See Shankland, The Alevis in Turkey, Appendix 4; Harald SchUler, Tirkiye'de Sosyal
Demokrasi (Istanbul: iletigim Yayinlari, 1998), pp. 157-185, and "Secularism and Ethnicity," in Civil Society
in the Grip of Nationalism pp. 197-250.
2 Lice, the birthplace of Tank Ziya Ekinci.
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them in a wider vision of Turkey, even if it did not push for their demands when it was last in
power and is very unlikely to win an election at any point in the near future. This political
choice may also be due to the cultural uniqueness of Alevis, who have a long tradition of
concealing their identity and, at least the Turkish-speaking ones, a profound devotion to the
Kemalist republic.
Kurdish voting behavior is another matter. The Kurdish vote has always been split
among different parties, but in the 1990s it became definitively polarized along a left-
wing/secular/separatist versus right-wing/religious/assimilationist cleavage. 23 5 The last two
elections in the southeast were exclusive duels between AKP and HADEP/DTP. There is no
doubt that a demand to rectify Kurdish linguistic oppression lies at the core of the
HADEP/DTP movement. Sami, a Kurdish doctor living with his Turkish wife, Unzile, and
their baby daughter in a suburb of Ankara, told me the following:
When I was little the teacher at school made us swear to the Koran that we would not speak
Kurdish any more. I started talking to my parents in Turkish and didn't break that oath until
I went to university. I don't want my child to grow up the way I did.
Baran, a medical student at Dicle University in Diyarbakir, spoke along similar lines:
I speak Kurdish but not very well. I am a product of the assimilation policy.... My mother is
illiterate. When I drove her and my father to the polling station on election day, she told me
'I will vote for the lamp' [the lamp is the AKP symbol]. I told her, 'what lamp? Is this why I
brought you here?' I took the DTP ballot, put it in her hand, and said, 'this is what you're
gonna vote for.'236
Although the army used recruits from the west to do most of the heavy fighting in the
southeast in the 1980s and 90s, the conflict also had a fratricidal dimension, with certain
Kurdish tribes and individual soldiers (known as k6y korucu, village guards) pitted against
other tribes and youngsters recruited by the PKK. These divisions, which often have an
23 Hakan Yavuz and Nihat Ali Ozcan, "The Kurdish Question and Turkey's Justice and Development Party,"
Journal of Middle East Policy vol. 8 no. I (Spring 2006).
236Interview with Baran, Diyarbakir, 28/1/2008.
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ethnic origin, lie behind some of the present electoral variation.2' Within Diyarbakir
province, eastern mountainous areas where villages were destroyed by the military are
DEHAP/DTP strongholds; the AKP is stronger in the Tigris valley and in the predominantly
Turkish-speaking western areas. In 2002 DEHAP won respectively 77 and 74% of the vote in
the eastern districts of Silvan and Lice in Diyarbakir province; it won only 15 and 22% in the
westernmost districts of ingtii and Qermik. In Batman and Mardin provinces, Arabic-
speaking villages fought against the PKK and have been traditionally voting for right-wing
parties (ANAP and DYP in the 1990s, and AKP today). Despite its detractors' wordplay, the AKP is more like
an Arab-Turkish than an Arab-Kurdish party in these regions.
The electoral system in the post-1987 era created strong incentives for political
parties to merge in order to cross the mercilessly high threshold. Such merges did take place
several times (most recently in 2007 when the stumbling ANAP and DYP joined forces and
DSP candidates were put on CHP lists). But what would have been a truly historic marriage,
the affair between the Turkish and the Kurdish left in 1987-1991, ended with a divorce. From
that point on the Kurdish left kept control of local government in the southeast and an
approximate five percent of the national vote, which left it out of parliament. As much as the
CHP struggled to stay in parliament itself (and failed to do so in 1999), it calculated that it
had suffered too much from its association with the Kurds and was better off reclaiming its
traditional Turkish voter base in western Turkey. Under its new president Deniz Baykal, the
CHP adopted a more nationalist rhetoric against Kurdish separatism and its position
deteriorated in the southeast, to the extent that it now finds it hard to field enough candidates
for local elections.2 38
Throughout modern Turkish electoral history most Alevi voters have lived in
constituencies strongly dominated by Sunnis and most Kurdish voters have lived in
constituencies strongly dominated by Kurds. Given the numerical superiority of the Sunni
Turkish majority and the regional concentration of Kurds, Turkey is a country with medium-
to-low heterogeneity and the demographic potential for Turkish-Kurdish cross-ethnic voting
237Interviews with Hilmi Aydoglu, Abdurrahim Hattapoglu, Muzafer Deger, Salih Altun, Hilmi Oncu and
Cernal Vesko.
238Interviews with Yakup Kepenek and Korel G6ymen.
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at the constituency level is not very high; the potential for Sunni-Alevi cross voting is
greater, at least in those constituencies where Alevis form a substantial minoirty.
Despite the dramatic population growth, urbanization, and ethnic conflict in the span
of the last six decades, Turkey's ethnic demography has remained fairly constant. Kurds and
Alevis make up significant, partly overlapping minorities today as they did in the 1950s,
within a predominantly Turkish-speaking Sunni society. Kurds are a majority in the
southeast, while Alevis are a minority everywhere, except in Tunceli, where most of them are
Kurdish-speaking. The only difference is that Alevis, like the rest of Turkey, may now be a
predominantly urban population. While the war with the PKK and forced evacuations of
villages by the military in the 1990s painfully accelerated the migration flow, the religious
and linguistic map of eastern Turkey did not substantially change.
Regarding the theoretical propositions, in the first period of multi-party democracy
(1950-1960), P1 and P2 would predict low party fragmentation; P3 and P4 would predict low
cross-ethnic voting between Turks and Kurds, but some cross-sectarian between Alevis and
Sunnis. The Kurds' regional concentration favored the formation of a party appealing to
Kurdish ethnicity; Alevis were more disadvantaged by the strongly majoritarian electoral
system, but their demographic weight in many eastern districts gave them some leverage.
The prediction about the number of parties is indeed correct, but the one about cross-ethnic
voting fails with respect to Kurds. Intra-Kurdish divisions maintained two-party competition
in the southeast, while the DP, which was successful in mixed Sunni-Alevi areas, did make
an effort to appeal to Alevis.
In the second period (1960-1980), districts remained almost identical, so ethnic
heterogeneity remained constant (no change for P2 and P4). P1 would predict an overall rise
in the number of parties and P3 would predict a drop in cross-sectarian voting among Alevis,
since the highly proportional system created no incentives for it, and the formation of agonist
parties representing Alevis and Kurds. P1 proves correct but P3 does not. Despite the
favorable low threshold, an agonist party (TBP) failed to win the Alevi vote, which was
eventually captured by a magnet party (CHP). An agonist party (YTP) was briefly successful
in the southeast, but it did not advance Kurdish-specific appeals and later disbanded. All
parties competing for the Kurdish vote in the 70s were contenders with a primary voter base
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outside the southeast. In other words, in a period that favored ethnic voting, Kurds and Alevis
continued to vote across ethnic lines.
In the third period, the national threshold forced politicians to think of the entire
country as a constituency as well. All parties and particularly small parties would have an
incentive to appeal to minorities, in order to gain valuable votes that would allow them to
enter parliament. The reduction in proportionality should therefore lead to party merges and
probably higher cross-ethnic voting for both Kurds and Alevis. P1 would predict the overall
number of parties to decrease and P3 would predict higher cross-ethnic voting. P1 is correct
in the long run, but it took more than a decade of adjustment and unstable parliaments for
Turkish parties to adjust. In the 1990s party fragmentation remained higher than it had been
in the 70s, under higher proportionality, and parties typically preferred to risk staying out of
parliament than to merge with their ideological kin. It took the 2000 financial fiasco to
achieve what the electoral threshold could not do-eliminate some parties from the race.
P3 fails yet again, as cross-ethnic voting decreased over time in the third period-
both because the center left lost its Kurdish following, and because of the rise of the
nationalist far right. Initially, Alevis continued and Kurds began to append themselves to a
mainstream Turkish leftist magnet party (SHP/CHP). But the experiment failed on the
Kurdish side, and an agonist party was formed instead that has attempted but failed to gain
universal support among Kurdish voters.239 Nevertheless, the party has attracted almost half
the Kurdish electorate, who supported it in successive elections for emotional reasons, even
though they understood that it was unlikely to enter parliament.
DTP officials often complain that the party's electoral performance would be better
had HADEP/DEHAP not faced so much state persecution. The party has clearly faced many
obstacles in its operation, and this complaint may not be entirely undounded-neitehr though
is the accusation that it has served as the political wing of the PKK. But one should not forget
that the Islamic party also faced persecution and still managed to win both Turkish and
Kurdish votes, eventually rising to power. 24 Over time, the Islamic party was able to
239Aylin Giiney, "The People's Democracy Party," in Political Parties in Turkey, pp. 122-137; interviews with
Ufuk Uras and Tarik Ziya Ekinci. The DTP maintains cordial relations with fringe Marxist Turkish parties
like the ODP, and launched a new initiative in 2008 for an all-inclusive leftist party ( ati Partisi); but the
perennial weakness of the Turkish far left leaves it without any sizable ideological counterpart.
2A case for DTP's closure is still pending at the Supreme Court; a similar case against AKP was dropped.
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maintain its cross-ethnic appeal, whereas HADEP/DTP remained hemmed in as an ethnic
Kurdish party of the left. The two larger phenomena of bridging attributes (the attraction of
Alevi voters by the secular Turkish center left and the attraction of Sunni Kurdish voters by
the Turkish religious right) are observed continuously since the 1970s and cannot be
attributed to the reduction in electoral proportionality introduced in 1983.
In terms of effects on party system structure, Turkey's electoral reforms therefore
generally conform to predictions about party fragmentation (more so the first than the second
one), but generally fail predictions about cross-ethnic voting. Assessing the impact of party
system structure on ethnic conflict is harder because there is a weaker basis for within-case
comparison. Nevertheless it is worth observing that inclusion in a magnet party for Alevis
did not reduce sectarian tension, compared to the period when an agonist Alevi party existed.
Alevi attitudes towards the far right and vice versa continue to be very hostile. Similarly, the
success of religiously-minded right-wing parties, most notably AKP, at attracting Kurdish
votes in the southeast has not yet produced a political solution to the Kurdish question in
Turkey. Change may just be on the horizon, but admittedly EU pressure and general
democratization has played an important role. In the past, Turkish mainstream parties, right
and left of center, tended to pursue agendas based on integrative, unitary citizenship, which
are synonymous with assimilation and oppression for the Kurdish left. Cross-ethnic voting in
Turkey, therefore, has not had a clear mitigating effect on ethnic conflict, and in the southeast
it may indicate underlying ethnic rifts between Kurds and Arabs, between religious and
secular Kurds, between those who accept and those who reject assimilation or between tribes
that fought with the PKK and tribes that fought against it. Nor can the Kurdish question be
exactly described as a problem of access to power for Kurds.2 41 Assimilated Kurds have been
able to rise to positions of authority and there has never been a governing party in Turkey
that did not poll at least decently well in Kurdish areas. Turkey has been primarily governed
by right-wing parties in the last sixty years, so it has been a major challenge particularly for
the left to increase its vote share. But the secularist Turkish left has repeatedly demonstrated
(in 1991 and 1999) that it prefers the Turkish center-right as a coalition partner to the
Kurdish far left.
24 1In Ethnicity and Electoral Politics (Cambridge University Press, 2007), J6hanna-Kristin Birnir argues that
resort to violence is more likely for ethnic groups that are excluded from government.
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While electoral systems and levels of violence fluctuated, some features of Turkish
politics with respect to ethnicity have exhibited continuity. One of them undoubtedly has
been political censorship on expressions of ethnicity. One could even claim that this reduces
Turkey's value as a case study for electoral design since such restrictions are unlikely to be
imposed by liberally-oriented international actors. Nevertheless, in Turkey's case these
restrictions have not impeded parties with ethnic platforms from forming and competing in
elections since the 1960s. A more important constant has been the qualitative difference
between Alevi and Kurdish demands and the willingness of mainstream Turkish parties to
engage them. Alevis can be satisfied either with a state that abstains from religious affairs or
one that engages them as a religious community on an equal footing with Sunnis. To the
secular left, either agenda is acceptable. Religious equality may now start becoming
acceptable to the right as well, even though Alevis are suspicious of AKP's assimilationist
intentions. In contrast, Kurdish demands to reverse linguistic discrimination or to consider
territorial autonomy for the southeast have been unacceptable to most Turkish parties. At the
same time there is a traditional segment within Kurdish society which values Islamic
religious identity above Kurdish linguistic identity and finds common ground with
conservative Sunni Turks. Tolerance towards the Kurdish language has increased in Turkey
in the last two decades as a result of both domestic and international pressures, notably the
prospect of EU accession. But changes in this direction have been and continue to be
painfully slow. Under these circumstances it becomes obvious why electoral instruments
have not been crucial. What really matters is not whether political institutions favor the
creation of ethnic parties and their inclusion or exclusion from parliament, but whether the
majority group is inclined to engage the minorities or not and on what common grounds.
This, not the electoral system, is what has determined Alevi and Kurdish electoral support for
parties making cross-ethnic appeals.
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Maps 1-3: Estimated concentration of Kurds (1965, 1990) and Alevis by province
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Table 2: Historical Evolution of Turkish Political Parties, 1950-2007
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Table 4: Summary of parliamentary election results in Turkey, 1950-2007 (source: TUIK)
First Period, 1950-1960 (Vote Shares/Seats)
Year MP/CMP DP HP CHP
1950 3.1 1 57.4 417 - 39.5 69
1954 4.9 5 59.2 505 - 35.4 31
1957 7.1 4 47.9 424 3.8 4 41.1 178
Second Period, 1960-1980 (Vote Shares)
Year MHP MP MSP AP DP YTP CGP CHP BP TIP Other
1961 14.0 - - 34.8 - 13.7 - 36.7 - - 0.8
1965 2.2 6.3 - 52.9 - 3.7 - 28.7 - 3.0 3.2
1969 3.0 3.2 - 46.5 - 2.2 6.6 27.4 2.8 2.7 5.6
1973 3.4 0.6 11.8 29.8 11.9 - 5.3 33.3 1.1 - 2.8
1977 6.4 - 8.6 36.9 1.9 - 1.8 41.4 0.4 0.1 2.5
Second Period, 1960-1980 (Seats)
Year MHP MP MSP AP DP YTP CGP CHP BP TIP Other
1961 54 - - 158 - 65 - 173 - - -
1965 11 31 - 240 - 19 - 134 - 14 1
1969 1 6 - 256 - 6 15 143 8 2 13
1973 3 0 48 149 45 - 13 185 1 - 6
1977 16 - 24 189 1 - 3 213 0 0 4
Third Period, 1987-2007 (Vote Shares)
Year MHP RP/FP/AKP ANAP DYP DSP SHP/CHP HADEP Other
1987 2.9 7.2 36.3 19.1 8.5 24.7 - 1.2
1991 16.9 24.0 27.0 10.8 20.8 - 0.6
1995 8.2 21.4 19.7 19.2 14.6 10.7 4.2 1.8
1999 18 15.4 13.2 12.0 22.2 8.7 4.8 6.5
2002 8.4 34.3 5.1 9.5 1.2 19.4 6.1 16
2007 14.3 46.6 - 5.4 - 20.9 5.2* 7.6
Third Period, 1987-2007 (Seats) * DTP candidates ran as independents in 2007
Year MHP RP/FP/AKP ANAP DYP DSP SHP/CHP HADEP Other
1987 0 0 292 59 0 99 - -
1991 62 115 178 7 88 - 0
1995 0 158 132 135 76 49 0 0
1999 129 111 86 85 136 0 0 3
2002 0 365 0 0 0 177 0 8
2007 71 341 - 0 - 112 20* 6
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The Turkish Workers' Party 4th Congress declaration on the Eastern Question
(Courtesy of the Turkish History Foundation)
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Map 4: Deviations from the average national YTP vote share in 1961-1969 by electoral
district (dark gray in districts where the party received 200% or more of its national average
vote, medium gray where it received between 150% and 200%, pale gray where it received
between 50% and 150%, and white where it received less than 50% of its average). The
party's stronghold in the east and particularly the southeast is evident.
Map 5: Deviations from the average national TBP vote share in 1969-1977 by electoral
district (dark gray where the party received 200% or more of its national average, medium
gray where it received between 150% and 200%, pale gray where it received between 50%
and 150%, and white where it received below 50% of its average). The concentration in
Alevi areas is evident (cf. Map 3). Both YTP and TBP failed to sustain themselves under a
very favorable electoral system.
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Map 6: Deviations from the average national HADEP/DEHAP vote share in 1995-2002 by
electoral district (dark gray for provinces where the party received 200% or more of its
national average vote, medium gray where it received between 150% and 200%, pale gray
where it received between 50% and 150%, white where it received below 50% of its
average). The party's stronghold in the southeast is evident. HADEP established itself and
persisted under a very unfavorable electoral system.
Map 7: Deviations from the average national CHP vote share in 1995-2002 by electoral
district (dark gray in districts where the party received 150% or more of its average national
vote, medium gray where it received between 100% and 150%, pale gray where it received
between 50% and 100%, and white where it received below 50%). CHP performs best in the
capital, in western coastal regions, and in Alevi areas; and worst in the southeast and the
religiously conservative Central Anatolia and Black Sea regions.
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Map 8: Deviations from the average national MSP vote share in 1973-1977 by electoral
district (dark gray for over 150%, medium gray for 100-150%, pale gray for 50-100% and
white for below 50% of the national average). Under low-threshold PR, the Islamic party
established itself both in Sunni Turkish Central Anatolia and in the Sunni Kurdish southeast.
The votes in Alevi minority areas came from Sunnis. This is evident from Tunceli, the only
Alevi majority district, which is a white island in the east (-8.4).
Map 9: Deviations from the average national RP/FP/AKP vote share in 1995-2002 by
electoral district (dark gray for over 150%, medium gray for 100-150%, pale gray for 50-
100% and white for below 50% of the national average). Under high-threshold PR, the
Islamic party retained and enlarged its power base in Central Anatolia and the Black Sea,
facing competition from the Kurdish HADEP/DEHAP/DTP in the southeast, and from CHP
in Alevi and western areas (contrast with Maps 1-3).
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Chapter 5
SRI LANKA: THE DIVIDED MINORITY
Few countries can compete with Sri Lanka in serving as sad examples of the long
term costs of ethnic strife on socioeconomic development. The British once considered
Ceylon their model colony and introduced universal suffrage as early as the 1930s. At
independence in 1948, Ceylon looked no less if not more poised for success than Hong Kong
or Singapore. Six decades later, with a per capita income only slightly higher than Guyana, it
is reeling from a protracted civil war that claimed approximately 80,000 lives, by far the
deadliest case of ethnic conflict included in this study. My fieldwork in Sri Lanka took place
in winter and spring of 2009, during the final stages of this war between government forces
and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). It was a dramatic climax marking the
failure of peace negotiations aimed at institutional reforms and conversely the success of the
resort to brute force. My goal in this chapter is to analyze the minimal impact that electoral
institutions have had on the course of ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka, and to argue that they
ultimately proved irrelevant.
Ethnic Identities in Sri Lanka
Like Turkey, Sri Lanka has one dominant ethnic group comprising between two
thirds and three quarters of the population and has experienced conflict both along linguistic
and religious lines. Unlike Turkey, however, the two cleavages are reinforcing rather than
overlapping (except Christianity), creating a number of segmented minorities vis-ai-vis a
majority that shares no common ethnic attribute with them. The major ethnic group, the
Sinhalese, the people of the lion (sinha), gave their name to Ceylon. Sinhala is an Indo-
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European language whose literary ancestor, Pali, was used to record the most ancient
Buddhist sacred texts. The association of the island with Buddhism was a recurrent theme in
these traditional epics, which gained renewed symbolic importance for the Buddhist
revivalist movement protesting British colonialism and creeping Christianization in the late
19th century. Apart from criticizing the colonial authorities' partiality towards Christians,
Buddhist revivalists also resented an alleged 'Tamilization' of Ceylon, manifested both
through Tamil immigration from India and overrepresentation of Tamil speakers in the
administration.2
There are three Tamil-speaking minority groups on the island: the Sri Lankan Tamils,
the Indian Tamils, and the Moors. The Ceylon or Sri Lankan Tamils, approximately one
ninth of the total population, live primarily along the northern and eastern coasts, which they
claim as their traditional homelands. The Indian Tamils are descendants of indentured
workers recruited in South India by the British to work in the coffee and tea plantations of
the central highlands. Tamil is a Dravidian language spoken by over sixty million people
in the Indian state of Tamil Nadu. Pali sources mention Dravidians on the island since
ancient times, but the Tamil concentration in the northeast is probably the result of a large
scale invasion from South India in the late medieval period. Just as the Sinhalese kingdoms
of old had an often adversarial relationship with the South Indian Tamil dynasties, Sinhalese
nationalists in modern times have viewed the much larger population of Tamils across Palk
Strait with a sense of suspicion and alarm: originally as a source of unwanted migrants, and
later as a support base for LTTE insurgents and a lobbyist to the Indian government in favor
of intervention in Sri Lankan affairs. After independence, Sinhalese politicians
disenfranchised most Indian Tamils and pressured India to repatriate them, eventually
reducing their numbers on the island by half (see Table 1).
242 For more details for the role of Buddhist revivalism in the conflict see Patrick Grant, Buddhism and Ethnic
Conflict in Sri Lanka (Albany: SUNY Press, 2009); David Little, Sri Lanka: the Invention of Enmity
(Washington DC: USIP Press, 1994); Stanley J. Tambiah, Buddhism Betrayed? Religion, Politics and Violence
in Sri Lanka (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992); and K. N. 0. Dharmadasa, Language, Religion and
Ethnic Assertiveness: the Growth of Sinhalese Nationalism in Sri Lanka (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan
Press, 1992).
243 For an authoritative history of this migration see Patrick Peebles, The Plantation Tamils of Ceylon (London,
New York: Leicester University Press, 2001).
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Table 1: Ethnicity and religion in the Sri Lankan census, 1946-2001
1946 1953 1963 1971 1981 2001
Sinhalese 69.41 69.36 70.99 71.96 73.95 81.97
Sri Lankan Tamils 11.01 10.96 11 11.22 12.7 4.32
Indian Tamils 11.73 12.03 10.61 9.26 5.52 5.05
Moors 6.15 6.32 6.44 6.73 7.05 7.91
Others 1.71 1.32 0.93 0.82 0.77 0.75
1946 1953 1963 1971 1981 2001
Buddhist 64.27 64.33 66.18 67.27 69.3 76.71
Hindu 19.97 19.89 18.51 17.64 15.48 7.76
Muslim 6.6 6.69 6.84 7.11 7.55 8.48
Christian 9.12 8.95 8.36 7.91 7.61 7
Other 0.03 0.14 0.11 0.07 0.06 0.05
Population 6657 8098 10582 12690 14847 16929
Note: Ethnic and religious groups are given as percentages, total population in thousands.
Figures for the 2001 census include government-controlled areas only.
The third Tamil-speaking group identifies more closely with its faith than with its
244language. The Ceylon Moors, as they were historically known, or Sri Lankan Muslims, as
they presently prefer to be called, form around seven percent of the population. Tamil leaders
have repeatedly approached them on the basis of a common linguistic platform and have
viewed them simply as Tamil converts to Islam, like the Muslim population of Tamil Nadu.
But the Moorish leadership has decided to distance itself from Tamil separatism, trading its
loyalty to the Sinhalese establishment in return for concessions on religious and educational
matters. Muslim intellectuals have also fostered a different sense of ethnic origin, claiming
ancestry from Arab traders who settled on the island over the centuries, married local Tamil
women, and adopted the South Indian lingua franca. The Muslim community of Sri Lanka is
technically larger than the Moors, encompassing small numbers of Malay, Gujarati, and
Sindhi immigrants from British times concentrated in the capital, Colombo; but these groups
244 M. A. Nahman, Sri Lankan Muslims: Ethnic Identity within Cultural Diversity (Colombo: ICES, 2007).
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have dwindled in size and were never electorally significant. Most Sri Lankan Muslims speak
Tamil at home, peppered with some Arabic vocabulary. However, given the option to choose
the medium of instruction for their children since 1956, more and more Muslim families
living in Sinhalese-majority areas opt for Sinhala primary education, signaling a gradual
linguistic shift.
The vast majority of Sinhalese are Buddhist, while most Sri Lankan and Indian
Tamils are Hindus. Christianity has served as the only bridging religion between the two
linguistic groups and Ceylon's colonial masters generally favored cultural assimilation
through conversion. The Portuguese were most fervent, to the point of expelling Muslims
from the west coast and destroying Hindu and Buddhist temples. As a result, Catholicism is
the largest Christian denomination; most Christians live along the western and northern
coasts; and a significant concentration of Muslims is found in the east, descendants of the
16th century refugee wave. The Dutch promoted Protestantism less fanatically, while their
trickle of immigration to the island produced a patrilineal mixed-race aristocracy, the
Burghers, who continued to play an important role under British rule. The Ceylon Tamils and
the low country coastal Sinhalese were more affected by colonial assimilation than the
Sinhalese highlands, which were conquered last. By the mid-20th century English language
education and experience in colonial administration had given rise to a common culture
among Ceylonese elites, nourishing the Britons' false optimism for the prospects of ethnic
accommodation after their departure. Things turned out differently. Though schooled by
Christian missionaries, key Sinhalese politicians at least nominally embraced or reconverted
to Buddhism, riding the wave of the fundamentalist anti-colonial movement. The Burghers'
political clout disappeared when their appointed legislative seats were abolished in 1972, and
many have since left the country. Tamils did not follow this trend and Christians retained a
high profile in the minority's leadership.
As in other South Asian societies, caste distinctions exist among the Tamils and the
Sinhalese but their relative salience has decreased over time. 245 The traditional caste systems
245 For a rich treatment see Janice Jiggins, Caste and Family in the Politics of the Sinhalese (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1979); Bryan Pfaffenberger, Caste in Tamil Culture: the Religious Foundations of
Sudra Domination in Tamil Sri Lanka (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University, 1982; Michael Roberts, Caste
Conflict and Elite Formation: the Rise of a Karava Elite in Sri Lanka, 1500-1931 (Cambridge and New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1982); Tamara Gunasekera, Hierarchy and Egalitarianism: Caste, Class, and
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of the two communities mirrored one another to a great extent, while differing from those on
the subcontinent. The dominant and by far the largest caste were farmers (Goigama for the
Sinhalese, Vellalar for the Tamils), making up 50-60% of each group. Next in social
hierarchy came various service castes, most notably the fishermen (Karava for the Sinhalese,
Karaiyar for the Tamils-approximately 10%). Among the Tamils, the untouchability of the
five low castes (Panchamar) was stricter than among the Sinhalese, constituting a significant
social issue in intra-Tamil politics. The Indian Tamil indentured laborers overwhelmingly
came from the untouchable castes of Southern India (Parayar, Pallar, Sakkiliar), while their
supervisors (known as Kangany) usually came from the Vellalar caste. In the immediate
post-independence period, Goigama and Vellalar families dominated Sinhalese and Tamil
politics respectively, and Kanganies led the Indian Tamil trade union movement. Among the
Sinhalese, caste remains salient in the countryside, particularly for marriage arrangements; its
importance in urban centers has declined as education and commercial opportunities created
upward mobility and the state adopted socialist welfare policies. In the north, Tamil
nationalists deplored caste discrimination as undermining Tamil unity and the insurgency
contributed to significant caste leveling.24 6
As in Turkey, language and territoriality have constituted the principle dividing issues
between the majority and the main minority in Sri Lanka; unlike Turkey, though, religion is
an overlapping rather than a crosscutting cleavage that can play a potentially bridging role.
Following independence, the Buddhist movement agitated for the adoption of Sinhala as the
only official language, the pinnacle of a wider agenda aimed at reducing the influence of
Christian elites and eliminating the overrepresentation of educated Tamils in the public
sector. Although never fully implemented and eventually abandoned, the Sinhala-only
campaign generated immense resentment among Tamils and led to outbreaks of communal
violence in the 1950s. Unable to ensure safeguards for the status of Tamil as a regional
minority language, Tamil leaders espoused the goal of a separate Tamil homeland in the
Power in Sinhalese Peasant Society (London: Athlone Press, 1994); Shakkela Jabar, Does Caste Matter? A
Study of Caste and Poverty in Sinhalese Society (Colombo: Centre for Policy Analysis, 2005); John D. Rogers,
"Caste as a Social Category and Identity in Colonial Sri Lanka," The Indian Economic and Social History
Review vol. 41 no. 1 (2004): 51-77; and Casteless or Caste-Blind? Dynamics of Concealed Caste
Discrimination, Social Exclusion and Protest in Sri Lanka, edited by Kalinga Tudor Silva, P. P. Sivapragasam,
and Paramsothy Thanges (Colombo, Chennai: Kumaran Book House, 2009). Article 12 of Sri Lanka's 1978
constitution prohibits caste discrimination.
246 Much of Tigers' leadership, including Prabhakaran himself, came from the Karaiyar caste.
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northeast, either federal or, as attitudes hardened after the 1983 riots, independent. Tamils
have also decried the land settlement schemes promoted by the Sri Lankan government as
organized colonization of their traditional lands, which Sinhalese leaders have variably
defended as necessary on grounds of agricultural development and population pressures.247
The state now officially promotes bilingualism, but many Tamils still feel alienated. As
Sunil, a Sinhalese staff officer of a major international organization candidly told me "I
wouldn't like to be a minority in this country." For the last twenty years, the conflict has
essentially revolved around the constitutional status of the predominantly Tamil-speaking
Northern and Eastern Provinces (see Map 1). After the LTTE's rout, regional devolution, the
subject of all past abortive peace plans, seems to have been put aside.
Ethnic Demographics
Until the 1980s, Sri Lanka's overall ethnic demographic balance had changed only as
a result of the emigration of groups that had settled there in colonial times. Apart from the
departure of Burghers and Malays, the main driver was the practically forced repatriation of
Indian Tamils to India (some of them second and third generation immigrants who had never
left the island). Accounting for roughly twelve percent in the 1940s and 50s, the Indian Tamil
share of the total population dropped to under six percent in 1981, the year that India stopped
issuing passports and forced Sri Lanka to naturalize most of the remaining stateless persons.
The census authorities have been counting Ceylon and Indian Tamils as separate
categories since 1911, but the distinction has not always been clear-cut, particularly since all
plantation Tamils were awarded Sri Lankan citizenship in 1988. The social disruption and
deemphasizing of Tamil caste distinctions caused by the LTTE insurgency has brought about
the assimilation of Indian Tamils in the north-those living there all along as well as those
who fled north in response to communal riots in the south. Meanwhile, after acquiring
247 See K. M. De Silva, "Separatism in Sri Lanka: the Traditional Homelands of the Tamils" in Secessionist
Movements in Comparative Perspective, edited by Ralph Premdas, S. W. R. de A. Samarasinghe, and Alan B.
Anderson (London: Pinter Publishers, 1990); Chelvadurai Manogaran, "Colonization as Politics" in The Sri
Lankan Tamils: Ethnicity and Identity, edited by Chelvadurai Manogaran and Bryan Pfaffenberger (Boulder:
Westview Press, 1994); and Jeyaratnam Wilson,"Sri Lanka: Ethnic Strife and the Politics of Space" in The
Territorial Management ofEthnic Conflict, edited by John Coakley. (London, Portland: Frank Cass, 2003).
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citizenship, some Indian Tamils in the south also preferred to identify as "Sri Lankan Tamil"
as a means of underlining and defending their residence status. Much like the Moors, the
plantation Tamils of the central highlands distanced themselves from Tamil separatism,
working instead with the Sinhalese elites to secure their own interests. Over time, through
these processes, immigrant ancestry and caste receded in comparison to region and political
outlook as the defining differences between Sri Lankan and Indian Tamils, with the latter in
the south adopting an Upcountry Tamil (Malaiyaka Tamil) identity. As one scholar has
astutely noted, "paradoxically, up-country Tamils have been increasingly identifying
themselves as Tamil Sri Lankans, but this did not entail further links and connections with
Sri Lankan Tamils." 248
In terms of regional demographics, Tamil speakers are highly clustered in the
northeast; but whereas the Jaffna peninsula in the north is overwhelmingly Sri Lankan Tamil,
the Eastern Province is split between Tamils, Muslims, and a substantial Sinhalese minority
that grew over time as a result of the land settlement schemes. Indian Tamils are a plurality in
the tea producing peaks of Nuwara-Eliya and a significant minority in the neighboring
regions. The Moors are the only group that is more evenly spread, straddling opposite coasts.
Despite their concentration in Eastern Province, two thirds of Muslims actually live outside
the east, with an important presence in the two major urban centers, Colombo and Kandy
(see Maps 2-5). Notwithstanding the mingling of her Anglophone elites and the multiethnic
character of her capital, Sri Lanka's demographic make-up has provided poor potential for
cross-ethnic electoral appeals-with Eastern Province, parts of Central Province, and of
course Colombo being the notable exceptions.
Like Guyana, Sri Lanka inherited the British single-member district formula; unlike
Guyana, Sri Lanka maintained it long after independence. The regional clustering of ethnic
groups made it possible to ensure adequate minority representation under plurality voting if
the institutional designers were so inclined. Indeed, the issue was hotly debated in the last
years of British rule-the Tamils unsuccessfully airing a demand for 50:50 representation in
the 1930s-and the 1946 delimitation commission took particular pains to achieve as
248 Daniel Bass, "Making Sense of the Census in Sri Lanka," in Writing Tamil Nationalism, edited by R.
Cheran (Colombo: International Centre for Ethnic Studies, 2007), p. 315.
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proportional an expected ethnic distribution of seats as possible, lamenting that this was not
perfectly feasible for the Indian Tamils and Muslims due to their thinner dispersal. 249 A small
number of multi-member districts were created for this very purpose, most notably Colombo
Central, where at least one of the three deputies returned was consistently a Muslim.25 0
Voting in the multi-member districts was cumulative, which worked to the advantage of
minorities.25 1 The number of MPs was increased twice, in 1959 and 1976 (see Map 6), and
the stated goal of safeguarding minority representation was retained. In practice, while
Muslims managed to win seats even in districts where they constituted a minority, the
concern about plantation Tamils was eclipsed when most were stripped of citizenship in
1949. As shown in Table 2, the originally drawn single-member districts actually produced
fairly proportional ethnic representation; it was the citizenship restrictions, rather than the
plurality formula, that skewed the seat distribution in favor of the Sinhalese. The Sri Lankan
Tamils were slightly overrepresented at first, but subsequent reapportionments corrected
this-to the further advantage of the Sinhalese majority.2s2
Table 2: Expected Ethnic Distribution of Ceylon's Legislative Seats under SMP
Year Seats Sinhalese Ceylon Tamil Indian Tamil Muslim
1946 95 69 72.6% 13 13.7% 8 8.4% 5 5.3%
(1949) 95 76 80.0% 14 14.7% 0 0% 5 5.3%
1959 151 126 83.4% 18 11.9% 0 0% 7 4.6%
1976 168 141 83.9% 19 11.3% 1 0.6% 7 4.2%
Note: Figures for 1949 reflect the effects of the Citizenship Acts, not a new delimitation.
Calculations by the author based on delimitation commission reports.
A constitutional overhaul in 1978 replaced SMP with PR, using the administrative
districts (see Map 1) to elect 196 MPs, plus 29 on a national list for a total of 225. This
249 See the Report of the Delimitation Commission, Sessional Paper XIII - 1946 (Colombo: Government
Publications Bureau, 1946), pp. 19-24.
250 Another one was consistently won by Pieter Keuneman, a Burgher communist.
251 Benjamin Reilly, Democracy in Divided Societies, p. 116. The cumulative vote is a variation of plurality
voting in multi-member districts; voters have a number of votes equal to the deputies returned, which they can
either cast all for one candidate or distribute them among candidates, or any combination thereof.
252 Reapportionment was done on the basis of total, not voting population, and thus assigned additional seats to
parts of the highlands with a Sinhalese voting majority and an Indian Tamil disenfranchised minority.
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reform would have made only a small difference (mostly by increasing representation for
Muslims) were it not also for the final settlement of the Indian Tamil problem in the 1980s.
Table 3 shows the ethnic composition of the PR constituencies according to the 1981 census.
Most of them remain overwhelmingly dominated by either the Sinhalese or the Sri Lankan
Tamils, with the exception of Nuwara-Eliya in the center where Indian Tamils form at least
plurality (in reality a majority, considering what was previously mentioned about the "Sri
Lankan Tamil" identification in the census), and Trincomalee and Ampara in the east, which
have no ethnic majority.








































































































































































Until the late 1970s, the repatriation of Indian Tamils and the controversial Sinhalese
colonization of the east were the two factors altering regional demographics. The civil war
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then produced major population movements; 1981 was the last census conducted throughout
the island. The 1983 riots sent thousands of Tamils fleeing north or abroad, to India, Britain,
and North America. The fighting in the northeast affected all ethnic groups, with disputes
between settlers, squatters, and displaced locals being fueled by the government and
insurgent forces. The LTTE particularly targeted Sinhalese settlers and in 1990 it expelled all
Muslims from Northern Province, flooding neighboring Puttalam district in the west and
Trincomalee district in the east with Muslim refugees.2 53 The general effect of these
population movements was to make the north even more purely Tamil and to polarize the
situation in the ethnically mixed Eastern Province. The 2004 tsunami caused massive loss of
life and displacement along the entire coastline, but its impact on regional demographics was
relatively limited because the communities affected were often resettled locally, while the
government and the LTTE kept separate control over the international relief process in their
respective areas of control.
Electoral Systems and Political Parties in Sri Lanka
Except an undemocratic interlude in the mid-1980s, Sri Lanka has one of the longest
electoral records in the developing world. In 1931 Ceylon became the first non-white British
colony to be granted universal suffrage. All residents aged over twenty-one could vote for a
consultative State Council with limited authority and the British registered around 100,000
Indian Tamils voters (one fifth of their population).254 Echoing the Indian example, Sinhalese
and Tamil elites had originally collaborated within the Ceylon National Congress (CNC) in
advancing demands for self-rule, although ethnic antagonisms were well evident by the
1930s. When the prospect of independence became clear after World War Two, the Tamil
leader G. G. Ponnambalam formed the All Ceylon Tamil Congress (ACTC or simply TC).
CNC's Sinhalese component and prominent Muslims like Razik Fareed (All Ceylon Muslim
253 This is also evident in the 2001 census for Puttalam and a special 2007 enumeration in Eastern Province for
Trincomalee, showing the Muslim percentage to have increased to 18.8 and 45.5 respectively.
254 For details on the introduction of franchise and general history of elections under SMP, see K M. De Silva,
Universal Franchise, 1931-1981: the Sri Lankan Experience (Colombo: Department of Information, Ministry of
State, Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, 1981).
255 For an excellent account of this period, see Nira Wickramasinghe, Ethnic Politics in Colonial Sri Lanka,
1927-1947 (New Delhi: Vickas Publishing, 1995).
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League) and T. B. Jayah (All Ceylon Moors' Association) rallied behind Don Stephen
Senanayake's United National Party (UNP). Ceylon also had an active socialist movement
which had split during the war into the Trotskyite Lanka Sama Samaja Party (LSSP) and the
pro-Soviet Communist Party (CP).
First Period, 1947-1977
In the first election for a legislature with full powers, UNP polled highest but fell
short of a majority due to the large number of independent candidates. It consequently joined
in a coalition with ACTC, an act interpreted then as an indication that cross-ethnic
cooperation would continue at the highest level. The adopted national flag added a green and
an orange stripe next to the Sinhalese lion-a symbol of inclusion for the Hindu and Muslim
Tamil-speaking minorities. 256
One of UNP's first initiatives, though, was to retract the extension of suffrage to the
Indian plantation workers initiated by the British. The UNP leadership had been hostile to
Indian immigrants all along, and as talks between Nehru and Senanayake had reached an
impasse, the Soulbury Commission responsible for Ceylon's constitution left the issue up to
the legislature. Electoral considerations in 1947 also seem to have played a part: the Ceylon
Indian Congress (CIC), the plantation workers' trade union-cum-political party, won six
seats, while Indian Tamil votes helped leftist candidates in several neighboring districts.
Senanayke moved swiftly and got G. G. Ponnambalam to agree on a move that would both
weaken the left and stall the path to citizenship for the lower castes. The 1948 Citizenship
Act required plantation workers to document that their father or grandfather was born in
Ceylon, while the 1949 Indian and Pakistani Residents Act allowed those with an
uninterrupted residence on the island (ten years for the single, seven for the married) to apply
for citizenship as long as they fulfilled certain income requirements. By the 1951 deadline,
the vast majority of Indians had thus applied, but the Ceylonese authorities were very slow in
256 For a historical survey lionizing the Senanayake legacy, see K. M. De Silva, Managing Ethnic Tensions in
Multi-Ethnic Societies: Sri Lanka, 1880-1985 (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1986). For a pro-
Tamil account, see A. Jeyaratham Wilson, The Breakup ofSri Lanka (London: Hurst & Co., 1988).
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processing their applications, leaving almost a million people stateless and pressuring India
to take them back.
The close ties with UNP and the Indian Tamil question triggered ACTC's decline. In
1949 three of the party's deputies left it in protest to form the Lanka Tamil Federal Party
257(Ilankai Tamil Arasu Katchi, abbreviated as ITAK or more often FP in English sources).
ITAK's leader, S. J. V. Chelvanayakam, a man who described himself as four times a
minority (Tamil among Sinhalese, Christian among Tamils, Protestant among Christians, and
Anglican among Protestants), famously declared that "today it is the Indian Tamils.
Tomorrow, it will be the Ceylon Tamils who will be axed.25 s" ITAK supported Panchamar
activists campaigning to end discrimination against the Tamil untouchable castes. At first,
cross-caste Tamil nationalism did not resonate at all with the Vellalar establishment. In 1952
Chelvanayakam lost his seat, defeated by a Tamil UNP candidate who had fervently argued
against universal suffrage. 259
ACTC was not the only target of ethnic outbidding. On the UNP side, Solomon
Bandaranaike, Senanayake's long-term internal rival, broke off in 1951 to form the Sri Lanka
Freedom Party (SLFP), building on his strong links with the Buddhist religious
community.260 Meanwhile, a synthesis of Sinhala nationalism and Third World socialism had
made its appearance on the left, personified by Philip Gunawardena, a founding member of
LSSP who drifted first to CP and eventually to SLFP. Campaigning jointly under the banner
of MEP (Mahajana Eksath Peramuna, People's United Front) in the 1956 election,
Bandaranaike and Gunawardena placed the adoption of Sinhala as the only official language
at the top of their agenda, arguing that the continuing use of English was a colonial legacy
favoring Christian and Tamil elites. UNP felt compelled to follow suit, losing most of its
Muslim and Tamil support. LSSP and CP wanted both Sinhalese and Tamil as official
languages, but nonetheless agreed to limit their electoral contests with SLFP, in order to
257 For sympathetic accounts of ITAK's history, see Jeyaratnam Wilson, S. J. V. Chelvanayakam and the Crisis
of Sri Lankan Tamil Nationalism: 1947-1977 (London: Hurst, 1994) and Ambalavanar Sivarajah, The Federal
Party of Sri Lanka: the Strategy of an Ethnic Minority Party in Government and Opposition, 1949-2002
(Colombo: Kumaran Book House, 2007).
258 Quoted in Sithamparam Nadesan, A History of the Up-Country Tamil People (Colombo: Ranko Publishers,
1993), p. 176.
259 This serves as anecdotal demonstration that SMP does not necessarily favor ethnic outbidders.
260 For his biography, see James Manor, The Expedient Utopian: Bandaranaike and Ceylon (Cambridge, New
York: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
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minimize vote-splitting vis-a'-vis UNP. The strategy worked. In the first of a series of
unbalanced election results under plurality, UNP received only 8 seats with 28% of the vote
and SLFP formed a majority government. ITAK swept the board in the Tamil northeast
against ACTC, and even elected two Muslim candidates.2 6'
The 1956 (Sinhala Only) Language Act was a source of tremendous bitterness for
262Tamils. To assure the continued use of Tamil as a minority regional language in the
northeast, Chelvanayakam negotiated a pact with Bandaranaike in 1957, but Sinhalese
nationalist circles forced the latter to recant. In 1959 Philip Gunawardena pulled out of the
coalition and Bandaranaike was assassinated by a radical Buddhist monk. His widow,
Sirimavo, took over the reins of SLFP. In 1960 Senanayake's son, Dudley, won without a
majority, but he was unwilling to form a coalition with the Tamils. In a follow-up election
that same year, Sirimavo Bandaranaike became the world's first female prime minister. She
was assisted in that victory by a comprehensive no-contest pact with LSSP and CP. Even the
Indian Tamils were persuaded to support the accord, and Sirimavo gave one of SLFP's
appointed seats to the CWC leader, S. Thondaman.2 63 Alarmed at the prospect of Buddhist-
leftist rule, the Christian old guard of the military staged an unsuccessful coup against her in
2641962, and was then summarily purged. In 1964 LSSP officially joined the government and
Sirimavo reached an agreement with Indian Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri to naturalize
about one third of the Indian Tamils and ship the rest to India.26 s
In reaction to SLFP's leftist turn, the party's right wing split in 1960 and formed the
Lanka Democratic Party (LPP-Lanka Prajatantravadi Pakshaya). Joined by more SLFP
dissenters in 1964, LPP crossed the floor to the opposition along with Thondaman, who was
26' For more information on the allegiances of Muslims in this period, see Urmila Phadnis, "Political Profile of
the Muslim Minority of Sri Lanka", International Studies vol. 18 no. 1 (January-March 1979): 27-48 and De
Silva, Managing Ethnic Tensions, pp. 227-235.
262 For a detailed treatment of the language question, see Neil De Votta, Blowback: Linguistic Nationalism,
Institutional Decay, and Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004).
263 Until 1972, six seats appointed by the Governor were reserved for "underrepresented" interests.
264 Donald Horowitz's book Coup Theories and Officers' Motives: Sri Lanka in Comparative Perspective
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980) is considered the classic account of this affair.
265 The original agreement called for Ceylon to naturalize 300,000 of the stateless population "plus their natural
increase" and India to issue passports to and accept the repatriation of 525,000, with the fate of the remaining
150,000 to be decided later. A 1974 follow-up agreement with Indira Gandhi split this remainder equally,
increasing Sri Lanka's quota to 375,000 and India's to 600,000. For details on these negotiations see P.
Sahadevan. India and Overseas Indians: the Case ofSri Lanka (Delhi: Kalinga Publications, 1995).
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promised by UNP that the naturalized Indian Tamils would not be put on a separate electoral
register. UNP returned to power in 1965 with a coalition including LPP, MEP, ACTC, and
ITAK. But Senanayake, like Bandaranaike before him, reneged on guarantees he had given
to Tamils for language equality and a stop to Sinhalese colonization projects in Eastern
Province. In 1968 ITAK left the coalition, while SLFP, LSSP, and CP declared that they
would collude in the next election as the United Front. Although UNP actually received a
higher share of the vote than SLFP in 1970, the plurality system gave the latter a crushing
advantage.266 Extending the parliament's tenure to enact constitutional changes, the United
Front renamed the country Sri Lanka in 1972 and declared it a republic, cutting the umbilical
cord with the United Kingdom. The new constitution introduced an indirectly elected
president and abolished the senate and the appointed legislative seats. The government
expanded welfare and the public sector and strengthened ties with socialist countries like
China. By siding with SLFP, LSSP and CP made a strategic decision that cost them in Tamil
votes.267 Prof. Tissa Vitarana, nephew of LSSP founder N. M. Perera, justifies this on
ideological grounds: "We had to fight against imperialism, sever our ties with the British
crown... SLFP was ready to go along with the anti-imperialist struggle of LSSP. The fact
that they were racist was unfortunate." 268
In the overpopulated south, a radical section of Sri Lanka's frustrated unemployed
Sinhalese youth found its expression in the Maoist People's Liberation Front (JVP-Janatha
Vimukthi Peramuna). The government quelled a disorganized JVP insurrection in 1971, and
imprisoned its top leaders. It then implemented standardization quotas for university
admissions that effectively constituted affirmative action for Sinhalese and Muslim students.
After the Sinhala language policy had eroded their position in public administration,
comparatively higher rates of university admission had remained a key professional career
outlet for the educated Jaffna Tamils. Disillusioned with the Sinhalese leadership, ITAK,
ACTC, and CWC joined to form the Tamil United Front (TUF) in 1972, with
Chelvanayakam at the helm. But the pan-Tamil alliance was not meant to last. When it
266 For a detailed account of this election see A. Jeyaratnam Wilson, Electoral Politics in an Emergent State: the
Ceylon General Election of May 1970 (London: Cambridge University Press, 1975).
267 While generally unable to win seats with the notable exception of CP's 1956 win in Point Pedro, Marxist
candidates competed ably against ITAK and ACTC in the north until 1965.
268 Interview with Prof. Tissa Vitarana, Ministry of Science and Technology, Colombo, 18/3/2009.
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became clear that separatism would be the central platform, CWC abandoned ship. The party
was then renamed the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF), embracing in its manifesto the
claim for historically separate Tamil territoriality in the northeast. TULF particularly
protested the carving of two Sinhalese-majority electoral districts (Seruwila and Ampara,
numbers 93 and 99 on Map 6) from areas of Eastern Province that had been flooded with
Sinhalese settlers.2 69
Sri Lanka's economic woes under the United Front (from which LSSP had been
expelled in 1975) led to a UNP landslide victory in 1977. It was now SLFP's turn to taste the
unfairness of the plurality system, winning only eight seats with almost 30% of the vote.
TULF with eighteen deputies became the official opposition, sparking new riots.
The Long Parliament and the Onset of Civil War, 1978-1989
UNP's new leader, J. R. Jayawardene, decided to use his insuperable majority to
launch constitutional reforms that would benefit the country, the party, and himself:
proportional representation to avoid extremely skewed election results; a directly elected
executive presidency, which he was certain to win; and a two-thirds majority requirement to
amend the constitution in the future, something unlikely for any one party to achieve after the
introduction of PR.27 0 The Tamil minority stood to gain from several of these points. Tamil's
status was raised to 'national' language, although Sinhala remained the 'official' one. PR
guaranteed minority representation and made coalition governments with Tamil participation
more likely, while also making it improbable for a Tamil party to be the main opposition in
parliament ever again-an ethnically polarizing configuration. The president would be
elected through a preferential system, which theoretically meant that even if a Tamil
candidate were running, Tamil voters could strategically express a lower preference for one
269 Chelvadurai Manogaran, Ethnic Conflict and Reconciliation in Sri Lanka (Honolulu: University of Hawaii
Press, 1987), pp. 140-148. Manogaran's observations about the underrepresentation of Tamils, however,
sidestep the fact that it was due to the disenfranchisement of Indian Tamils, not gerrymandering.
270 As Prof. Lakshman Marasinghe, Attorney-at-Law at the Sri Lankan Supreme Court and legal advisor to past
presidents told me, "today's system was devised so that the constitution would be difficult to change." After
Jayawardene won the new executive presidency, PR would deprive SLFP of the majority needed to revoke his
powers.
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of the main Sinhalese contestants. 2 7 1 This was obviously designed to aid UNP, which was
considered less anti-minority than SLFP. Jayawardene himself opined that, "A President
elected by the people will have to depend on the minority vote: he cannot go against
them."272
In implementing his reform package, Jayawardene abused the same prerogatives
previously employed by the left, while ethnic relations deteriorated further. By the late 1970s
a number of Tamil rebel groups had sprung up in the northeast, the LTTE being only one
among them.m The state responded with harsh security measures. In 1981, in retaliation for
the death of two Sinhalese policemen at a TULF rally, the police went on a rampage in Jaffna
burning down the public library. In 1982, UNP held presidential elections and a referendum
to extend the parliament's term. Jayawardene won amidst convincing accusations of fraud. In
July 1983, an LTTE ambush against an army patrol triggered the largest pogrom against
Tamils to date. Jayawardene failed to take control of the situation and publicly blamed the
episodes on the Tamils.27 4 As full-scale civil war unraveled, TULF deputies forfeited their
seats in parliament when they refused to take an oath to a new constitutional amendment
(Article 157A) proscribing separatism. UNP declared an emergency and postponed elections
indefinitely.
Meanwhile, important political developments affected the smaller Tamil-speaking
minorities. Muslims in Eastern Province were at first sympathetic to the rebels, but LTTE
extortion tactics and land disputes pushed them to the government side. In 1981 a former
TULF candidate, M. H. M. Ashraff, founded the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC). 27 In
271 The system for the election for the president is technically considered an extension of the supplemental vote
(SV) rather than full-fledged AV, in that it allows voters to rank their top choice plus only one or two additional
candidates, depending on the total number of candidates in the race. Marking preferences is optional. See The
Constitution ofSri Lanka, Chapter XIV, articles 88-104.
272 Quoted in Amita Shastri, "Channeling Ethnicity Through Electoral Reform in Sri Lanka," Commonwealth
and Comparative Politics vol. 44 no. 1 (March 2006): p. 38.
273 See chapter "The Armed Groups" in The Sri Lankan Tamils: Ethnicity and Identity.
274 A commission appointed twenty years later by Kumaratunga apologized for 'Black July' and put the blame
on everyone but the left. See Report of the Presidential Truth Commission on Ethnic Violence (1981-1984),
Sessional Paper No. 111-2003 (Colombo: Department of Government Printing, 2003). Estimates of the total
death toll vary and the commission did not provide a complete list of victims. In The Intra-Group Dimensions
ofEthnic Conflict in Sri Lanka (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), pp. 118-134, Kenneth Bush gives 2,000
dead, 18,000 homes and 5,000 shops destroyed.
275 For background on SLMC's formation, see Sari Knoerzer, "Transformation of Muslim Political Identity," in
Culture and Politics of Identity in Sri Lanka, edited by Mithran Tiruchelvam and Dattathreya C. S. (Colombo:
ICES, 1998).
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that same year, India reneged on the Sirimavo Shastri pact and by 1984 the repatriation of
Indians was completely suspended due to the conflict. With S. Thondaman acting as a
mediator, Jayawardene agreed to naturalize the remaining stateless Tamils, a decision
supported by all parties except SLFP and MEP. The 1988 Citizenship Act extended Sri
Lankan citizenship rights to an additional 230,000 people from the original plantation
population, bringing a paradoxically peaceful conclusion to the plight of Indian Tamils in the
midst of civil war.27 6
By the mid-i 980s, the LTTE had ruthlessly decimated its rival Tamil groups, forcing
them to join it or else become inactive or collaborate with the government. While Tamil
Nadu and India as a whole remained friendly toward the rebels, Sri Lanka sought military aid
from India's adversaries: China, Pakistan, and Israel. When the Sri Lankan army launched an
assault to capture the Jaffna peninsula in 1987, Rajiv Gandhi responded with an airlift to
relieve the siege and force Jayawardene to negotiate. The resultant Indo-Sri Lanka Peace
Accord was signed in July 1987 without rebel participation and envisioned that an Indian
peacekeeping force (IPKF) would enforce it. The Northern and Eastern provinces would be
temporarily merged, subject to a referendum on their status-which never took place. The
13th and 15 1 amendments to the Sri Lankan constitution elevated Tamil to a co-official
language along with Sinhala and reduced the district electoral threshold from 12.5% to
5%.277
India was in principle opposed to Tamil secession, and thought it could arrange the
affairs of the northeast as it saw fit, giving more power to those it favored: TULF (whose
leadership had fled to Tamil Nadu) and smaller armed groups like the Tamil Eelam
Liberation Organization (TELO) and the Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front
(EPRLF). The LTTE demanded full control of the transitional administration and repudiated
the ceasefire. Having underestimated the rebels, by October the IPKF found itself fighting
them, thus simply replacing the Sri Lankan army. But the Sri Lankan government was in no
better position to smirk. The JVP re-emerged and launched a second insurrection based on
university campuses, accusing the government of treason for having acquiesced to India's
intervention. Jayawardene nearly escaped an assassination attempt. His successor elected in
276 Sahadevan. India and Overseas Indians, pp. 214-232.
277 Constitution of Sri Lanka, Chapter IV, Article 18 & Chapter XIV, Article 99.
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1988, Ranasinghe Premadasa, crushed the JVP with executions and surreptitiously helped the
Tigers expel the IPKF. Rajiv Gandhi was less lucky than Jayawardene. At a rally near
Chennai in 1991 he and fourteen more people were blown up by a female LTTE suicide
bomber. 278 Premadasa met the same fate in 1993.
Second Period, 1989-2009
The prize for the re-enfranchisement of Indian Tamils was, of course, their votes. In
the long overdue 1989 election, UNP, the party of Sinhalese capitalists, was returned to
power in cooperation with CWC, the trade union of Tamil plantation laborers. The Sri
Lankan Tamil vote was split between (presumably pro-LTTE) independents and a TULF-
TELO-EPRLF alliance. LSSP and CP tried their luck on a joint leftist ticket in the south but
failed miserably. The time when the Marxist left could act independently of SLFP had
passed. SLMC won about half of the Muslim vote in the east, urging its co-religionists to
"vote for the Koran." In March 1990 India completed its withdrawal and the LTTE took over
one city after another in the northeast. Having grown stronger and more experienced by
fighting the IPKF, the Tigers resumed operations against the government.
By 1994, war fatigue was settling in among the Sinhalese. Bandaranaike's daughter,
Chandrika Kumaratunga, was the perfect figure to embody compromise, having lost her
father and husband to Sinhalese extremists. 279 The LTTE welcomed her peace proposals and
she easily won the presidential election north and south-her margin of victory was so large
that she did not even need the Tamil vote. Her People's Alliance (PA), including SLFP,
LSSP, and CP, won the legislative election earlier that year and formed a coalition with
SLMC and a small Indian Tamil party, the Upcountry People's Front (UPF). But her
proposed regional devolution package did not bode well. LTTE made exorbitant demands
278 On the Indian debacle, see Alan Bullion, India, Sri Lanka, and the Tamil Crisis 1976-1994: an International
Perspective (London and New York: Pinter, 1995); Sumantra Bose, "Flawed Mediation, Chaotic
Implementation: the 1987 Indo-Sri Lanka Peace Agreement," published in Ending Civil Wars: the
Implementation of Peace Agreements, edited by Stephen John Stedman, Donald Rothchild, and Elizabeth
Cousens (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002); Gautam Das and M. K. Gupta-Ray, Sri Lanka Misadventure:
India's Military Peacekeeping Campaign, 1987-1990 (New Delhi: Har-Anand Publications, 2008). On JVP, see
Rohan Gunaratna, Sri Lanka, a Lost Revolution? The Inside Story of the JVP (Kandy: Institute of Fundamental
Studies, 1990) and C. A. Chanrdraprema, C. A. Sri Lanka, the Years of Terror: the JVP Insurrection, 1987-
1989 (Colombo: Lake House Bookshop, 1991).
279 Her husband, popular actor and leftist politician Vijaya Kumaratunga, was killed by the JVP in 1988.
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and UNP now played the Sinhalese nationalist card from the opposition benches. 28 0 In 1995
the ceasefire broke down and the Sri Lankan army managed to recapture Jaffna. To borrow
Sumantra Bose's aptly chosen words, "during 1995-1996, President Kumaratunga
metamorphosed from dove to hawk, pledging to wage a 'war for peace' to finish the
LTTE. "21 With CWC and the Eelam People's Democratic Party (EPDP) switching to her
side, PA won the elections again in 2000. But the government's own MPs like Mahinda
Rajapakse voted against Chandrika's devolution plan and M. H. M. Ashraff threatened to
defect. After his death in a mysterious helicopter crash, his party split. His deputy, Rauf
Hakeem, opened negotiations with UNP, but his widow Ferial decided to remain with
Chandrika. Meanwhile the Tigers captured the strategic Elephant Pass, isolating Jaffna by
land. SLMC's defection precipitated fresh elections in 2001 which were won by UNP's Ranil
Wickremesinghe on a peace platform. After adopting semi-presidentialism, this would be Sri
Lanka's first experience with split government.
Wickremesinghe continued the peace process under Norwegian mediation. At first,
the Tigers toned down their demands to federal autonomy, opened the highway to Jaffna and
set up political offices. While the government was economically exhausted, they too were
pressured after 9/11, with their international financial network based on money laundering
and diaspora contributions coming under scrutiny. Having assassinated Neelan Tiruchelvam,
the TULF negotiator for the devolution package, in 1999 the Tigers made it clear to Sri
Lankan Tamil politicians that whoever was not with them was against them. In 2001 TULF,
TELO, and most of EPRLF coalesced to form the Tamil National Alliance (TNA). But the
talks again stalled in 2003 as the government was unwilling to simply hand over control of a
transitional administration of the northeast to the rebels. While Wickremesinghe was visiting
the US, Kumaratunga precipitated a showdown by using her presidential powers to declare a
state of emergency and dismiss his ministers.2 82
280 For the failure of this proposal see Neelan Tiruchelvam, "The Politics of Federalism and Diversity in Sri
Lanka," in Autonomy and Ethnicity: Negotiating Competing Claims in Multi-Ethnic States, edited by Gai Yash
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 197-218; and Partha Ghosh, Ethnicity versus Nationalism:
the Devolution Discourse in Sri Lanka (Delhi and London: Sage Publications, 2003).
281 Sumantra Bose, Contested Lands: Israel-Palestine, Kashmir, Bosnia, Cyprus, and Sri Lanka (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), p. 38.
282 For a more on elections in this period, see Laksiri Jayasuriya, The Changing Face ofElectoral Politics in Sri
Lanka (Singapore: Marshall Cavendish Academic, 2005). For the peace process, see Negotiating Peace in Sri
Lanka: Efforts, Failures, and Lessons, edited by Kumar Rupesinghe (Colombo: Research and Documentation
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Beginning in 2000, SLFP and UNP faced new challengers from the far left and the far
right. Having abandoned terrorism for electoral politics, JVP was reincarnated with "a one-
point agenda of undermining the peace process with the Tamils."283 On the right, the Sinhala
Heritage (SU-Sihala Urumaya), later renamed National Heritage Party (JHU-Jathika Hela
Urumaya), combined an odd array of fundamentalist ideals ranging from anti-Tamil
Sinhalese nationalism to anti-Western eco-Buddhism. JHU started chipping away at UNP
votes in the capital's Western Province. JVP also gained most of its votes from Western
Province as well as the southern coast, its traditional power base. Ahead of the 2004 election,
Kumaratunga made a pact with JVP, who had assassinated her husband. TNA dominated the
northeast, performing even better than TULF had in 1977.. UNP held on to Colombo and the
highlands, the latter thanks to the Indian Tamil vote. After the election though, CWC, which
had run on the UNP ticket, switched sides to PA and helped it form a government. To
counter a split in JVP, Prime Minister Rajapakse later brought even JHU into the cabinet.
When I asked him how devout Buddhists could co-exist in government with communists,
JHU's Environment Minister Champika Ranawaka told me that their "sole aim was to
preserve the unitary character of the Sri Lankan state."
By 2004 the peace had faltered, and the PA government scored a major victory when
the rebel commander in Eastern Province, Colonel Karuna, defected. By taking half as many
lives in one day as the war took in twenty years, the 2004 tsunami gave international
observers false hopes that the tragedy might provide an opportunity to overcome ethnic
divisions. To the contrary, the government accused foreign NGOs of funneling aid funds to
the LTTE. The Tigers made a major strategic blunder by boycotting the 2005 presidential
election.284 The contest between Wickremesinghe and Rajapakse was so close that it could
have been, for the first time, decided by the minority vote. Indeed, Tamils in the east and
upcountry voted en masse for the UNP candidate, but turnout in the north was too low.
Following his incredible defeat, Wickremesinghe took a visiting fellowship at MIT and
Rajapakse unleashed the dogs of war on the LTTE. Internationally isolated, the Tigers
Centre, Foundation for Co-Existence, 2006) and chapter 7 in Timothy Sisk, International Mediation in Civil
Wars: Bargaining with Bullets (London and New York: Routledge, 2009).
283 Bose, Contested Lands, p. 47.
284 Rumors that Rajapakse somehow tricked the LTTE into believing that he would give them a better deal seem
plausible but cannot be confirmed.
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conceded defeat in May 2009. Vellupilai Prabhakaran, the evil genius who defeated the
Indian army and had wrecked every peace plan since the 1980s, lay dead. Colonel Karuna
turned his faction into a political party (TMVP) and was given a government portfolio.
Having triumphed in the battlefield and in provincial elections, Rajapakse is now preparing
for a big win in the 2010 general election.
Yet another constitutional review process regarding electoral reform is underway.
The dominant proposal is for a mixed system, with two thirds of the seats coming from the
old single-member constituencies and one third from the current PR district lists. SLFP
favors a "best-loser" variant that will assign the PR seats to the parties with largest
remainders, whereas UNP prefers a more majoritarian version. 28 The impetus for the reform
comes partly for the realization that "executive presidency can't exist with PR," as Susil
Premajayantha, general secretary of the governing coalition told me. Sensing that it is
designed to weaken small parties, JHU and JVP oppose the change, but LSSP and CP favor
it, believing that they used to win more seats under SMP because they were able to
concentrate on a few smaller constituencies. TNA is also in favor, as much as it wants to see
the executive presidency abolished.286 This is a promise that Kumaratunga had aired in the
past, but neither major party is really likely to fulfill.
Elections and Ethnicity in Sri Lanka: an Appraisal
Sri Lanka's pre-independence ethnic politics shared some parallels with Guyana, but
the two fellow British colonies followed different paths. In both places the British had
favored an educated minority and initially the party system featured cross-ethnic, class-based
cooperation that broke down before independence. Ceylon, however, was a more developed
colony than British Guiana, and its politics tilted to the conservative side. Like PPP, CNC
split along ethnic lines; but CNC had been an opportune coalition of Sinhalese and Tamil
bourgeois elites, whereas PPP was a leftist alliance of Indian and African trade unionists.
Hence the British felt comfortable transferring power to Senanayake, whereas they thwarted
285 See The Electoral Debate in Sri Lanka, edited by Rohan Edrisinha and Asanga Welikala (Colombo: Centre
for Policy Alternatives, 2008).
286 Interviews with Susil Premajayantha, Ranil Wickremesinghe, Champika Ranawaka, D.E.W. Gunasekara,
and Nallathamby Sri Kantha.
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Jagan. Ceylon's Marxist parties also enjoyed a cross-ethnic appeal early on, although the
plantation Tamil trade unions never merged with them, remaining ethnically separate.
Throughout the SMP period, Ceylon's party system remained more diverse than Guyana's,
characterized by intra-ethnic competition between UNP and SLFP among the Sinhalese, and
ACTC and ITAK among Tamils, with LSSP and CP trying to compete for the Tamil vote but
eventually throwing their lot with SLFP. As in all three preceding case studies, crosscutting
social cleavages did not manage to save Ceylonese democracy. The Marxist parties were
mobilizing voters along a different dimension and spanning the ethnic groups, but when they
found joint cause with SLFP on their socialist agenda, they basically tossed the multicultural
one.
Despite Ceylon's geographically clustered demography, there was cross-ethnic voting
under SMP. This was not only due to strategic voting by minorities for majority candidates in
mixed constituencies like Colombo (as predicted by Proposition 3); Moor candidates were
able to attract Sinhalese votes and win in constituencies where Muslims were a minority,
while UNP and the Marxist parties often ran at least a few Tamil candidates in the north.
What is most surprising, however, is that the intense competition between UNP and SLFP
did not lead either of them to reconsider the disenfranchisement of Indian Tamils in the
plurality period, when the electoral incentives to 'activate' and capture those extra votes were
immense. Instead, both parties remained loyal to the Sinhalese nationalist line for three
decades, fighting solely over the votes of the plantation Tamils naturalized through the snail-
paced official process. 287 The policy changed only when India forced Sri Lanka's hand and
the government became worried that Indian Tamils might join the insurgency.
After the PR reform and the re-enfranchisement of Indians, both proportionality and
the ethnic heterogeneity of districts increased. The combined effect from Propositions 1 and
2 would predict at least a moderate rise in the number of parties in parliament. The exact
opposite occurred: the effective number of political parties by vote share dropped from 3.83
in 1952-1977 to 2.67 in 1989-2004. The Sinhalese party system became more polarized in
287 Between 1949 and 1970 only around 148,000 Indians received Ceylonese citizenship; the only plantation
Tamil parliamentarians were the appointed ones. Another 102,000 were naturalized by 1977 and Nuwara Eliya
was made a three-member district, allowing CWC's Thondaman to finally win a seat there that year. The source
of the figures is Sahadevan, Indian and Overseas Indians, pp. 142, 176, and 190.
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the PR period as the Marxist left ceased to be an independent pole and amalgamated with
SLFP. The absence of a strong multiplicative effect from PR can also be observed in Ceylon
Tamil politics. Under SMP, ACTC and ITAK maintained a healthy competition for the Tamil
vote in the northeast for twenty years, the former being UNP's favored conservative partner.
ACTC then merged with ITAK in the 1970s not because it was so disadvantaged by the
electoral system, but because the Jaffna elite became exasperated with Sinhalese rule. Under
PR, competition for the Sri Lankan Tamil vote between TULF, EPDP, DPLF, and TELO
resurfaced in the 1990s, only to decline again with the formation of TNA. PR's failure to
increase party diversity, however, may be attributed to the simultaneous introduction of a
directly elected executive presidency.
Patterns of cross-ethnic voting remained more or less constant over time. Contrary to
the predictions of Proposition 3, cross-ethnic voting by Muslims and Indian Tamils continued
under PR. Colombo Tamils (who comprise around I1% of the capital's population and a
similar proportion of the island's Sri Lankan Tamil population as a whole) still vote for
UNP-the party primarily responsible for Black July. Against the predictions of Proposition
4, the Indian Tamil parties choose to run on either the UNP or the PA ticket, even though the
Tamils' concentration in Nuwara-Eliya, Badulla, and Kandy makes the 5% district threshold
easy for them to cross on their own. Here economics dictate electoral strategy. Vulnerable
and dependent on the Sinhalese welfare state, upcountry Tamils have learned to play the
kingmaker role as adroitly as the Muslims, but always on board a Sinhalese train. SLMC
surely benefited from PR, yet this did not dramatically change the pattern of Muslim support
for the two major Sinhalese parties. Even in Eastern Province, SLMC's power base, a large
chunk of the Muslim vote still goes to UNP.2 88
As in eastern Turkey and Northern Ireland, elections in the northeast of Sri Lanka
were conducted under problematic circumstances during the civil war. But this does not
mean that their results can be easily dismissed as unrepresentative or rigged, or that Sri
Lanka's experience is fundamentally different from other societies steeped in conflict. It is
288 SLMC's vote share is consistently lower than the percentage of Muslims both nationally and in Amparai, the
only Muslim plurality district, where turnout has been generally very high. In 1994 SLMC switched its
allegiance to PA because UNP would not agree not to run its own Muslim candidates in Eastern Province. As an
independent Muslim party, SLMC appears as a novelty facilitated by PR. But in the SMP period, Eastern
Province had a tradition of electing independent Muslim deputies.
174
Evangelos Liaras Electoral Engineering in Sri Lanka
true that most elections were severely disrupted by violence, particularly in rural areas. The
Tigers were often boycotting and turnout was lower than average, yet this varied between
elections. In 1989 when the IPKF was present, turnout in Jaffna was 44.8%. It dropped to
2.3% in 1994 when the city was LTTE-controlled, rising to 21.3% in 2000, 3 1.1% in 2001,
and 47.4% in 2004 (cf. the first 2005 election in Iraq with 58% nationwide turnout and only
2% in Anbar province). Lower turnout in legislative elections in the north did not deprive the
Sri Lankan Tamils of a political voice because the districts are ethnically homogeneous and
the same number of deputies was elected regardless. The issue was whether the LTTE would
decide to contest in some way, or scorn the electoral process and go on with the war.
Hundreds of thousands of people from Northern and Eastern Province voted in each election
at polling stations set up in government-controlled areas and the pro-rebel TNA actually won
in 2001 and 2004.
So far the preferential aspects of the post-1978 electoral system have not played an
important role either. Not once has a presidential candidate won thanks to lower preferences,
to the delight of the election commission that has been spared the tiresome task of counting
them.289 This does not mean that no president has ever been elected thanks to the Tamil vote.
It was certainly the case in 1988 for Premadasa, who won with a narrow margin nationally
but carried all but one of the districts in the northeast (as did Kumaratunga in 1994, although
she would have won with the Sinhalese vote alone). Even with Tamil candidates in the race,
most Tamil voters give their first preference directly to the least nationalistic Sinhalese
candidate, demonstrating that they are even more strategically minded than the SV formula
assumes. Thus vote pooling at the presidential level is observed and did make a difference
electorally. But it did not subsequently make a difference politically, because the winning
Sinhalese candidate was still not as conciliatory as the LTTE and the Tamil politicians would
have wanted. Wickremesinghe might have been the exception, but he was deprived of victory
in 2005 by the foolish LTTE boycott.
At the legislative level, the open list PR system could also have encouraged individual
candidates to make cross-ethnic appeals in Colombo and in mixed upcountry constituencies.
This has generally not been the case. The upcountry Tamil parties run as many candidates on
289 ... as the Additional Election Commissioner, P. M. Siriwardana, frankly confessed to me in our interview.
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the UNP ticket as UNP expects to elect based solely on the numbers of Indian Tamils in the
district. Mano Ganesan, a popular Indian Tamil UNP deputy from Colombo and leader of
CWC's rival trade union, the Western People's Front (WPF), was lucid on this topic:
As far as I know, no Sinhalese ever votes for non-Sinhalese, Muslims always vote for
Muslims... We say Tamils vote for Tamils only. We don't see anything wrong with
that... We tell people: 'vote for elephant symbol [UNP] but give all three preferences to
our candidates.'
By generating competition between candidates on the same party list, preferences
(manapa in Sinhala) have become a source of intra-ethnic conflict instead of cross-ethnic
vote pooling. Election monitoring NGOs ordinarily report bombings and beatings taking
place far from the battle zones, orchestrated by candidates wanting to get rid of fellow party
rivals. 2 90 It comes as no surprise that parties have reached a consensus to abolish open lists in
the future. Closed lists may help women and minority candidates, but they may also create
more space for ethnic tokenism, as the national list does today and the appointed seats used
to in the past. SLFP has often resorted to this practice, since it has traditionally found it hard
to attract the Sri Lankan Tamil vote.2 9'
Regarding the corollaries, the picture again casts doubt on the impact of the electoral
reform. As explained, PR was not necessary to ensure the fair representation of minorities
(but the re-enfranchisement of plantation Tamils was). Contemporary observers believed that
SMP had not stifled party pluralism in Ceylon. The trend in more recently scholarship is to
blame plurality voting for exacerbating ethnic polarization. In her qualified critique, Amita
290 Interviews with Kingsley Rodrigo and Paikiasothi Saravanamuttu.
291 In the 1970s, SLFP included in its cabinets the appointed Tamil MP Chelliah Kumarasuriar, who was reviled
for this reason by Sri Lankan Tamils. In 1975 the SLFP mayor of Jaffna (and former independent MP) Alfred
Duraiappah was one of the LTTE's first victims. In 2005 the LTTE assassinated the foreign minister, Lakshman
Kadirgamar, a Tamil elected on the PA national list. Things changed after Karuna's defection, UPFA won all
three districts in provincial elections in Eastern Province in 2008, including the overwhelmingly Tamil
Batticaloa. TNA boycotted the election, claiming intimidation by TMVP gunmen.
292 See Robert Kearney, The Politics of Ceylon (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1973), pp. 94-
101.
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Shastri has argued that SMP was responsible for strengthening the larger parties on each side
of the ethnic divide.29 3 Echoing Donald Horowitz, Sumantra Bose has written that
The sustained dynamic of intraethnic competitive chauvinism... was driven by the nature
of Sri Lanka's electoral system... This built-in tendency for the front-runner party to
emerge with massive parliamentary majorities also provided an incentive to the two
major Sinhalese parties to try to outbid each other in adopting the most populist and
intransigent positions on Tamil issues. [The territorial concentration of Tamils] meant
that in the rest of Sri Lanka... Tamil voters were not a factor that needed to be taken into
consideration by vote-seeking Sinhalese politicians.294
SMP was certainly responsible for producing erratically unbalanced seat distributions
between the two major parties-SLFP won twice, in July 1960 and in 1970, with a lower
percentage of the vote than UNP. But the claims linking SMP with ethnic polarization seem
much less convincing when compared to the subsequent PR period. It is difficult to establish
that SMP instigated the drop in party fragmentation, since the phenomenon continued under
high proportionality. The Sri Lankan party system became more bifurcated over time due to
the fusion of SLFP and the far left. This was not driven by either electoral formula, but by
post-electoral considerations: given its anti-Western orientation, SLFP was the left's natural
coalition partner. Sinhalese parties did not ignore Tamil votes under SMP any more than they
do under PR. In fact UNP always relied on the Tamil vote in Colombo, where Ceylon Tamil
parties did not run candidates. And it is simply not true that SMP bestowed an advantage to
the greatest jingoist; if that were the case, UNP would not have won in 1952, 1965, and 1977.
UNP repeatedly squandered its opportunities to forge a lasting ethnic compromise because,
albeit more tolerant of the minorities, it too was committed to the basic tenets of Sinhalese
nationalism. PR removed the crushing seat imbalance produced by SMP, but also smoothed
the path for ethnic outbidding by small parties like JVP and JHU. And while government
293 Amita Shastri, "Electoral Competition and Minority Alienation in a Plurality System: Sri Lanka 1947-1977,"
Electoral Studies vol. 10 no. 4 (December 1991): 326-347. As she correctly points out, however, the advantage
to SLFP accrued from overrepresentation of rural districts due to weightage by area in addition to population.
294 Sumantra Bose, Contested Lands, pp. 22-23.
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formation under PR has relied more on Tamil parties, this was accomplished through more
Indian Tamil and less Ceylon Tamil support.295
The Tamil-speaking minority's religious and caste divisions created opportunities for
UNP and SLFP to make cross-ethnic appeals (or to divide and rule, as one may see it),
without this contributing in any way to the resolution of the conflict, since separatism was a
specifically Ceylon Tamil agenda which Muslims were uninterested in and Indian Tamils
unable to embrace. As noted, Sri Lanka's electoral history contradicts most of the theoretical
predictions laid out in the introductory chapter. The main culprit for the electoral institutions'
inefficacy is not the demographic dominance of the Sinhalese majority or the geographic
clustering of the Tamil minority. Rather, it is the difficulty of bridging drastically divergent
views on regional autonomy seen since 1968, when ITAK left the UNP coalition. The Tigers
were more radical than ITAK or TULF, overestimating their ultimate chances of success and
always asking for more than the Sri Lankan government could offer. Prabhakaran can be
rightfully blamed for this intransigence. In his absence, a negotiated solution might have
been reached. But the LTTE was not exactly a one man-show; it was a social movement that
drew strength from the Sri Lankan Tamils' turn to separatism in the face of the Sinhalese
insistence on a unitary state. The reasons behind this persistent divergence may be sought in
Sinhalese colonial grievances, Tamil resentment for Sinhalese oppression, the pernicious
proximity of Tamil Nadu, or the West's sympathy for the Tamils. They are not to be found in
electoral dynamics. The greatest indication that the electoral formula has been relatively
inconsequential for the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka is that the Sinhalese and the Sri Lankan
Tamils can hardly agree on any other constitutional issue of substance, yet they agree on
electoral reforms.
295 The 1947, 1952, and 1965 governments were formed with support from the largest Ceylon Tamil party in
parliament at the time. The only Sri Lankan Tamil party to participate in governments under PR (in 2000 and
2004) has been the relatively marginal leftist EPDP. Under SMP, SLFP formed its governments without Tamil
support. Under PR, all governments since 1989 have included at least one Indian Tamil party.
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Table 5: Parliamentary election results in Sri Lanka by vote share, 1947-2004
First Period, 1947-1977
LSSP CP MEP SLFP LPP UNP CWC ACTC ITAK Others
1947 10.8 3.7 - - - 39.8 3.8 4.4 - 37.4
1952 13.1 5.8 - 15.5 - 44.1 - 2.8 1.9 16.8
1956 10.4 4.5 39.5 - 27.9 - 0.3 5.4 12
1960a 10.7 4.9 10.7 21.3 4.4 29.9 - 1.3 5.8 11.1
1960b 7.4 3 3.5 33.7 1 37.7 - 1.5 7.1 5.1
1965 7.5 2.7 2.4 30.2 3.2 39.3 - 2.4 5.4 6.9
1970 8.7 3.4 0.9 36.9 - 37.9 - 2.3 4.9 5
1977 3.6 2 0.4 29.7 - 50.9 1 6.8 5.7
Second Period, 1989-2004
JVP LSSP/ MEP SLFP SU/ SLMC UNP/ TULF/ Other
CP JHU UNF TNA Tamil
1989 - 2.9 1.7 31.8 - 3.6 50.7 3.4 3.9
1994 1.1 48.9 - 1.8 44 1.7 0.6
2000 6 45.1 1.5 2.3 40.2 1.2 1.7
2001 9.1 37.2 0.6 1.2 45.6 3.9 1
2004 45.6 6 21 37.8 6.8 0.9
Table 6: Presidential election results in Sri Lanka by vote share, 1989-2005
UNP SLFP JVP Others
1982 52.9 39.1 4.2 3.9
1988 50.4 45 - 4.6
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Table 7: Post-election parliamentary seat distribution in Sri Lanka, 1947-2004
First Period, 1946-1977
LSSP CP MEP SLFP LPP UNP CWC ACTC ITAK Other
1947 10 3 - - - 42 6 7 - 27
1952 9 4 - 9 - 54 - 4 2 13
1956 14 3 51 - 8 - 1 10 8
1960a 10 3 10 46 4 50 - 1 15 12
1960b 12 4 3 75 2 30 - 1 16 8
1965 10 4 1 41 5 66 - 3 14 7
1970 19 6 0 91 - 17 - 3 13 2
1977 0 0 0 8 - 140 1 18 1
Second Period, 1989-2004
JVP LSSP/ MEP SLFP SU/ SLMC UNP/ TULF/ Other
CP JHU UNF TNA Tamil
1989 - 3 3 67 - 4 125 10 13
1994 1 105 - 7 94 5 13
2000 10 107 1 4 89 5 9
2001 16 77 - 5 109 15 3
2004 105 9 5 82 22 2
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Map 1: Map of Sri Lanka's administrative provinces and districts (Source: ICES)
Note: For electoral purposes, Killinochi is joined with Jaffna district, Ampara is called
Digamadulla, and Mullaitivu, Mannar, and Vavuniya together form the Vanni district.
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Maps 2-5: Regional concentrations of Sinhalese (top left), Sri Lankan Tamils (top right),
Moors (bottom left) and Indian Tamils (bottom right) according to the 1981 census (dark
shade indicates a majority, medium shade a plurality, light shades a substantial minority)
IF
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Map 6: Sri Lanka's single-member districts in 1977 (Source: Ceylon Daily Times)
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Posters showing the different campaign attitudes of the two major Sri Lankan parties towards
the end of the civil war: (above) militaristic poster for SLFP President Mahinda Rajapakse,
Hikkaduwa, February 2009; (below) UNP poster protesting war censorship that appeared
after the assassination of journalist Lasantha Wickramatunga, Colombo, January 2009.
(Photographs by author)
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Chapter 6
THE LIMITS OF ELECTORAL ENGINEERING
In this final chapter, I will bring together the material from the four case studies in a
structured comparison reinforcing the common negative finding that differences in electoral
proportionality and district demographics had no systematic observed impact on ethnic party
systems. First, I will distinguish which hypotheses can be best evaluated at which level of
comparison and explain my choice of indices for measuring the variables of interest. Then, I
will proceed with within- and across-case comparisons examining the hypotheses on the first
theoretical link, between the electoral formula and the ethnic structure of parties. Finally, I
will make a more reserved assessment of the hypotheses on the second causal link, between
party system and ethnic conflict, and offer some general concluding thoughts about the
electoral engineering enterprise as a whole.
Making a Structured Comparison
Depending on the hypothesis examined, the case studies provide observations that can
be analyzed at two levels: individual elections, and entire electoral periods during which the
electoral formula and demography remained approximately the same. There are a total of ten
electoral periods (three for Northern Ireland and Turkey, two for Guyana and Sri Lanka)
which from now on I will refer to with Latin numerals, so that Sri Lanka I stands for the
1947-1977 period in Sri Lanka, etc. Examining the impact of an electoral reform involves a
within-case comparison of two consecutive electoral periods. The hypotheses make static
predictions about ultimate outcomes. Dynamically comparing individual elections within the
same case-period can only serve to determine whether there was actually a trend towards that
predicted outcome; this was done in the individual empirical chapters.









Medium party fragmentation High party fragmentation
Low cross-ethnic voting Low cross-ethnic voting
Low party fragmentation Low party fragmentation
Medium cross-ethnic voting High cross-ethnic voting
District Heterogeneity
Low High
Turkey II & III, Guyana II,
Sri Lanka II Northern Ireland II & III
Turkey I, Sri Lanka I, Guyana I
Northern Ireland II
Figure 1 summarizes the predictions for different combinations of the independent
variables and maps out the electoral periods of each case according to their values on these
two variables. As explained in the theory chapter, the theoretical expectation is that under
high proportionality cross-ethnic voting would be low, while party fragmentation should vary
from medium to high depending on ethnic heterogeneity. Under low proportionality, party
fragmentation should be low, while cross-ethnic voting should vary from medium to high
depending on ethnic heterogeneity. Note that the bottom right cell contains a single country-
period, Guyana 1947-1961, whereas all other cells contain three. This dearth of observations
for this particular combination of independent variables creates a problem for the strength of
cross-case inference involving that cell. I will return to this point in the regression analysis.
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The four variables of interest can be operationalized in different ways. I have used
both standard indices used in the literature as well as ones that I devised and which I believe
are better suited for the questions at hand.
Proportionality has been measured in various ways in electoral studies. The most
common are a categorical classification (e.g. plurality/majority vs. proportional), the proxy of
district magnitude, and the Gallagher least squares index (LSI). If v, stands for each party's
vote share in an election and s, for that same party's corresponding seat share in the
legislature, the Gallagher index is calculated by the following formula:
i=LSI=
LSI is considered the best among a class of related indices. 29 6 Its conceptual
limitation is that it is retrospective, measuring proportionality from the angle of vote-to-seat
allocation (what Maurice Duverger referred to as the mechanical effect of the electoral
formula), and thereby ignoring the strategic effect that the electoral formula had on political
parties' decisions to run candidates or not. District magnitude (or its logarithm) can capture
both effects, but it cannot capture malapportionment or details of electoral systems like
special thresholds. To address this, I have devised an alternative measure for proportionality
based on the Gallagher index and the concept of "elections as census" in the ethnic politics
literature. If p, stands for the proportion of an ethnic group in a country's population and s,
stands for the seat share that this ethnic group could hope to achieve if all votes fell along
ethnic lines, then Ethnic Proportionality (EPR) can be defined as the Gallagher index in an
imaginary ethnic census election:
EPR =1-
296 Rein Taagepera and Bernard Grofman, "Mapping the Indices of Seats-Votes Disproportionality and Inter-
Election Volatility," Party Politics voL 9 no. 6 (November 2003): 659-677.
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EPR captures how proportionally the different ethnic groups are represented by the
electoral system in place, a core concern in most divided societies. Using constituency-level
information on ethnic composition, I have calculated EPR separately for each country and
each election. In the quantitative analysis I will use both EPR and district magnitude in
alternative models to compare their performance; the qualitative comparisons amount to a
categorical classification of proportionality.
Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization (equal to one minus the Herfindahl index) is the
most common measure of ethnic heterogeneity. A major premise of the research design was
that studies using ELF did not capture constituency-level demographic information, which is
relevant for electoral calculations. For this purpose I have developed an alternative index,
Regional Ethnic Fractionalization (REF), which is similar to ELF except that it uses the
weighted average of the districts' Herfindahl indices. If p. is the proportion of an ethnic
group in a district's population and ki is a population weight for that district, then
REF =1-ZZ kjpu
j=1 i=1
REF can be calculated on the basis of any sub-national geographic division; naturally,
I used electoral constituencies as the relevant unit. REF is substantially different from ELF
and can change with every redrawing of district boundaries even under the same electoral
formula. For example, a country with two ethnic groups of equal size concentrated in two
distinct homogeneous regions will have ELF = 0.5 but REF = 0. Like ELF, REF ranges
between zero and one; the higher it is, the more diverse a country's regions are on average.
For party fragmentation, I used the Laakso-Taagepera index for the Effective Number
of Parties (ENP) calculated on the basis of both vote shares and seat shares, to measure the
strategic and mechanical effect of the electoral formula respectively. ENP equals one over








Cross-ethnic voting (CEV) is perhaps the most difficult variable to operationalize,
both for conceptual and measurement reasons. In single-member districts, it could be defined
as the total number of voters who cast a ballot for a non-co-ethnic candidate; in practice,
though, this is almost impossible to determine accurately. The problem becomes even more
complicated when voters can allocate votes across different candidates or when they vote for
party lists which may contain candidates of various ethnic origins. This is where the
functional party categorization I developed in the theory chapter comes handy. It is far easier
to determine if a party as a whole is receiving substantial support from one or multiple ethnic
groups than to estimate the ethnic breakdown of a given candidate's voters. Therefore gross
CEV can be simply defined as the total vote share of magnet and antagonist parties in a
given election. This definition also applies in societies with clustered demographics where a
party with multi-ethnic appeal may be running mono-ethnic candidate rosters in different
ethnically homogeneous regions (this is the case for some Sinhalese parties running Tamil
candidates in Jaffna, or Turkish parties running Kurdish candidates in the southeast).
However convenient this definition may be, it is not conceptually appropriate for all
cases. Centripetalist theorists and policymakers are concerned with encouraging cross-ethnic
appeals that bridge salient ethnic cleavages. Cross-ethnic voting between groups that enjoy
relatively good relations may be welcome but not so relevant. It may also be the result of
alliances that sprang during the course of the conflict-as with Moorish support for Sinhalese
parties in Sri Lanka. In addition to total CEV, I therefore measured salient CEV, i.e. cross-
ethnic voting only along the primary cleavage: Sinhalese/Tamil in Sri Lanka, Indian/African
in Guyana, and Turkish/Kurdish in Turkey.297
To codify parties, I considered 3/4 and 1/10 as cutoffs for determining congregation
and pluralism respectively. These rough cutoffs were fairly easy to assess based on census
data, survey results, secondary sources, and interviews. Parties that received at least 3/4 of
297 Obviously, this makes no difference for Northern Ireland. CEV estimates for Northern Ireland include
terminal transfers to parties of the other community as calculated by Sydney Elliott (see Chapter 3).
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the vote of one group and 1/10 or more of the vote of at least one more group were coded as
magnets; parties that received 3/4 of the vote of one group and no more than 1/10 of the vote
of any other group were coded as hegemons; parties that received at least 1/10 (but less than
3/4) of the vote of more than one group were coded as antagonists; all other parties were
coded as agonists (See Appendix). In each country, I checked the output of this coding
method with specialists, who found it uncontroversial. The complete list of parties coded by
their ethnic structure is presented at the end of each empirical chapter.
Electoral periods were defined by changes in proportionality. Nationwide ethnic
heterogeneity and district-level heterogeneity also changed somewhat between electoral
periods, but this change was dramatic only in Northern Ireland (whose constituencies in the
plurality period were much more homogeneous than in the PR periods). With the exception
of Northern Ireland then, it is valid to regard electoral reforms as changes in only one
independent variable and to use them as a quasi-experimental test for evaluating P1 and P3,
which theorize the effects of changes in proportionality. The simultaneous changes in
proportionality and district heterogeneity in Northern Ireland are actually convenient because
their predictions are in the same direction. In 1929, both proportionality and district
heterogeneity dropped, which would predict even lower party fragmentation (and cross-
ethnic voting) in the subsequent period than a drop in proportionality alone. The opposite is
true for the 1973 reform, where both proportionality and district heterogeneity rose: the
combined effect should be even higher party fragmentation than with a rise in proportionality
alone. It is not a problem then to include the reforms in Northern Ireland when assessing P1
and P3 qualitatively. P2 and P4 could be assessed within-case by comparing electoral results
in constituencies with different demographic configurations. I have done this qualitatively in
the empirical chapters, but a more detailed analysis was hampered by data limitations (Sri
Lanka is the only case with reliable data on the ethnic composition of all of its constituencies
for all periods). Despite this shortcoming, I was able to produce estimates of the overall
electoral demography (captured by the REF index) for each country and period, as described
above. I will use these estimates to examine all propositions quantitatively with a pooled data
set of all elections from all cases.
A few judgment calls were necessary during the coding process. REF could be




Northern Ireland.298 For the SMP period, I estimated it arbitrarily at 0.25 based on the data
from Belfast wards. The calculation of EPR for Northern Ireland in the SMP period did not
require detailed constituency-level information on religion, because, as explained in Chapter
3, the majority religion in each constituency was obvious and the districting led to a very
predictable pattern of seat allocations between Nationalists and Unionists. REF and EPR
estimates for Northern Ireland were based on a Catholic vs. non-Catholic dichotomy because
all reliable estimates by experts for the problematic censuses (1971, 1981, and 1991) lump
together Protestants and others. For the 2001 census I used the data for family religious
background (rather than stated religious affiliation) for the same reason. For Turkey, I used
Servet Multu's estimates for the Kurdish population and added my own estimates for Alevis
by district to calculate a value of REF = 0.25 for 1950-1980 and 0.32 after 1987. The district-
level estimates for Turkey were also used to calculate EPR. To reflect Turkey's party block
vote system in multi-member districts in 1950-1960, I set district magnitude at 1 for that
period. For all other periods I used the mean district magnitude. 2 99
The graphs in figure 2 track changes in ENP, CEV, and EPR for each of the four
cases studies across time. They provide a very good summary of the findings presented in the
empirical chapters regarding electoral history and voting behavior.
The discussion this far covered the hypotheses regarding the causal link between
electoral design specifics and party system outcomes. The hypotheses linking party system
features and ethnic conflict outcomes will be examined last, qualitatively, across-case, using
my knowledge of the cases and the roles that political parties played in conflict resolution. As
mentioned in the introductory chapter, the research design of this project was developed to
address specifically the first set of hypotheses, which is logically precedent. Acknowledging
that the comparison for the second set of hypotheses is less structured (since systematic
controls for factors affecting ethnic conflict, such as external involvement, are missing), it is
nonetheless possible to make some general pertinent remarks.
298 It was not possible to accurately determine REF for Guyana in 1953 because I was unable to find published
information on the boundaries of the 24 electoral districts. Instead I averaged the values for 1957 (0.562, 14
districts) and 1961 (0.522, 35 districts). The expected allocation of seats by ethnic group for the calculation of
EPR was much easier.
299 Although the median district magnitude is more commonly used, I preferred the mean in order to better




Figure 2: ENP, CEV, and EPR over time in each of the four cases
Guyana: Effective Number of Parties, 1953-2006
-ENP vote
- ENP seat
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Indian-African Cross-Ethnic Voting, 1953-2006
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
Guyana: Ethnic Proportionality, 1953-2006
2010














Evangelos Liaras Con elusion







1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010











1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010























1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010












1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010













1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
Evangelos Liaras Conclusion
Evangelos Liaras
Sri Lanka: Effective Number of Parties, 1947-2004
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Within- and Across-Case Comparison: Electoral Reforms
The quasi-experimental- research design involving electoral reforms allows strongest
inference for propositions 1 and 3 regarding the effects of changes in proportionality. There
were a total of six such reforms in the case studies (two in Northern Ireland and Turkey, one
in Sri Lanka and Guyana). Comparative case studies cannot easily measure magnitudes of
effects, but they can certainly identify direction. Binary (pass/fail) results of within-case
comparisons presented in the empirical chapters are summarized in the following truth table.
High ethnic heterogeneity Low ethnic heterogeneity
Guyana N. Ireland (b) N. Ireland (a) Turkey (a) Turkey (b) Sri Lanka
PR: Increase Increase Decrease Increase Decrease Increase
Pl: Fail [Pass] [Fail] Pass Fail Fail
P3: [Pass] Pass [Pass] Fail Fail Fail
Brackets indicate that caveats shed some doubt on the validity of that observation. For
the 1929 reform in Northern Ireland which took place after only two STV elections, there is a
question of truncation-perhaps there was not enough time for the party system to adjust. If
truncation did matter, the results might have been flipped (NILP might have increased its
share of the vote later on, so P1 would pass and P3 would fail). The effect of P1 for the 1973
reform in Northern Ireland and P3 for the 1964 reform in Guyana was actually observed one
election before the reform, so this weakens the argument that the reform caused it.
The overall picture does not lend strong support for either proposition, with P1 failing
in four and P3 in three out of the six reforms. There is some indication, however, that P3 (the
centripetalist claim that an adverse relationship exists between PR and CEV) may hold for
more ethnically heterogeneous societies; this deserves some further investigation. The fact
that Northern Ireland is the only case with a high 'pass' rate may also indicate that our
theories have been based on insights gained from electoral behavior in developed societies
(cf. how consociationalism has used the Lower Countries and Switzerland as models or how
centripetalists use Australia as an example for the adoption of AV).
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Across-Case Comparison: Election Results
To evaluate the hypotheses across cases, I use regressions with pooled data from all
elections (N=54). The panel nature of the data requires accounting for the fact that errors may
be heteroschedastic within clusters, meaning the different electoral periods for each country,
during which the values of the independent variables did not substantially change. Since the
number of time periods is small compared to the number of countries, and the observations
were not spaced in regular time intervals across cases, I preferred to employ OLS with robust
standard errors clustered by country.300 The dependent variables are ENP (either by vote or
seat share) and salient CEV.
I am using two explanatory models: one with the indices I created (EPR, REF, and
their interaction term), and one with the indices that are most commonly used in quantitative
studies (district magnitude for proportionality, ELF for heterogeneity, and their interaction
term). The interaction term is included to capture the purportedly interactive relationship
between proportionality and heterogeneity according to previous studies and centripetalist
theories. I am also using two control dummy variables to account for weaknesses of the
research design mentioned in the theory chapter. The variable 'violence' switches on in each
election year when there was ethnically motivated violence before the election. This includes
every year after 1983 for Sri Lanka, 1961, 1964, and 1992-2001 for Guyana, 1958 (due to the
IRA border campaign) and 1969-1996 for Northern Ireland, and 1977-1999 and 2007 for
Turkey (a PKK ceasefire was in place during the 2002 election). The competing hypothesis is
that violence increased ethnic polarization, and may therefore have triggered a reduction in
both party fragmentation and cross-ethnic voting. The second control variable is semi-
presidentialism, adopted by Guyana after 1980 and Sri Lanka after 1978. Direct election of
the executive is expected to have a reductive effect on party fragmentation, since it operates
essentially as an additional (and institutionally important) single-member district election.
Pair-wise correlations showed no substantial collinearity between the independent variables
except ELF and REF (0.82) and EPR and district magnitude (0.74). This verifies that the
indices I developed are closely related to those usually employed by similar studies.
300 This is also the approach followed by William Clark and Matt Golder in "Rehabilitating Duverger's
Theory" Comparative Political Studies vol. 39 no. 6 (August 2006): 679-708.
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Regression results are shown on Table 1. The models with EPR and REF perform
consistently better than the models using ELF and district magnitude, but the results for ENP
reveal no significant effect of proportionality, heterogeneity or their interaction on party
fragmentation. Violence and semi-presidentialism appear significant for the effective number
of electoral parties, but the effect of the former is in the opposite direction than expected:
violence is associated with higher party fragmentation. The two control variables, however,
seem to have had primarily a strategic effect. Their mechanical effect on the number of
legislative parties is both weaker (smaller coefficient) and less significant.
The model for CEV using ELF and district magnitude is entirely unimpressive, but
the one using EPR and REF shows both variables and their interaction significant at p <.01
and an R2 of 0.50.301 But I suspect that this finding was driven primarily by the observations
from Guyana's SMP period. Guyana started its electoral history with high levels of cross-
ethnic voting, but then the party system became racially polarized and cross-ethnic voting
collapsed by 1961. There is some concern here about truncation; it is very possible that if the
switch to PR had not taken place in 1964 but later, Guyana would have seen many more
elections with low CEV under low proportionality. The findings may therefore be driven
essentially by only two observations, the Guyanese 1953 and 1957 elections. Indeed, when
Guyana I is dropped as a cluster, the significance of REF and the interaction term evaporates,
while that of EPR drops substantially. This indicates that it is necessary to include more data
in the sample from cases similar to Guyana I (low proportionality, high heterogeneity) before
issuing judgment on the centripetalist assertion that proportionality and district heterogeneity
affect cross-ethnic voting.
These inferences are not substantially different if the interaction terms are dropped, or
if other clusters are dropped, particularly Northern Ireland I which also exhibits truncation. In
short, the data do not justify the theoretical claims about purported relationships between the
variables that institutional designers can change and the variables describing the ethnic
structure of the party system in divided societies.
301 Semi-presidentialism was not included as an explanatory variable for CEV; there is no hypothesis linking it




Table 1: Regression results (OLS with robust standard errors clustered by period)
Dependent Variable: Effective Number of Electoral Parties
Regressor Coefficient Robust SE Coefficient Robust SE
EPR 2.00 (11.51)
REF -20.17 (28.33)
EPR x REF 20.71 (31.21)
Violence 0.75** (0.29) 0.62* (0.27)
Semi-presidential - 2.04*** (0.59) - 2.03** (0.67)
log(district magnitude) 3.47 (2.80)
ELF 2.88 (4.65)
log(district magnitude) x ELF -5.36 (5.68)
Constant 1.91 (10.49) 1.81 (2.11)
Observations 54 54
R 2 0.39 0.38
Dependent Variable: Effective Number of Legislative Parties
Regressor Coefficient Robust SE Coefficient Robust SE
EPR 0.47 (11.60)
REF -28.51 (30.70)
EPR x REF 30.64 (33.45)
Violence 0.45* (0.24) 0.31 (0.24)
Semi-presidential - 1.20* (0.61) - 1.22 (0.70)
log(district magnitude) 3.38 (2.49)
ELF 3.82 (4.26)
log(district magnitude) x ELF -4.55 (4.98)






Dependent Variable: Salient Cross-Ethnic Voting
Regressor Coeff. Robust SE Coeff. Robust SE Coeff. Robust SE
EPR 12.80*** (2.19) 17.50* (7.63)
REF 29.31*** (6.20) 48.53 (28.98)
EPR x REF - 32.37*** (6.79) - 52.21 (30.31)
Violence 0.02 (0.10) 0.04 (0.11) 0.04 (0.10)
log(distr. magnitude) 1.05 (1.07)
ELF - 1.09 (1.85)
log(distr. magnitude) x ELF -1.86 (2.01)
Constant - 11.23*** (2.03) 0.77 (0.92) - 15.78* (7.24)
Observations 54 54 51
R2 0.50 0.41 0.54
Guyana I dropped
This is all unsurprising considering the results of qualitative within-case comparisons
in the individual case studies. The more demographically mixed societies, Guyana and
Northern Ireland, did not display higher levels of cross-ethnic voting than Turkey and Sri
Lanka, which are more clustered-in fact it was just the opposite. PR did not produce greater
political diversity in Guyana, Sri Lanka, or among Alevis in Turkey; the multiplicative effect
of PR was only seen in Northern Ireland and among Turkey's Kurds, but less so for Kurds
who, unlike Northern Irish Catholics and Protestants, never voted for one party en masse. PR
did not hurt cross-ethnic voting in Sri Lanka and Turkey. It may have done so in Northern
Ireland and Guyana, but in both cases the drop in CEV preceded the electoral reform, casting
doubt on direct causality. It is possible that PR sustained the low level of cross-ethnic voting,
providing no incentives for a change in pattern. The centripetalist assertion that lowering
proportionality in mixed demographics could increase incentives for cross-ethnic appeals
certainly deserves more exploration. This is an open topic for future research, requiring sub-




Across-Case Comparison: Party Systems
As mentioned, the hypotheses on the second causal link, between party systems and
ethnic conflict outcomes, are much harder to assess because the study was built with better
controls for the first link. Arguably, if the first link is weak, that is if we admit that we cannot
produce or bolster the types of political parties we want by manipulating the electoral
formula and the electoral demography, the whole enterprise of electoral design for divided
societies falls apart,. However, even if we can achieve results at least in some cases, electoral
engineering may be worth trying. So it is still important to examine the next step: assuming
that the electoral intervention has some impact on the party system, does that then have the
expected effects on ethnic conflict? To assess the second set of hypotheses, I will consider
the instances where a case study satisfied the proposition leading to a corollary, and ignore
those instances where the electoral reform flatly did not work as expected.
On Corollary 1 (voice to the alternative) vs. Corollary 3 (rewards to extremism)
The PR reforms in Guyana and Sri Lanka failed to increase the number of parties, but
the ones in Northern Ireland and Turkey did lead to greater party proliferation. Did this help
or was it detrimental? In both cases the two effects cancelled out. In Northern Ireland the PR
reform consistently helped the Alliance Party, and in the 1990s other small parties as well
(the Women's Coalition, and the Progressive Unionist Party), to remain part of the political
landscape and bring their views to multi-party talks. But before that, PR had helped extremist
fringe parties (Vanguard, Democratic Unionists, Sinn Fein) to gain a voice and undermine
the peace process for years. When we remember the positive role that small moderate parties
played in Northern Ireland, we should not forget that for the larger moderate parties the
problem of ethnic outbidding was exacerbated by the permissive electoral system. SDLP and
UUP would likely have been able to work better together in the 1980s and 90s were it not for
the competition they faced respectively from SF and DUP. Looking at the larger historical
picture, it is unclear whether small parties in Northern Ireland brought the peace agreement
closer or pushed it further away. The same dynamic can be observed in Sri Lanka, where
whatever moderating incentives came from the inclusion of small Indian Tamil parties in
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parliament has been countered by the flanking effect of the Buddhist fundamentalist JHU on
UNP and the radical Sinhalese nationalist JVP on SLFP. In Turkey, the role of the Islamic
MSP and the Pan-Turkist MHP in bringing down the Second Republic in the 1970s is well
established; the desire to exclude the Turkish far right from parliament was just as much a
motivation behind the military's decision to introduce the 10% threshold, as was the
emergence of the Kurdish left. The reverse move, reducing proportionality to eliminate
extremist parties, is harder to assess; it was attempted with that goal in mind in only one of
the cases (Turkey), and it is also an infrequent kind of electoral reform globally. It certainly
did not work well in Turkey. Once a popular radical political movement is formed, shutting it
out of politics without addressing the underlying grievances that caused it is unlikely to make
the problem go away.
On Corollary 2 (voice to the excluded)
The reform in Guyana, the first reform in Turkey, and the second reform in Northern
Ireland expanded opportunities for representation to Africans, Alevis, and Catholics
respectively compared to the previous plurality/majority system. Did this help reduce ethnic
tensions? Not by itself in any of the cases. For Alevis in Turkey, it allowed the possibility of
an all-Alevi party, but the minority quickly retracted to hiding under the mantle of Turkish
secularism when small far-right Sunni parties emerged that clearly benefited from the same
reform. For Africans in Guyana and Catholics in Northern Ireland, it did not change the fact
that they constituted a minority that was not guaranteed a share in government without a
power-sharing agreement. Catholics got that concession simultaneously with the PR reform
through Britain's intervention, but it sparked twenty-five years of conflict until Protestants
could reluctantly accept it. In Guyana the African party held on to power through dictatorial
means and vote rigging, and when it returned to its demographically dictated role in
opposition after the Cold War it still tried to undermine the electoral process, frustrated by its
exclusion from government. As the work of J6hanna Kristin Birnir also indicates, fair




power.302 When parties of the majority group are perpetually unwilling to enter pacts with
parties of the dissenting minority, the external intervenor will have to consider mandatory
power-sharing as a non-electoral institutional mechanism.
This is not to diminish the symbolic and practical importance of representation.
Among the cases examined, only in Sri Lanka was a minority group entirely disenfranchised,
and that was done formally through citizenship rules, rather than through the electoral
formula. Due to their immigrant past, the Plantation Tamils were too weak economically and
educationally to rebel or resist deportation, and worked with the government to amend the
law even while their ethnic kin on another part of the island took up arms. In Turkey, the
electoral system after 1980 worked to deprive a substantial sector of a minority from any
voice in the legislature-but this was almost as much a result of the Kurdish party's choice
not to exploit windows in the law as it was of the law itself. Even in these cases the
polarizing effect of non-representation was felt. More generally, under a disproportional
electoral formula, the demographic situation combined with the reluctance of the majority
group's parties to engage minority voters may leave an ethnic group entirely unrepresented,
with whatever perilous consequences that may entail. It is only in these joint circumstances
that increasing electoral proportionality becomes mandatory.
On Corollary 4 (rewards to moderation)
As mentioned, the case study observations do not show any clear relationship
between proportionality and cross-ethnic voting. Parties drawing votes from multiple ethnic
groups have fared well under both plurality/majority and proportional systems (PPP in
Guyana, UNP in Sri Lanka, and both center-right and center-left parties in Turkey). Cross-
ethnic voting has remained high in Turkey and low in Northern Ireland throughout their
modern political history. Northern Ireland is the only case that consistently had higher cross-
ethnic voting under plurality, and there is evidence that low proportionality may have played
a role in that-Nationalists generally refrained from running candidates in Protestant-
dominated constituencies so as not to divide the vote of Labour against the Unionists. But at
302 Bimir, Ethnicity and Electoral Politics, chapter 7.
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the same time, plurality was highly detrimental to Labour, making it the biggest loser in the
vote-to-seat allocation (a whopping 16-17 percentage point difference in the early 1960s). It
is hard to assess counterfactually how Labour would have fared in post-World War II
Northern Ireland under a PR system. Cross-ethnic voting has historically been high in
Guyana only if the voting behavior of smaller ethnic groups (the Amerindians and people of
mixed race) is considered; focusing only on the primary ethnic cleavage, Guyana has had low
salient cross-ethnic voting since 1961, before its PR reform. In Turkey, it could be argued
that the decrease in proportionality strengthened incentives for cross-ethnic voting because
an Alevi or Kurdish party would have to muster the entire minority vote to enter parliament.
Finally, Sri Lanka has seen more cross-ethnic voting between Sinhalese and Tamils under PR
(on the basis of party lists, not individual candidates). It is unclear whether PR had anything
to do with this, because most Indian Tamils, who furnish the bulk of cross-ethnic votes, were
disenfranchised before the electoral reform.
What is not hard to conclude is that even salient cross-ethnic voting has had very little
to do with actual conflict resolution. It is a known fact that ethnic conflicts often develop
intra-ethnic dimensions-this was evident in all cases.30 3 Cross-ethnic voting can be the
electoral manifestation of such an intra-ethnic rift that is not a path to a solution but just an
aspect of the ongoing conflict. The Tamil-Moor clash in Sri Lanka and the intra-Kurdish
violence in southeast Turkey during the respective insurgencies attest to this. In Sri Lanka,
the Tamil-speaking Muslims have long downplayed their Tamil identity and rallied with
Sinhalese political parties, while the Upcountry Tamils distanced themselves from Jaffna
Tamil separatism after the early 1970s. In Turkey, the Kurdish-Turkish and Alevi-Sunni
cleavages coexist with a larger religious vs. secular social division. The bonds between
Alevis and non-practicing Sunnis on one hand, and religious Sunni Turks and Sunni Kurds
on the other were forged already in the 1970s, and continue to this day. Undeniably, the
governing Islamic party has approached the Kurdish populace with a wider agenda for
minority policy reform which may soon turn Turkey into a peaceful success story. But this
has more to do with broader changes within Turkey society, the softening of anti-minority
attitudes, and the pervasive pressure from the EU. Until the mid-i 990s, mainstream Turkish
303 Rogers Brubacker and David D. Laitin, "Ethnic and Nationalist Violence," Annual Review of Sociology vol.




parties won the bulk of the Kurdish vote by promising economic patronage without making
any concessions on linguistic rights. One should not forget that the conflicts in Sri Lanka and
Turkey were ultimately decided by the force of arms, not by moderate parties making cross-
ethnic appeals; while Guyana and Northern Ireland, with much lower levels of cross-voting,
have experienced less ethnic violence overall.
Concluding Remarks
My personal inspiration for this research project dates to the summer of 2005, which I
spent working for the Elections Department of the OSCE mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
There I experienced first-hand the frustration of the international officials, who had literally
run the entire election process for ten years since the Dayton Accords, still finding
themselves in the unpleasant position of having to work with the same governing parties that
had waged the war (the Serbian SDS, the Croatian HDZ, and the Muslim SDA). Despite
occasional bureaucratic turf battles between OSCE and the omnipotent Office of the High
Representative (OHR), the two international watchdogs had collaboratively employed
various methods to weaken the nationalist parties: a PR electoral system that should help new
contenders, dismissals of individual elected politicians, the threat of financial audits, a one-
time unsuccessful experiment in using AV for the presidential election in the Serb federal
entity, and flagrant support for the ex-communist Social Democratic Party in the 2000
elections.3 4 When OSCE handed the reins over to an all-national Election Commission in
summer 2005, there was a pervasive feeling that the organization had served its official
mandate well but had not made striking progress in its unofficial feud with the nationalist
parties.30 5
In all its misfortune, Bosnia is relatively lucky as far as post-conflict societies go in
receiving so much direct international diplomatic attention and economic aid, along with a
304 Roland Paris and Timothy D. Sisk, The Dilemmas of State Building: Confronting the Contradictions of
Postwar Peace Operations (London and New York: Routledge, 2009), pp. 183-186.
30' For more background on Bosnia see Carrie Manning, Carrie and Miljenko Antic, "The Limits of Electoral
Engineering: Lessons from Bosnia and Herzegovina," Journal ofDemocracy vol. 14 no. 3 (July 2003): 45-59




host of initiatives regarding war crimes persecution, refugee return, and ethnic reconciliation.
The EU is so invested in Bosnia's future that it has no real deadline for withdrawal, only
dreams of accession. Among the cases included in this study, Northern Ireland also benefited
from the fortuitous circumstance of being located in Europe. Despite whatever role the
governments of Great Britain and Ireland had played in the past, by the mid-1980s they were
fundamentally more concerned about the general well-being of the local population and
mutual good relations than ultimate ownership of the territory. Moreover, they both belonged
to a supranational European community that made national borders increasingly less
relevant; and Britain's internationally acknowledged and domestically undisputed sovereign
right meant that if consensus in Belfast was lacking or had collapsed, London could always
be counted on to provide some democratic governance. Most conflict-torn societies are not
privileged with such a constellation of propitious factors. In other places, where the
commitment was weaker and the perceived time pressure stricter, the internationals strove to
make an impact in a shorter period with more limited resources. The pressure to build
legitimacy through a free election was strong, and the hopes placed on the results of this
election sometimes, unrealistically, enormous.
Perhaps nowhere else was this pressure more palpable than in Afghanistan and Iraq
after the US invasions. To avoid Bosnia's perceived mistake of conducting the poll too soon,
elections were in both cases postponed. Afghanistan, Asia's poorest and most illiterate
society, opted for the Single Non-Transferrable Vote (SNTV), a peculiar semi-proportional
system abandoned in Japan, where it had been used for decades to perpetuate one-party rule.
In theory, it is a system as simple as SMP, but with larger districts that can provide some
degree of proportionality. Critics have argued that in practice it is detrimental to party
formation, favoring personalistic politics and organized elites that can engage in shrewd vote
management. And yet, it is hard to see how the warlord-domineered Afghan society could
end up with any better a post-war legislature.306 In literate and much more developed Iraq,
PR was chosen, but the districts were changed between the two elections that took place in
2005. In January, the Iraqi Transitional Government was elected with one nationwide
3 Notably, the election of a significant number of women was guaranteed thanks to a quota. See Andrew
Reynolds, "The Curious Case of Afghanistan," Journal ofDemocracy vol. 17 no. 2 (April 2006): 104-117;
and "Afghanistan Considers Election System Change," IFES Feature Story, September 6 2007, URL:
http://www.ifes.org/features.html?tite=Afghanistan Considers Election System Change
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constituency, under the thinking that this would maximize proportionality. The result was a
parliament dominated by a massive Shia and a smaller Kurdish block, while Sunnis were
effectively unrepresented due to the extremely low turnout and fighting in western provinces.
Realizing the blunder, Iraq's eighteen governorates were chosen as electoral constituencies
for the December election. Sunni participation improved, but the mono-ethnic character of
cartel parties largely continued. Given Iraq's clustered demographics, it is unclear how a
different electoral formula could have produced any other result. 307
On one hand there is the hope that democracy in places like Iraq and Afghanistan will
survive and flourish, and that whatever pluralism the institutional designers hoped to achieve
will surface in the future; and on the other hand, the awareness that these will be long term
processes (decisively affected by the security situation), not the kind of immediate solutions
that could make matters easier for the internationals. While they may, in some cases, if
sustained, work in the desired direction in the long run, electoral reforms have repeatedly
failed to produce short-to-medium term ripple effects in the party system within a realistic
time frame for the intervenors-give or take a decade or three elections.
Even if they are sustained over several iterations, there is no guarantee that electoral
incentives will triumph eventually over countervailing considerations. Two main reasons for
this arise from the case studies presented here. The first is that ethnic outbidding often works
in critical junctures when moderation could have changed the course of events (in Ceylon in
the 1950s and 60s, Northern Ireland in the 1970s, Turkey in the early 1990s). If the expected
or actual loss of co-ethnic votes supersedes the gains from cross-ethnic votes, no electoral
formula that weighs these votes equally can save a moderate party of the majority group-the
one usually required to make concessions for an ethnic deal to work. The second reason is
that once established, and particularly when they rest on a slim demographic advantage,
governing majorities (like the Ulster Protestants before the Troubles) or pluralities (like the
Indo-Guyanese) are adept at ethnically policing their unity through fear tactics that inflate the
threat from a change in the status quo. On the contrary, ethnic minorities may be more prone
to fragmentation either under pressure from the majority or due to internal disputes over
307 See Aweed Dawisha and Larry Diamond, "Iraq's Year of Voting Dangerously," Journal ofDemocracy vol.
17 no. 2 (April 2006): 89-103 and Imad Salamey and Frederic Pearson, "The Crisis of Federalism and
Electoral Strategies in Iraq," International Studies Perspectives vol. 6 no. 2 (April 2005): 190-207.
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strategy when condemned to the role of eternal opposition (consider Turkey's Kurds and the
Sri Lankan Tamils for the former, the Northern Irish Catholics before the Troubles and the
Afro-Guyanese recently for the latter).
Electoral formulas are algorithms for translating social preferences into representative
constellations and, through them, into decision outcomes. Our theoretical interest in voting
rules in political science stems from the observation that the same social preference profile
could correspond to different decision outcomes under different electoral formulas. This
should not cause us to forget that some social preference profiles may produce the same
result under different electoral rules. In practice, electoral engineers in divided societies may
not wish to translate social preferences as they currently stand, but rather to alter them or to
distort them. The former is probably unfeasible by means of the electoral rule, and the latter
is probably unwise. As Orit Kedar has argued in her effort to explain why moderate voters
may at times support extremist parties, voters can anticipate the political outcomes of specific
institutional configurations and try to work around them.308 Therefore, electoral reforms
based on observations of current patterns of ethnic voting may ignore that voters will respond
to the reform and adjust their voting behavior to obtain the same preferred outcomes.
There is a growing realization in the field today that electoral institutions are not the
powerful tool once thought to be, and that the electoralist approach to ethnic conflict has
produced mixed results at best. 309 Given accumulating evidence to the contrary, perhaps the
real curiosity is not whether electoral engineering works, but why the view that it does still
persists. The answer, I believe, is as simple as it is embarrassing for our profession to
confess. Electoral systems were and continue to be one of the most studied subjects in
political science. While major electoral reforms in established democracies are rare, in the
post-Cold War era the third wave of democratization on one hand and the cascade of
international interventions on the other created a thriving market for applied electoral design
expertise. It was only natural that experts would take to the field either insight gained from
308 Orit Kedar, "When Moderate Voters Prefer Extreme Parties: Policy Balancing in Parliamentary Elections,"
American Political Science Review, vol. 99 no. 2 (May 2005): 185-199.
3 See Benjamin Reilly, "Post-war Elections: Uncertain Turning Points of Transition," in From War to
Democracy: Dilemmas of Peacebuilding, edited by Anna K. Jarstad and Timothy D. Sisk (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2008) and Robert G. Moser, "Electoral Engineering in New Democracies: Can
Preferred Electoral Outcomes be Engineered?" in Is Democracy Exportable? Edited by Zoltan Barany and




less problematic contexts or ideas developed theoretically but hardly tested in real life
situations. And while political scientists certainly cannot be accused of generating the
demand for this expertise, we also cannot deny that there were benefits in being asked to
provide it, and even, perhaps, an instinctive inclination to put faith in the potency of the
medicine one had built a career on prescribing. This happens in every profession, and there is
no basis for castigating what was generally well-intended scholarship. But after two decades
of toying with electoral engineering it is time for dogmatic views on the efficacy of this
approach to subside.
Should we then entirely give up on the idea of designing electoral rules or influencing
party systems in divided societies? Political necessity dictates otherwise: interventions in
such places will occur, elections will have to be conducted, and certain political forces will
be preferred over others. Still, we can benefit from some sobering realizations. The first is
that we still do not have a good grasp of the underpinnings of social preference formation, of
why different societies end up with different party systems, or why electoral formulas work
as expected in some societies but not others. More research is needed, and in the meantime,
more moderation about the state of our knowledge would be wise. Since optimal electoral
design eludes us, one suggestion would be to refocus our quest on at least avoiding disastrous
electoral design-a somewhat different, more limited agenda. The second realization is that
elections may be one of the most facile but not the most appropriate stage to intervene in the
political process. After all, they are but moments of reckoning, preceded by long incubations
and followed by intricate power play. If electoral engineering is a poor avenue, we should
pay more attention to other institutional and extra-institutional approaches including power-
sharing agreements, collective executives, veto rights, targeted financial incentives, and
grass-roots political party development. All these are in fact currently tried and even less well
understood. Compared to the vast literature on electoral design, that on power-sharing is only
now budding, and there is very little systematic work on the rest. Acknowledging that it is no
easy endeavor, we certainly cannot give up on the effort to rebuild conflict-ridden societies.




CODING PARTIES BY THEIR ETHNIC STRUCTURE
A codification of ethnic structure for current and historical political parties in each of
the four case studies was provided at the end of each empirical chapter (pp. 81, 112, 146, and
181). The typology of parties presented in the theory chapter with four ideal types (hegemon,
magnet, agonist, and antagonist) in practice requires defining thresholds for congregation and
pluralism: How much of an ethnic group's vote must a party capture to be a hegemon and not
simply an agonist? How much of a second ethnic group's vote must a party capture to be a
magnet and not just a hegemon? Similarly, how much of a second group's vote must a party
capture to be considered an antagonist and not an agonist? The reader may have noticed that
my typology basically differs from Horowitz's in that I omitted the 'non-ethnic' category and
instead created two variants for mono-ethnic (hegemon and agonist) and multi-ethnic parties
(magnet and antagonist) based on the concept of congregation. I did this because of the need
to focus on actual electoral performance, but also out of a belief that, ultimately, there is no
such thing as a non-ethnic party in ethnically divided societies. Every political party in these
societies has to have and indeed does have some stated position on the ethnic question, which
either appeals to only one or to multiple communities. And if a segment of the population
strongly and consistently self-identifies as 'others' under conditions of high polarization, then
what we have essentially is another ethnic group.
The typology stemmed from my empirical understanding of politics in a number of
multiethnic societies. If parties fell along a perfect continuum of ethnic support, then the four
types would not make a lot of sense, and exact measurements of congregation and pluralism
would be needed instead. However, in practice the ethnic support profiles of political parties
tend to be quite discrete. Several parties in divided societies are entirely mono-ethnic and
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compete with other like-minded parties only for their own ethnic group's votes; these are the
agonists, the easiest type to identify-from the party's name, platform, the backgrounds of its
candidates, or its regional basis of support. The agonist then is the fundamental party type
from which other types are differentiated, either by a higher level of congregation (hegemon)
or pluralism (antagonist) or both (magnet).
Setting rule-of-thumb thresholds for party categorization is an exercise in calibration,
which entails a dialogue between concepts and empirics. At the empirical level, knowing my
cases, I know that some parties enjoyed cross-ethnic appeal while others did not, that some
parties monopolized their ethnic group's political expression in certain periods while others
did not. Since I developed my theoretical insights from my case studies, I should calibrate
my concepts to fit this empirical material-and, in the future, test whether this calibration is
appropriate for the larger universe of divided societies. Conceptually, on the other hand, the
thresholds should satisfy the intuitive logic behind the typology: hegemons and magnets are
parties that face very little to no credible competition for the votes of one specific group;
magnets and antagonists are parties with support bases in more than one group, each sizeable
enough to make them unmistakably multiethnic. Finally, the nature of my data dictated some
technical limitations. Lacking information on the ethnic composition of very small units of
aggregation (e.g. polling divisions) or even electoral results at such levels, it was not possible
to apply sophisticated ecological inference methods to arrive at quantitative estimates of each
party's ethnic support. My calibration would thus inevitably have to be qualitative, but using
the same logic as ecological inference: looking at the electoral performance on parties first in
ethnically homogenous areas, and then making educated guesses about mixed areas.
The easiest party type to identify was agonists: parties with clear mono-ethnic profiles
that obtained only a fraction of the vote of the group they appealed to even in elections with
high turnout. There is no doubt that parties like the Upcountry People's Front, the Guyana
United Muslim Party, Sinn F6in, or the Turkey Unity Party (whose official emblem was the
lion, a Safavid symbol of Ali, circled by twelve stars representing the twelve imams of Shia
Islam) belong to this category. For the other party types, a proper calibration method should
identify a common minimum level of congregation between ideal hegemons and magnets,
and a common minimum level of pluralism between ideal magnets and antagonists. Some
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parties from the case studies fit the ideal profiles so well (at least in some historical periods)
that I considered them appropriate to serve as prototypes. I list them here indicatively.
Hegemons Magnets Antagonists
UUP (1920s) UNP/UNF (Indian Tamils) ANAP
CIC (1940s) SHP/CHP (Alevis) DYP
TULF (1970s) PPP/Civic (Indo-Guyanese) PA
TNA (2000s) PNC/Reform (Afro-Guyanese) AFC
From such a cursory cross-case comparison, three quarters of an ethnic group's vote
appeared as an appropriate common minimum level of congregation between ideal hegemons
and magnets. I could not exclude the possibility that a few Tamils in the east voted for UNP
and not TULF in 1977 or that some Alevis did not vote for SHP; I was certain that some
Protestants voted for NILP and independent unionists instead of UUP in 1925 and that Indian
Tamils voted for Marxist parties in areas where they constituted a minority and CIC did not
run candidates in 1947. Still, given overall vote shares and turnout rates, I could safely claim
that the parties in the first two columns commanded the vote of at least three quarters of their
key ethnic constituency. Similarly, for the last two columns, one tenth of the vote of at least
two ethnic groups appeared as a satisfactory minimum level of pluralism for magnets and
antagonists. By looking at district-level electoral results it was easy to surmise that a party
obtained a fraction of a minority's vote (Kurds for ANAP and DYP, Amerindians for PPP
and PNC, Sri Lankan Muslims for PA) that did not fall below one tenth. At the same time,
the performance of these parties outside minority regions indicated that they also obtained at
least one tenth-or much more-of a larger group's vote (Sunni Turks for ANAP, DYP, and
SHP, Sinhalese for UNP and PA, Indo-Guyanese for PPP, Afro-Guyanese for PNC).m'
310 Other possible higher or lower thresholds would miscode one or more parties. A higher requirement of two-
fifths or one-quarter of an ethnic group's vote for pluralism would make the Turkish parties and the Sri Lankan
leftist PA seem not multiethnic enough; on the other hand, any threshold less than one tenth of the minority vote
would set the bar very low and also be difficult to assess based on the data-for example, it would make it
difficult to exclude parties like the ultra-nationalist MHP, whose votes in southeastern Turkey are widely
believed to come mostly from Turkish public servants and soldiers stationed there, not the Kurdish inhabitants.
Similarly, a lower threshold of congregation, e.g. two-thirds, would force me to code more parties as hegemonic
even when they faced fierce intra-ethnic competition (e.g. ITAK, UUP, and NP in the 1960s), while a threshold
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Hegemons and magnets are by their nature large parties relative to their bastions of
ethnic support; therefore defining thresholds with reference to the electorate (three quarters of
an ethnic group's voters, and for magnets an additional one tenth of another group's voters)
was sufficient. For antagonists, however, this criterion would be problematic for small parties
with demonstrably cross-ethnic but weak overall support. To address this, I had to modify the
minimum threshold with a reciprocal reference to the party's voter base, so that a party was
deemed to be ethnically plural if it commanded at least one tenth of the vote of more than one
ethnic group or if at least one tenth of its own voter base came from more than one ethnic
group. This conjunction allowed me to code small cross-communal parties (like APNI and
NIWC in Northern Ireland, the Communists in Ceylon, and WPA in Guyana) as antagonists,
and to maintain the same codification for parties that retained their diverse sources of ethnic
support even as their electoral fortunes waned, like ANAP and DYP in Turkey.
Therefore, parties that met only the pluralism criterion were coded as antagonists and
those that met only the congregation criterion were coded as hegemons; parties that met both
were deemed magnets, and those that met neither were deemed agonists. Using these criteria,
I was able to codify all parties that obtained at least one percent of the total vote (and several
parties that obtained even less) with confidence for most of their history. However, I knew
from the historical record and I could corroborate from the electoral results that the ethnic
support of some parties had shifted at certain times. In some cases this transition was clearly
marked by a pivotal election; in other cases it was more gradual and required a judgment call
on my part. I am including here a list of these transitions, separated into those I could identify
with greater confidence and those where I made a more subjective decision based on rough
estimates and my general knowledge of the period.
Coded with Confidence
UUP Hegemon -+ Agonist 1929
Agonist -+ Hegemon 1949
Hegemon -+ Agonist 1953
above three quarters would set the bar too high and exclude cases like UUP in the 1920s (which faced electoral
competition for the Protestant vote only in Belfast).
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NP Agonist -> Hegemon 1925
Hegemon -+ Agonist 1933
Agonist -> Hegemon 1949
Hegemon --+ Agonist 1953
YTP Antagonist -+ Agonist 1965
CHP Antagonist -+ Magnet 1973
Magnet -+ Antagonist 1995
Antagonist -+ Magnet 2002
ACTC Hegemon -+ Agonist 1952
ITAK Agonist -+ Antagonist 1956
UNP Magnet -+ Antagonist 1952
Antagonist -- Magnet 1989
Magnet -+ Antagonist 2000
Antagonist -+ Magnet 2001
SLFP Agonist -+ Antagonist 1952
PA Agonist -+ Antagonist 2000
CWC Hegemon -+ Agonist 1994
All these cases involved a marked shift in electoral support clearly visible in election
results and corroborated by secondary sources. The party's appeal to an ethnic group either
critically contracted (hegemon -> agonist, antagonist -- agonist, magnet -+ antagonist) or
critically expanded (agonist -+ hegemon, antagonist -+ magnet, agonist -+ antagonist). Some
of these shifts were only temporary, while others had long-lasting effects.
Coded with Ambivalence
NILP Antagonist 1938, 1949
PPP Magnet -+ Hegemon 1961
PNC Antagonist -+ Magnet 1961
CP Antagonist -+ Agonist 1965




These cases revolved around three particular historical situations: NILP's declining
support among Catholics during the Spanish Civil War and after the Northern Ireland Act;
the outbreak of race riots in Guyana; and the alignment of the far left in Ceylon with SLFP.
In the first case, the question is whether NILP was at times reduced to a Protestant party in
the electoral arena and should therefore be coded as an agonist instead. Being unable to judge
if NILP received less than a tenth of its votes from Catholics, I decided to keep the party's
categorization as an antagonist, in recognition of the fact that its membership remained bi-
communal and that NILP continued to court the Catholic vote. Since NILP performed poorly
in both elections (5.7% and 7.1% of the vote respectively) a different coding would affect my
estimate of cross-sectarian voting in those two years only slightly downwards. In Guyana,
PPP split into a predominantly Indian and a predominantly African faction in 1955 but both
,parties still put up candidates belonging to the other ethnic group in 1957. Research by
Donald Horowitz and Ralph Premdas indicates that electoral support for PPP and PNC had
bifurcated along racial lines by the early 1960s. I therefore set the 1961 election as the point
of transition, recognizing that at least PPP, which continued to feature Africans in prominent
positions within the party, perhaps maintained some support among black voters until 1964.
In Ceylon, CP's and LSSP's alignment with SLFP was gradual, starting with an electoral no-
contest pact in 1960 and culminating in the formation of the United Front in 1968. It is clear
that after 1960 support for the left dropped in the overwhelmingly Tamil north-and LSSP
and CP received fewer than a tenth of their votes from Northern Province. However, I have
no way of guessing how many Tamils voted for Marxist candidates in the Colombo area. I
decided to consider the year 1964 (when LSSP joined the SLFP cabinet and prominent Tamil
trade unionist N. Sanmugathasan left the Communist Party) as the point of transition, coding
LSSP and CP as Sinhalese parties from the 1965 election on.
In short, my approach to the coding process was to look at the electoral record first,
and only if that was ambiguous to consider other aspects of the party's profile such as the
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C. N. Sharma, leader of Justice for All Party and owner of CNS Channel 6 station,
Georgetown, CNS TV 6 building, 11/9/2008
Dr. Sherwood Lowe, University of Guyana Dean of Technology, ex-PNC parliamentarian
and election campaign manager, Plaisance, 15/9/2008
Khemraj Ramjattan, AFC leader and ex-PPP central committee member, Georgetown,
16/9/2008
Manzoor Nadir, Minister of Labour and TUF leader, Stabroek, Georgetown, 18/9/2008
Raphael Trotman, AFC leader and ex-PNC parliamentarian, Georgetown, 18/9/2008
Aubrey Norton, PNC spokesperson and region 4 parliamentarian, Plaisance, 22/9/08
Prof. Clive Thomas, WPA co-leader and former parliamentarian, Stabroek, Georgetown,
22/9/08
Donald Ramotar, PPP general secretary, Freedom House, Georgetown, 25/9/2008
Dr. Steve Surujbally, Guyana Elections Commission (GECOM) Chairman, GECOM,
Georgetown, 24/9/2008
Henry, 66, Roman Catholic security guard of mixed African and Indian descent, East Bank
Demerara, 24/9/2008
Haslyn Paris, former PNC deputy prime minister, member of constitutional review
commission and election commission, Pisces Bar, Buxton, 25/9/2008
Raule, 35, Afro-Guyanese taxi driver, Georgetown, 25/9/2008
Trevor Benn, Electoral Support Program Analyst, UNDP, Georgetown, 26/9/2008
Moen McDoom, barrister and member of election commission, Georgetown, 26/9/2008
N. K. Gopaul, Permanent Secretary and Head of Public Service, former trade unionist
(NAACIE) and leader of Civic Guard, Office of the President, Georgetown, 29/9/08
Samuel Hinds, Prime Minister of the Republic of Guyana and former member of WPA,
Office of the Prime Minister, Georgetown, 2/10/2008
Freddie Kissoon, lecturer at University of Guyana and former member of WPA, Garden City
Cafe, Georgetown, 3/10/2008
Elvin McDavid, former PNC Minister of Information, advisor to Forbes Burnham, and
Guyanese ambassador to Moscow, Queenstown, Georgetown, 3/10/2008
Vincent Alexander, member of GECOM and former PNC vice-chairman, University of
Guyana, Plaisance, 9/10/2008
Aubrey Collins, former member of TUF executive committee and editor of the party
newspaper The Sun, Meadowbrook Gardens, Georgetown, 9/10/08
Adam Harris, chief editor of Kaieteur News and former PNC central committee member,
Georgetown, 13/10/2008
Fazeel Farouz, President of Central Islamic Organization of Guyana, Twin's Pharmacy,
Georgetown, 15/10/2008
Carolyn Rodrigues-Birkett, Minister of Foreign Affairs, MFA, Georgetown, 17/10/2008
Norris Witter, Guyana Trades Union Congress (GTUC) general secretary, Critchlow Labour
College, Georgetown, 18/10/2008
Roy, 20, Amerindian tour guide from region 8, Kaieteur Falls, 19/10/2008
Pandit Reepu Daman Persaud, President of Guyana Hindu Dharmic Sabha and former PPP
Minister of Agriculture, Office of the President, Georgetown 22/10/2008
Ashton Chase, founding member of PPP and Minister of Labour in 1953 cabinet,
Georgetown, 22/10/2008
Winston, 55, Afro-Guyanese former policeman, West Coast Demerara, 22/10/2008
Robert Corbin, PNC/R leader and former Deputy Prime Minister of Guyana, Congress Place,
Sophia, Georgetown, 23/10/2008
Yesu Persaud, chairman of Demerara Distillers Ltd and the Private Sector Commission of
Guyana, Kingston, Georgetown, 24/10/2008
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Dr. Rupert Roopnaraine, WPA co-leader, former parliamentarian and member of the
Constitutional Reform Commission, Tranquility Hall, Mahaica, 25/10/2008
Bishop Juan Edgehill, chairman of Ethnic Relations Commission and former chairman of the
Guyana Council of Churches, ERC, Queenstown, Georgetown, 27/10/2008
Majid, 37, Muslim Indo-Guyanese lawyer, East Coast Demerara, 28/10/2008
Ron, 33, Amerindian from region 6, former Guayanese army officer, East Bank Demerara,
29/10/2008
Cara, 55, Christian Indo-Guayanese and Narin, 32, Hindu Indo-Guyanese, private employees,
Georgetown, Guyana, 30/10/2008
Ravi, 26, Hindu Indo-Guyanese entrepreneur, East Bank Demerara, 31/10/2008
Dr Daniel Kumar, lecturer in government and international affairs, University of Guyana,
Georgetown, 1/11/2008
Leroy, 29, Hindu Indo-Guyanese businessman, East Bank Demerara, 1/11/2008
Eddie, 48, salesman of mixed Indian, Chinese, and Amerindian descent, Georgetown,
1/11/2008
Eric Phillips, executive member of the steering committee, African Cultural Development
Association (ACDA), East Bank Demerara, 2/11/2008
Moses Nagamootoo, PPP parliamentarian, novelist, and former Minister of Information,
Georgetown, 3/11/2008
Sam, 54, Afro-Guyanese mechanical engineer, Georgetown, 3/11/2008
Lloy, 21, Afro-Guyanese entrepreneur, East Bank Demerara, 4/11/2008
Rolf Olson, Political Affairs Officer, US Embassy in Guyana, Cara Lodge, Georgetown,
4/11/2008
Jason Jonathan, 28, Guyana Defence Forces officer and student leader at the University of
Guayana, Georgetown, 4/11/2008
Interviews in Ireland
Dr. Sidney Elliot, QUB School of Politics, Belfast, 25/4/2008
247-
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Helen Lewis, Policy and Practice Coordinator, INCORE (International Conflict Research),
University of Ulster Magee campus, Derry, 14/5/2008
Dr. Myrtle Hill, QUB School of Sociology, Belfast 7/5/2008
David, 38, Protestant public service employee, Belfast, 1/4/2008
Michael, 21, Protestant senior college student in sociology, Bangor, 26/5/2008
Peter, 53, Protestant taxi driver, Belfast, 27/5/2008
David Ford, Alliance Party leader and member of NI legislative assembly (South Anrim),
Stormont, 28/5/2008
Anna Lo, member of NI legislative assembly (APNI-South Belfast), Stormont, 28/5/2008
Peter Emerson, political activist and founder of De Borda Institute, Belfast, 2/6/2008
Dawn Purvis, leader of PUP and member of NI legislative assembly (East Belfast), Stormont,
2/6/2008
John Smyth, 56, Protestant, victim of UDA assault, Belfast, 3/6/2008
Oliver Napier, former APNI leader and Legal Minister, Holywood, 3/6/2008
Prof. Paul Arthur, University of Ulster School of History and International Affairs, former
member of People's Democracy, Bangor, 9/6/2008
Hugh Smyth, Belfast City Councillor and former PUP leader, Belfast 9/6/2008
Michael, 54, Catholic tour guide, Belfast, 10/6/2008
Noeleen Diver, former staff member of Northern Ireland Housing Executive and member of
New Ireland Group, Stormont Hotel, Belfast, 10/6/2008
Seamus, 24, Catholic fast food chain manager from South Armagh, Belfast, 11/6/2008
Mark Devenport, BBC correspondent for Northern Ireland, Broadcasting House, Belfast,
12/6/2008
Baron Paul Bew, member of the House of Lords and Professor of Irish Politics at Queen's
University Belfast, QUB, Belfast, 24/6/2008
Noel, 46, Protestant taxi driver from Ballynahinch, Belfast, 25/6/2008
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Brian Wilson, first Green Party MLA (North Down) and former member of NILP and APNI,
Stormont, 25/6/2008
Steven Agnew, Brian Wilson's assistant and member of Green Party, Belfast, 25/6/2008
Drew Nelson, grand secretary, Grand Orange Lodge of Ireland, East Belfast, 26/6/2008
Reverend Martin Smyth, former Grand Master of the Orange Lodge and Unionist MP,
former deputy leader of Vanguard, Belfast, 30/6/2008
Lord John Alderdice, former Alliance Party leader and Northern Ireland Assembly Speaker,
Knockbracken Healthcare Centre, Castlereagh, 30/6/2008
Maria Duggan, 34, Catholic NGO worker, Ormeau Road, Belfast, 30/6/2008
Bronagh Hinds, former electoral strategist for NIWC and senior fellow at QUB Institute of
Governance, Belfast, 1/7/2008
Jimmy Spratt, member of NI legislative assembly (DUP-South Belfast) and chair of the
Assembly and Executive Review Committee, Craigagh Road, Belfast, 7/7/2008
Austin Currie, former Nationalist Party MP and founding member of SDLP, Glenroyal Hotel,
Maynooth, 8/7/2008
Jim Gibney, member of Sinn Fein executive committee and ex-prisoner, Falls Road, Belfast,
10/7/2008
Douglas Bain, Chief Electoral Officer for Northern Ireland, St Anne's House, Belfast,
10/7/2008
Sean Brennan, member of INTERCOM (inter-communal dialogue NGO), Belfast Center,
17/7/2008
Stevie, 44, Catholic from mixed background, clinical psychologist, Family Trauma Centre,
South Belfast, 18/7/2008
Collin, 40, Catholic from mixed marriage, shop owner, Ormeau Road, Belfast, 19/7/2008
Richard Bullick, advisor to DUP leader and First Minister Peter Robinson, Stormont Castle
at Stormont Estate, Belfast, 22/7/2008
Alex Maskey, member of legislative assembly (Sinn Fein-South Belfast) and former Lord
Mayor of Belfast, Ormeau Road, 25/7/2008
Carmel Hanna, MLA (SDLP-South Belfast), first woman minister in NI, and her husband
Eamon Hanna, former SDLP general secretary, Lisburn Road, Belfast, 28/7/2008
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Chris MacCabe, former NIO political director, Queen's University Belfast, 29/7/2008
Sir Reg Empey, UUP leader, former chairman of Vanguard and deputy leader of UUUP,
Department of Employment and Learning, Belfast, 29/7/2008
Interviews in Greece
Hasan and Ali, Kurdish refugees from Diyarbakir, Triandria, Thessalonica, 29/7/2007
Orhan, editor of the journal 0 Agonas [The Struggle], Exarchia, Athens, 23/8/2007
Panayotis Bouras, Director, Red Cross Refugee Center, Lavrio, Attica, 24/8/2007
Salahattin, spokesperson of Kurdish refugees from Turkey, Lavrio, Attica, 24/8/2007
Members of Kurdistan Mutual Aid Center, Exarchia, Athens, 27/8/2007
Ali, Zaza Alevi author and refugee from Turkey, Omonoia, Athens, 28/9/2007
Interviews in Turkey
Murat Kogak, Youth Branch Director and Assistant to the President, Demokrat Parti, Balgat,
Ankara, 7/11/2007
Mehmet, 32, airline manager, Alevi from Sivas, Bostanci, Istanbul, 12/11/2007.
Prof. Ali (arkoglu, professor of political science at Sabanci University, Hilton Hotel,
Istanbul, 13/11/2007
Prof. Sabri Sayari, professor of political science at Sabanci University, Sagkinbakkal,
Istanbul, 14/11/2007
Firat, 26, Sunni hotel manager from Yozgat, Bilkent Center, Ankara, 24/11/2007
Dr. Dogan Tilig, EFE correspondent, member of ODP and ex-member of Dev Yol, Emek,
Ankara, 26/11/2007
Prof. Zafer Uskil1, AKP parliamentarian (Mersin) and chairman of the human rights
parliamentary committee, TBBM, Ankara, 27/11/2007
Abdulrahman Kurt, AKP parliamentarian (Diyarbakir), TBBM, Ankara, 28/11/2007
Ufuk Uras, independent parliamentarian (ODP - Istanbul), TBMM, Ankara, 4/12/2007
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Naci Kutlay, retired doctor, former TIP member of Kurdish background and advisor to the
DTP, Kizilay, Ankara, 4/12/2007
Emre, 21, university student of Circassian background, Kizilay, Ankara, 10/12/2007
Unnamed US embassy official, Tunali, Ankara, 12/12/2007
Prof. Yakup Kepenek, former CHP parliamentarian and professor of economics emeritus, of
Hemshin background, METU, Ankara, 13/12/2007
Mustafa Timisi, member of CHP, former BP leader and BP and SHP parliamentarian,
Bayindir Hastanesi, Ankara, 8/1/2008
Prof. Feride Agar, daughter of Raif Aybar, DP, HP, and YTP politician from Bursa, METU,
Ankara, 9/1/2008
Prof. Korel G6ymen, professor of political science and former member of the SHP steering
committee, Sabanci University, Istanbul, 10/1/2008
Evren, 25, physical therapist of Alevi background from Sivas, Sigli, Istanbul, 11/1/2008
Dr. Cemal Sener and ibrahim Dede, Karaca Ahmet Sultan Cemevi, Oskudar Istanbul,
13/1/2008
Fuat, 27, filmmaker, Kurdish Alevi from Erzincan, Taksim, Istanbul, 13/1/2008
Sevgi and Canan, 28 and 31, sisters of Alevi Kurdish background, Dikmen, Ankara,
20/1/2008
Kemal Avci, DTP press officer, DTP headquarters, Balgat, Ankara, 22/1/2008
Mesut Deger, member of CHP central committee and former parliamentarian (CHP-
Diyarbakir), CHP headquarters, Ankara, 23/1/2008
Zevki, 40, security guard, Sunni Kurd from Batman, Diyarbakir, 24/1/2008
Hilmi Aydoglu, DTP Diyarbakir province chairman, Diyarbakir, 25/1/2008
Muzafer Deger, brother of Mesut Deger, CHP Diyarbakir province chairman, Diyarbakir,
25/1/2008
Celal, 27, human rights activist of Kurdish background, Diyarbakir, 25/1/2008
Abdurrahim Hattapoglu, AKP Diyarbakir province chairman, Diyarbakir, 26/1/2008
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Ahmet Ocal, MUSIAD Diyarbakir province chairman, Diyarbakir, 27/1/2008
Prof. Fazil Htisnii Erdem, professor of constitutional law, member of the constitution drafting
committee, Dicle University, Diyarbakir, 28/1/2008
Baran, 25, medical school student, Ofis, Diyarbakir, 28/1/2008
Abdullah, 27, carpet dealer, Diyarbakir, 29/1/2008
Salih Altun, former DTP chairman of Batman province, Batman, 29/1/2008
Reyhan Yalindag-Baydemir, lawyer, vice-president of Insan Haklari Dernegi and wife of
mayor Osman Baydemir, Diyarbakir, 31/1/2008
Hilmi Onci and Cemal Vesko, DTP current and ex-chairman in Mardin province, Mardin,
1/2/2008
Yasemin, 30, member of DTP with relatives who have fled abroad, Diyarbakir, 2/2/2008
Sami and Unzile, married couple, doctors, Ytiztinci Yil, Ankara, 5/2/2008
Diego Mellado, Deputy Head of Mission of European Commission in Turkey,
Gaziosmanpaga, Ankara, 6/2/2008
Ercan Ge9mez, chairman, and other members of Haci Bektag Veli Foundation, Dikmen,
Ankara, 6/2/2008
Dogan Bermek, president of the Federation of Alevi Associations, Cem Foundation,
Yenibosna, Istanbul, 7/2/2008
Interviews in Sri Lanka
Dr. Vijaya Samaraweera, Sinhalese NGO consultant, ICES, Colombo, 12/1/2009
Marian, 52, and Padmini, 47, inter-ethnic Christian couple, Ruckmalgama, 18/1/2009
Koenraad, 38, Burgher businessman, Cinnamon Gardens, Colombo, 12/2/2009
Rrof. Jayadeve Uyangoda, Political Science Department Chair, University of Colombo,
19/2/2009
Sriyantha, 25, Sinhalese construction manager, Bambalapitiya, Colombo, 21/2/2009
Kingsley Rodrigo, Chairman, People's Action for Free and Fair Elections (PAFFREL),
Kirulapone, Colombo, 24/2/2009
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lanthi, 48, Sinhalese speech therapist, Kollupitiya, Colombo, 24/2/2009
Niamh O'Connor, Senior Country Director, National Democratic Institute, Colombo,
26/2/2009
K. A. P. Siddhisena, Professor of Demography, University of Colombo, 26/2/2009
W. N. Wilson, Head of Department of Geography, University of Colombo, 27/2/2009
Reshan, 34, Sinhalese electrical engineer, Borella, Colombo, 28/2/2009
Champika Ranawaka, JHU parliamentarian and Minister of Environment, Ministry of
Environment, Sri Jayawardenapura, 2/3/2009
Susil Premajayantha, UPFA general secretary and Minister of Education, Ministry of
Education, Sri Jayawardenapura, 2/3/2009
Sunil Bastian, senior research fellow and former director, International Centre for Ethnic
Studies (ICES), Colombo, 3/3/2009
Dr. Mahinda Gunasekara, National Movement Against Terrorism, Nugegoda, 4/3/2009
Dr. Paikiasothy Saravanamuttu, Executive Director, Centre for Monitoring Election Violence
(CMEV), Centre for Policy Alternatives, Colombo, 4/3/2009
Prof. Lakshman Marasinghe, Professor of Law Emeritus and Attorney-at-Law at Sri Lanka's
Supreme Court, Colombo, 4/3/2009
Dinesh Gunawardena, Minister of Urban Development, MEP leader and son of party founder
Philip Gunawardena, chair of parliamentary electoral reforms committee, Sri
Jayawardenapura, 6/3/2009
Gamunu, 39, Sinhalese tour guide, Colombo, 8/3/2009
Mahesh Senanayake, Lecturer in Political Science, University of Colombo, 9/3/2009
Vasana Jayakody, Senior Statistician, Department of Census and Statistics, Colombo,
9/3/2009
Ranil Wickremesinghe, UNP leader and former prime minister, Cinnamon Gardens,
Colombo, 9/3/2009
Prof. K. Sivathamby, Professor of Tamil Emeritus at University of Jaffna and former member
of the Communist Party of Sri Lanka, Wellawatte, Colombo, 11/3/2009
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Sunil, 42, Sinhalese international organization staff member, Colombo, 11/3/2009
Mohammed, 52, Muslim administrative assistant, Colombo, 11/3/2009
D. E. W. Gunasekara, CP general secretary and Minister of Constitutional Affairs,
Kollupitiya, Colombo, 14/3/2009
P. M. Siriwardana, Election Commissioner, Elections Secretariat, Rajapiriya, 15/3/2009
Saman, 54, Sinhalese security guard, Kollupitiya, Colombo, 15/3/2009
Jeevan Thiagaraja, Executive Director, Consortium of Humanitarian Agencies (CHA),
Cinnamon Gardens, Colombo, 16/3/2009
Nallathamby Sri Kantha, member of TELO, TNA parliamentarian from Jaffna and party
spokesperson, ICES, Colombo, 16/3/2009
Prof. Tissa Vitarana, Minister of Science and Technology, LSSP parliamentarian, nephew of
party founder N. M. Perera, chair of constitutional reforms committee, Kollupitiya, Colombo,
18/3/2009
Rajah, 64, Tamil librarian from Jaffna, Colombo, 18/3/2009
Mano Ganeshan, Indian Tamil UNF parliamentarian from Colombo and leader of
Democratic People's Front, Pamankada, Colombo, 18/3/2009
Kamalakkanan, 36, repatriated Tamil journalist, son of refugees from Jaffna who fled to the
UK, Colombo, 18/3/2009
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